THE JOURNAL OF CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES

Volume: 26/27 2019/2020 ISSN: 0975-086X

Centre of Central Asian Studies
University of Kashmir
Srinagar, J&K, India

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The Journal is peer reviewed, refereed and indexed in EBSCOhost and ProQuest. The Journal is also available online through EBSCOhost Database: Political Science Complete on web.ebscohost.com; and on the University of Kashmir web page http://ccas.uok.edu.in.

Scope of the Journal: The Journal welcomes original papers on all aspects of Central Asia, preferably, contemporary problems and emerging regional issues.

Price: Rs. 1000 / $ 25

Design
Discover Srinagar

Published by
Centre of Central Asian Studies
University of Kashmir
2020

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On the Road to Insurrection:
The Soviet Nationalities Problem, the Kazakhs, and Zheltoksan in Kazakhstan

*Michael G. Stefany**

Abstract

This article places the first instance of ethnic unrest in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev, the 17-20 December 1986 Alma-Ata events, in historical perspective by examining the Soviet nationalities (national minorities) problem and 300 years of previous Russo-Kazakh interaction in Central Asia. Besides, utilizing both archival sources and interviews, the author specifically shows why Mikhail Gorbachev's 16 December replacement of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK), Dinmukhamed Kunaev, with the Russian Gennadi Kolbin was viewed as a political and ethnic challenge by many young Kazakhs—who showed up the next day on Brezhnev (Republic) Square in Alma-Ata (Almaty) to protest the decision. After years of Soviet repressive measures such as Stalinist collectivization and purges, Khrushchev's Virgin Lands program, and the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Polygon, and the destruction of the Aral Sea, the Kazakhs constituted a minority population in their republic. During Leonid Brezhnev's and Kunaev's rule, however, Kazakhs began to gain ground in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR) both demographically and politically—a fact which the author documents with Soviet census data and ground-breaking archival data relating to the ethnic composition of the CPK—but Brezhnev's death in 1982 and the rise of Yuri Andropov and Gorbachev marked the beginning of an attack on the Kunaev political machine, culminating in the appointment of Kolbin. When tens of thousands of young Kazakhs subsequently took to the streets of Alma-Ata, then, the author concludes that it not only marked the beginning of an independent Kazakhstan—but also the beginning of the end for of the Soviet Union five years later—as Kazakhs were first to exercise their right to have an independent say in the governing of their republic.

Keywords

Alma-Ata, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, Kazakhs, Kazakhstan, Kolbin, *Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic*, Kunaev, Nationalism / Nationalities, Perestroika, Russians, Soviet Central Asia, Zheltoksan

Introduction

When the Soviet flag was lowered for the last time in December 1991 the world not only witnessed the ignominious end of the last great European empire, but also the failure of the ideology of Soviet Communism. This momentous event was not an overnight occurrence, however, but came as the culmination of decades of Russian and Soviet injustices, Brezhnev-era cynicism and stagnation, and Gorbachev-era ethnic and

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political unrest in the Union republics—especially those located in the Soviet South and Baltic regions. Thus, the seemingly monolithic edifice of the USSR did not fall from without but imploded from within as its constituent republics, one-by-one, decided to brave the uncharted waters of national independence. Though the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR) was the last Soviet republic to officially declare independence, the 17-20 December 1986 Alma-Ata demonstrations (also known as *Zheltoksan/Jeltoqsan*, or "December") predated Gorbachev-era outbursts in other parts of the Union. Thus, when thousands of young Kazakh students and workers demonstrated in the streets of their capital, the Gorbachev regime was shaken to its foundations as Kazakhs articulated their grievances in a public forum. The Alma-Ata demonstrations were caused by the Soviet nationalities' problem, ethnic grievances arising by a centuries-long process of Russo-Kazakh interaction which included Stalinist depredations and the Virgin Lands, and pro-Kazakh policies on the part of Leonid Brezhnev and his ally Dinmukhamed Kunaev which the Andropov and Gorbachev regimes seemed intent on reversing. Indeed, the protests also marked the inauguration of a five-year period of spiraling unrest that signaled the failure of Soviet nationalities policy and Gorbachev's attempt to revitalize the Union under *glasnost* and *perestroika*. This article will examine historical, demographic, and political factors leading up to Zheltoksan, and will situate the occurrence of the December protests within the wider expanse of Russo-Kazakh relations and the decline of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Nationalities Problem

The Soviet nationalities (national minorities) dilemma was arguably the main factor that contributed to the collapse of the USSR in December 1991.[1] The roots of the nationalities problem extend back to the years directly following the First World War. At this time, Lenin and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) reached a strategic compromise with several of the Union's larger nationality groups, bestowing a semblance of political legitimacy upon them by creating national republics in a Soviet federal system.[2] Though Lenin hoped to eventually replace the federal system with a French-style centralized government, he had no intentions of forcing the cultural assimilation of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union (Rywkin 1990:142).[3] Stalin, however, had different plans for dealing with the Soviet nationalities. During the 1930s and 1940s the emergence of the New Soviet Man (*sovetskiychelovek*), who was to be politically Marxist, but culturally and linguistically Russified, was stressed. In 1938 Russian was made compulsory in Soviet schools (Duncan 1990: 152-54). To ensure the success of his political program, Stalin tapped into Russian nationalism, which, according to Hugh Seton-Watson, at the time constituted "the only effective means available to the Russian politicians of the Right to mobilize popular support" (Seton-Watson 1977: 187). Thus, the Soviet republics were bound to Russia, all ethnic claims and disputes were labeled as manifestations of "anti-Soviet feeling", and the Soviet government attempted to draw interior borders in such a way as to divide-and-conquer subject nationalities (Duncan 1990: 158-59).[4]

Unfortunately for Moscow, however, the very structure of the Soviet federalized system had already provided a strong outlet for nationalistic expression. Besides, the "mobilizational aspect" inherent in the Soviet system, which emphasized education,

urbanization, and institution building, also helped to foster ethnic cohesion (Gleason 1990: 20). Thus, Stalin's heavy-handed attempt to Russify the non-Slavic Soviet population under the guise of socialism, while seemingly effective, created an elementary socio-political dichotomy, or contradiction, in Soviet society. Stalin's death in March 1953, the eruptions of nationalism in Eastern Europe during the mid-1950s, and Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 culturally and politically reinvigorated the Soviet non-Russian nationalities. Officially, the CPSU continued to assert that the nationalities problem had been "solved" right up until the time of Gorbachev.[5] During the 1970s, however, Leonid Brezhnev softened the Party line and began speaking of edinstvo ("unity"), among the various Soviet national groups instead of using the more offensive Stalinist terminology of the cultural sliianie ("fusion") of nationalities (Rywkin 1990: 141).[6]

Soviet Central Asia,[7] though lauded by the Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes as the showplace of the success of Soviet cultural homogenization, would eventually become a painful ethnic thorn in Moscow's side. In 1924, the Soviet central government created new administrative divisions among the multilingual, multicultural peoples that inhabited the former People's Republics of Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khorezm. On Stalin's recommendation, political boundaries were drawn utilizing European-style criteria, including homogeneity of language and ethnicity. The imposed, artificial boundaries created lasting tensions between the widely dispersed peoples of the region, who had formerly been separated only by deserts, not solid borders because all the new republics were home to significant populations of non-indigenous nationalities (Jukes, Nourzhanov, and Alexandrov 1998: 249-50). In ending the former tradition of ethnic diversity, tribalism, and multilingualism, however, the new boundaries also did something the Soviets had not anticipated: They created "preconditions for the rise of homogenous nations" (Swietochowski 1990: 229).

The Russian Civil War and Stalinist depredations such as collectivization (1929-33) and the Great Purge (1934-38) had a particularly harsh impact on Soviet Central Asia—so much so that between 1920 and 1945 it is estimated that at least one-quarter of the region's population died violently (Rashid 1994: 34). The former Soviet policy of rastsvet ("flourishing"), or tolerance of Central Asian culture, came under attack for "encouraging local chauvinism and nationalist deviations" in the early 1930s, and was phased out. Thus, the Islamic religion was discouraged, alphabet reforms changed the script of transliteration from Latin to Cyrillic, and migration and intermarriage between natives and Slavs were officially encouraged (Swietochowski 1990: 231). The Khrushchev years witnessed a continuing erosion of Central Asian culture as 1,000,000 Slavic settlers moved into the northern part of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR) during the Virgin Lands Program (1954-60) and Moscow stepped up attacks against Islam in 1955 and 1958 (Rashid 1994: 34). Though Moscow fostered modernization in Central Asia by instituting a mass-based educational system, modern communication systems, state-run social and health care, and industrialization, educational and cultural policies were geared toward Russification and imposed by the Soviet government. (Rakowsa-Harmstone 1991: ix)

Despite decades of Russification and Sovietization, during the 1960s and 1970s the indigenous peoples of Central Asia made a cultural and demographic comeback, and, in so doing, made a mockery of Soviet nationalities policy. Due to a revival of Muslim influence and more modern healthcare, the birthrate of indigenous Central Asian populations began to outstrip that of the Russians. Thus, after 1960 the Russian nationality's share of the regional population began to decline (Rakowsa-Harmstone 1991: xi)[8]. Moreover, in 1960s several strong republican leaders were able to circumvent the parallel Russian-dominated bureaucracy that had existed in the region since the days of Stalin and build their patronage networks. These included first secretaries Sharaf Rashidov (r. 1959-83, Uzbek SSR), Turdakun Usubaliev (r. 1961-85, Kyrgyz SSR), Mukhamednazor Gapurov (r. 1969-86, Turkmen SSR), Jabbar Rassulov (r. 1956-82, Tajik SSR)—and Kunaev, who served as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK) from 1964-82. Such indigenous leaders flourished during the corruption of the Brezhnev era when the CPSU finally compromised with the nationalities by tolerating the entrenchment of local satrapies so long as republican leaders remained outwardly subservient to Moscow. This de facto political independence, coupled with a great increase in the native educated population, helped to further strengthen political and cultural self-awareness and promised enhanced career opportunities for young Central Asians.

The Kazakhs in Historical Perspective

According to legend, the Kazakhs are descendants of 300 warriors (dzhigits) who left their homeland in ancient times and, as part of a rite of passage, settled on the Asian steppe. Founded by the sons of the mythical Alash (Alach) who were supposedly the first Kazakhs, these three hundred of warriors, or zhuz/juz ("hordes"), served as the basis for the modern Kazakh tribal division into Great, Small and Middle hordes. Kazakh society was, above all, nomadic. Each tribe possessed its genealogy of real or mythical ancestors and the tribes were subdivided into auls (“villages”), which were led by wealthy and/or powerful men known as bais (“chiefs”). A khan, who had been elected from the descendants of Chingis Khan, presided over each of the three hordes. An important chapter of Kazakh history was also written by the Mongols, who conquered the steppes in the 13th century and added significant linguistic, legal, and political customs to Kazakh culture. After the Mongols came to the Muslims. In contrast to their sedentary (or sart) neighbors such as the Uzbeks to the south, the Islamic religion came late to the Kazakhs. Because the hordes were not completely converted until the 18th century, the Kazakhs' practice of Islam was colored by elements from their pre-Islamic past (including pantheism), and the Kazakhs never developed their philosophical school (such as Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi sect) or built an indigenous Islamic center of learning (Olcott 2002: 209).[9]

During the 15th and 16th centuries, the Kazakhs comprised a political union or khanate which was formed from the various tribes and was geographically centered around the Chu river and Betpak-Dala desert (currently south-central Kazakhstan). According to Soviet-era historians, this was the era when the first truly Kazakh khan, Janibek, appeared (George, 2001: 6).[10] The Kazakhs, however, quickly found themselves

threatened from the east by Kalmyk Mongols, who pushed into their territory during the 17th and 18th centuries. This crisis pushed the Kazakh khans into a fateful embrace of the Russians, who they viewed more favorably than the Mongols. At first, the Russians were only interested in Kazakhstan as a commercial route to the lucrative markets of Persia and India and thus were somewhat tardy in taking advantage of Kazakh appeals for assistance. In the 1630s and 1640s, Cossacks constructed the first fortifications along the Ural River. These were followed by a string of forts stretching from Orenburg to Omsk in the first half of the 18th century—to which the Kazakhs again appealed for protection in 1731 and 1740. Even after the Russians agreed to protect their Central Asian neighbors, however, the resulting arrangement was still flexible enough to ensure a fair degree of political and cultural autonomy (Olcott, 1995).

During the late 18th and early 19th centuries, expansionist-minded monarchs such as Catherine II and Alexander I began pushing southward into Kazakh lands. Catherine's concern about rising Chinese influence in Central Asia translated into a more aggressive Tsarist policy vis-à-vis the Kazakhs, and Alexander I (r. 1801-1825) decided to annex the Small and Middle hordes. After putting down a seven-year rebellion led by Sultan Kenisary Qasimov in 1845, the Russians conquered the Great Horde as well, and by mid-century, the Kazakhs had been completely subjugated under Tsarist rule. The Russians viewed the Kazakhs as standing in the way of their expanding empire and believed the nomadic herdsmen were "wasting" the land by grazing their herds on it. Thus, an inevitable war of cultures between the Christian Russian peasant-farmers and the Muslim Kazakh steppe herdsmen lay in store for the future (Crowe 1998: 399-401).

With pacification came colonization: In the two decades between 1896 and 1916, 1,500,000 Slavic settlers moved into northern Kazakhstan (then known as "Turkestan") to farm the steppes, taking control of vast tracts of Kazakh grazing lands in the process. In 1905, the Kazakh elite used the workers' uprising in St. Petersburg to press the government for demands involving the rights of Muslim clergy and Kazakh language instruction in primary schools (Olcott 1995: 411). In 1916, Kazakh bitterness exploded to the surface when a massive revolt broke out after Nicholas II attempted to conscript 390,000 Central Asians for wartime labor service (Crowe 1998: 401).[11] In 1918, the Alash Orda, Kazakhstan's independent government during the Russian Civil War which governed the steppes from December 1917 to the middle of 1919, sided with the Bolsheviks because of the withdrawal of White military support and Lenin's more lenient attitude towards the nationalities of the former Russian Empire (Crowe 1998: 401-02).[12] Thus, the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) was formed in August 1920 and much of the former Alash leadership attended the first Constituent Congress of Soviets in the Kazakh ASSR in October (Rashid 1994: 114).[13] Tragically, it was also during this period that the Civil War and famines caused by Bolshevik grain requisitioning resulted in the deaths of 750,000 to 1,000,000 Kazakhs (Crowe 1998: 402).[14]

Compared to Lenin, Stalin had very different policies in mind: During the late 1920s and early 1930s, former Alash members of the Kazakh government were purged by the CPSU because of their resistance to collectivization, and labor camps (part of the GULAG system) were set up to house political prisoners in the republics (Rashid 1994: 104). During Stalinist collectivization, the loss of livestock and human life was

proportionately greater in Kazakhstan than in any other Soviet republic: Approximately 80 percent of the Kazakh herd was decimated and 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 Kazakhs perished from either starvation or resisting Party attempts to organize them into farms.[15] According to Martha Brill Olcott, the collectivization drive effectively ended Kazakh pastoral nomadism as 60 percent of the rural population previously living in auls was collectivized (Olcott 1995: 181, 185-87).[16] Then came Kazakhstan's role as the Soviet Botany Bay: Ethno-national groups relocated there included tens of thousands of Germans and Poles in 1936, and Greeks, Koreans, Jews, Crimean Tatars, and other peoples in subsequent years. In 1944, nearly half a million Chechens and Ingush (the largest single group of exiles) were also forcibly exiled to the KSSR—but most of these had returned home by 1957-58—leaving the Slavic population as the main competitor for power.[17] During the Second World War, Kazakh soldiers were placed on every major front. Kazakhstan also served as a haven for refugees, evacuees, and factories from embattled European Russia, and coal production in the KSSR tripled as the Soviets began tapping the vast mineral reserves in the republic for the first time (Holm-Hansen 1990: 188-89). In 1947, years of neglect of Soviet agriculture on the part of the central government caused a major famine in Ukraine. Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev proposed to solve the country's agricultural problems by plowing up millions of hectares of "under-utilized" land on the Kazakh steppes. To accomplish Khrushchev's grandiose scheme, Moscow, during the 1950s, moved almost 1,000,000 Slavic settlers into the northern territories of the KSSR. Thus, the rigors of Soviet life had cut such a swath through the Kazakh population that by the late 1950s—after the great influx of settlers during the Virgin Lands program—the Kazakhs constituted a minority population in their republic.[18]

Under Leonid Brezhnev, the industrialization of Kazakhstan's northern oblasts continued and more scientific methods—including fertilization, crop rotation, irrigation, and mechanization—were applied to agriculture and livestock breeding in the KSSR (Olcott 1995: 227-29, 237). Due to his service as First Secretary of the CPK from 1954-56, Brezhnev felt a special affinity for the KSSR and enjoyed a close friendship with Kunaev to the end of his life. The Kazakhs, however, paid a huge environmental price for the enhanced role of their republic in national affairs under Stalin's successors: The strip cropping of crops and fallow, long practiced in North America to help control wind erosion of sandy soils, was virtually unknown in the Kazakh Virgin Lands during the 1950s and early 1960s, as was the planting of shelterbelts of trees to stop soil erosion (Kahan 1961.[19] Thus, during the early and mid-1960s, a Soviet "Dust Bowl" occurred: Wind storms destroyed 10,000,000 acres of cropland in the KSSR and damaged 29,000,000 more—approximately half of the Kazakh Virgin Lands (Feshbackand Friendly 1992 cited in Christian 1997: 366). During Brezhnev's tenure, improved methods of soil conservation were instituted and the use of herbicides increased, but dust storms persisted in northern Kazakhstan and Western Siberia into the 1980s (Craumer 1990: 185, 190).

Kazakhstan also had the dubious distinction of serving as the focal point for Soviet nuclear weapons research: In 1947, the Soviet Ministry of Defense chose the northern oblast of Semipalatinsk as a nuclear test site due to its sparse population, good transportation network, and distant location from the Soviet border. Accordingly, the

central government appropriated over 18,000 square kilometers (over 11,000 square miles) of Kazakh ancestral lands in an oblast that housed the birthplace of the famous Kazakh poet, Abai. The native population was summarily evicted from their land, and in the space of 40 years (1949-89), the Soviet government conducted 470 under and above-ground tests—including Sakharov's 600-megaton thermonuclear bomb in 1953 (George 2001: 191-92).[20] Only once, in 1953, was the surrounding population evacuated. Radioactive contamination soon seeped into the soil, water reserves, and pasture lands: The water, milk, meat, fruit, and vegetables of the region became contaminated and the population suffered from a variety of related illnesses, which included birth defects in children. In 1989, the Kazakh poet Olzhas Suleimenov founded the internationally acclaimed Nevada-Semipalatinsk Anti-Nuclear Movement in protest and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev permanently shut down the test site in August 1991 (George 2001: 191-92, 198, 201, 204).

Even more damaging than Semipalatinsk was the destruction of the Aral Sea, which ranks as the greatest man-made ecological disaster of all time. During the 1930s, the Soviets began diverting water that had been flowing into the Aral Sea from its two major tributaries, the Syr Amur and the Syr Darya rivers, to extend cotton production in the region through irrigation. Due to the siphoning off of the incoming water, the level of the Aral Sea began dropping steadily. Water quality was further degraded by Soviet industrial waste and the overuse of agricultural fertilizers. By the 1980s, the once rich commercial fishing and shipping industry of the Aral Sea had been decimated, and the surrounding region had been turned into a desert by the high winds that whipped up salt and pesticides from the exposed sea bed; health problems among the population included a sharp increase in infant mortality, esophageal cancers, and typhoid, outbreaks of viral hepatitis, congenital deformation among children and waterborne diseases. Moscow attempted to placate the population by promising relief in the form of Brezhnev's even more grandiose "Siberian River Diversion Project," or Sibaral, meant to save the Aral Sea and boost agricultural production. In August 1986, however, the CPSU Central Committee put the project on hold, citing its prohibitive cost. In June 1990, the Central Asian republics made their last appeal for Moscow's help to combat the disaster by signing a joint declaration requesting moral and financial support (Jukes, Nourzhanov and Alexandrov 1998: 356-59, 363, 366-67).[21]

Ironically, during the same period, the Soviet government was despoiling the environment in the KSSR, Moscow's grip on the republic began slipping. As has previously been stated, Brezhnev compromised with his Central Asian subordinates by allowing them a great deal of freedom at the republican level in exchange for their support of the policies of the central government. Thus, during the 1960s and 1970s, First Secretary of the CPK and Brezhnev confidante Kunaev was successful in reinstituting a clan-based patronage system in the KSSR, and Kazakh population growth outstripped that of the Slavic population.[22] Even as the provincial clout of the non-Russian indigenous elite was flourishing during Brezhnev's tenure, however, according to Michael Watson the central government in Moscow "became more of a Russian preserve" with Russians predominantly staffing the Central Committee ministries, army, and KGB (Duncan 1990: 156-57). When Yuri Andropov came to power in November 1982 seeking to fight

corruption and address economic stagnation by decentralizing the Soviet economy, his ascension, according to Olivier Roy, "translated into a serious crisis between Moscow and the Muslim republics," because Andropov's policies directly threatened the Brezhnev-era republican leadership or political status quo. In 1983, for instance, the "Uzbek mafia"—Uzbek Party higher-ups in collaboration with Brezhnev's son-in-law who was accused of cheating the government out of a fortune by falsifying the yields of cotton harvests—was very publicly broken and two Muslims were removed from the Politburo (Roy 2000: 125-26).[23] According to Ilya Zemtsov, Andropov even tried to roll back the clock by replacing the term "national republic" with "union republic", but either was unsuccessful in his attempt or simply did not live long enough to enforce his new policies (Zemtsov 1985 cited in Gleason 1990: 16).

The Kazakh Reconquista

Despite the shift in politics in Moscow, Soviet census data relating to the ethnic composition of the population of the KSSR and Party statistical information regarding the percentage of Kazakh candidate and full members of the CPK (Tables 1 and 2) clearly illustrate how the Kazakhs were beginning to demographically and politically "recover" their republic under Kunaev. For example, in 1959, twenty years after Stalinist collectivization and during the sixth year of the Virgin Lands, the Kazakhs—who had made up over 40% of the population in 1939—constituted only 30% of the people of their republic. By 1979, however, the Kazakhs had rebounded to 36% of the population, and the Russian and Slavic (Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian) percentage of the population had been falling for some time. And, on the political front, the percentage of Kazakh candidate and full members of the CPK—both of which were dropping as Brezhnev and Kunaev came to power in 1964—also rebounded soon after, with Kazakhs constituting almost 50% of the candidate and 40% of full members of the CPK at the time of Brezhnev's death in 1982. Indeed, when the long-serving Kunaev was dismissed, this more favorable socio-political construct is likely the only one that most young Kazakhs had ever known—motivating them to take to the streets of Alma-Ata in protest. The effects of Andropov's rise to power on Kazakh political fortunes in the KSSR is also clearly visible in the data relating to the percentage of Kazakh candidate members of the CPK—which began to drop in 1983 for the first time in almost 20 years—and the increase in the percentage of Kazakh full members, which slowed appreciably in 1985-86 when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and began to directly target Kunaev.[24]

Table 1: The KSSR by Nationality, 1939-79 (Kazakhstan v tsifrakh 1987: 5)

Year of Soviet Census	KAZAKH	RUSSIAN	SLAVIC
1939 : Stalinist Purges	42.4	45	57.6
1959 : Virgin Lands, 6 th year	30	42.7	52
1970 : Kunaev in power 6 yrs.	32.6	42.4	51.1
1979 : Kunaev in power 15 yrs.	36	40.8	48.2

(Note: Boldface type indicates a decrease from the previous census.)

Table 2: Percentage of Kazakh Candidate and Full Members of the CPK (VKP(b) v tsifrakh 1948: 43; KPSS v tsifrakh 1954-87 in RGANI)

Year	Candidate Members	Full Members
1947: Post WWII	not available	40.2
1953: Virgin Lands begins	n/a	40.6
1954: Virgin Lands, 1st year	n/a	39.9
1958: Virgin Lands, 5th year	33.3	36.6
1964: Brezhnev/Kunaev rule	29.5	33
1965: Kunaev in power 1 yr.	32.3	32.8
1969: Kunaev in power 5 yrs.	38.7	34.3
1974: Kunaev in power 10 yrs.	41.6	36.2
1979: Kunaev in power 15 yrs.	45.6	38.3
1982: End of Brezhnev rule	46.9	39.4
1983: Andropov in power	46.2	39.7
1985: Gorbachev in power	42.9	40.3
1986: Kunaev"retired"	40.3	40.5

(Note: Boldface type indicates a decrease from the previous year.)

And so, when Kunaev was replaced with a Russian and outsider, Gennadi Kolbin, on 16 December 1986, young Kazakhs viewed it as a slap in the face and were ready to take on the Soviet establishment—and interviews conducted by the author in 2001 bear this out: Zheltoksan activist Rasulkhan Kudaibirgenov, for example, said that he responded by protesting the "*diktatura Moskvu"* ("dictatorship of Moscow") he felt the decision represented.[25] Professor Kanesha Satpaeva further elucidated that Gorbachev was mainly to blame for what happened next on Brezhnev Square because he replaced Kunaev with a *stranger* from Ulyanovsk (Kolbin) who was unfamiliar with the language, history, or traditions of the Kazakhs.[26] In addition, Nurtai Sabil'ianov told the author that young Kazakhs met on the square because Moscow had degraded their "national dignity" and encroached upon their right to national self-determination.[27] Umit Basmanova, for her part, described the Alma-Ata events as a "demonstration of people demanding their rights"—maintaining that nobody talked students into protesting or organized them (as would later be alleged by the Soviet government)—and Abdrakhman Umataev described the decision to go to the square as sudden and spontaneous, with students simply saying "Let's go there."[28] Finally, Dr. Bayan Besbaeva told the author she was sitting in an English-language class on the 16th when the announcement came over the radio that Kolbin had replaced Kunaev. According to Besbaeva, the instantaneous reaction among students and scholars was utter disbelief. People asked questions such as "*Kak ta*x?", "*Pochemu Kolbin*?", "*Pochemu ne Kazakha*?" ("How can this be?"; "Why Kolbin?"; "Why not a Kazakh?").[29] Thus, in the context of centuries of Russian colonization and decades of Sovietization, when faced with the perceived threat of a policy of renewed Russification on the part of Moscow, thousands of young Kazazhs—students and workers—took to the streets of Alma-Ata and other population centers in the USSR in what would become the first (but not the last) major instance of ethnic unrest during the

Gorbachev regime.[30]

Unfortunately for Andropov and his protégé, Gorbachev, then, Central Asians in general and Kazakhs, in particular, viewed both the anti-corruption drive and perestroika within the overall context of 300-year Russo/Soviet-native relations; or, as simply another means by which the central government was attempting to re-impose both Russian culture and political domination on their republics. Perestroika also posed a direct economic threat to the South, which had benefited from special attention on the part of Moscow during the Brezhnev years, especially following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Gorbachev's attempts to withdraw from the Third World in general—and from Afghanistan in particular—coupled with the low regard Moscow had for Muslims in general spelled trouble for the central government. In November 1986, when Gorbachev blasted Islam during a speech in Tashkent but made no mention of Christianity, Central Asians once again felt they had been singled out; what Roy terms as the "psychological break between Asiatic and Moscow *nomenklaturas*" that had begun during the Andropov years continued into the Gorbachev era, and many Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Turkmens, and Tajiks viewed both men as Russian nationalists bent on destroying the Brezhnev-era "reliance on cadres" (political arrangement) that had allowed for gains in the rights of the Soviet nationalities (Roy 2000: 126-29).[31] And so, when Gorbachev replaced Kunaev, the Kazakhs responded as if the move constituted a direct challenge to their prerogatives within the KSSR and the stage was set for the Alma-Ata events/demonstrations/protests[32] or a series of occurrences that has been described by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, in their groundbreaking study *Dynamics of Contention*, as "contentious politics"—a major ethnopolitical confrontation between the Kazakhs and Moscow that would shape the last five years of Soviet history (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 255).[33]

Notes

1. Edward Allworth defines the Soviet nationality question as "a disequilibrium that occurs when dissatisfaction overwhelms the satisfaction of the Soviet nationalities collectively and, at certain times, individually, in their immediate as well as extended environments throughout the state." Allworth further explains: "A widespread problem stems from the tension that persists between the presence of ethnic inequality in the country on the one hand, and ideological and policy requirements for its eradication on the other (Allworth 1990: 27-29)."
2. Gregory Gleason describes the distinguishing feature of Leninist Soviet nationality policy as the "tactical manipulation of local national sentiment" by the Bolsheviks, who granted "political recognition to ethno-territorial groups…in exchange for political support(Gleason1990: 11, 14, 20)."According to Peter Duncan, the Bolsheviks granted statehood to the main nationalities of the Russian Empire to "undercut minority nationalism and encourage the nationalities to cooperate within the federal framework of the USSR." Lenin, like Marx and Engels, "favored the existence of a single unitary party for the workers or a particular state, irrespective of nationality," and "believed the right of nations to self-determination was subordinate to the class struggle (Duncan 1990: 152-54)."
3. According to Grigol Ubiria, Lenin's original korenizatsiia (or "rooting") campaign was "aimed at popularizing the Bolshevik regime among non-Russian peoples through the affirmative action programs, which was thought to give the Soviet power a 'native' character and application in every political-administrative unit in the Soviet state." "Put simply," Ubiria continues, "the goal was to make each non-Russian group within the USSR believe that the Soviet regime was not alien, imposed upon them by force, but rather an indigenous one, serving their national interests equally with those of others, including the Russians (Ubiria2018: 148)."

4. According to Olivier Roy, Moscow's game of divida et impera included such tactics as "manipulating political factionalism" among the respective parties of the Central Asian republics, establishing patron-client relationships between "key members of the apparatus in Moscow…and the leaders of the republics," and "encouraging identification with the nationality and individual Soviet republic [as opposed to larger, more dangerous entities such as Pan-Islam or pan-Turkism] as well as loyalty to the Soviet Union as a whole (Roy 2000: 103-04)."
5. Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, in 1961 and 1971, respectively, declared the nationalities problem was no longer a challenge for the Soviet government (Rashid 1994: 35).
6. Rywkin examines various code words used to define Soviet policy goals with reference to nationality affairs, including rastsvet, or the "flourishing" of separate cultures within the confines of Soviet "political-economic integration"; sblizhenie, or the "rapprochement" of different cultures leading to a higher state of cohesiveness; and sliianie, or the total "fusion" of all Soviet cultures. The author views the proliferation of such terms that took place during the 1970s as a sign of compromise between Brezhnev and the nationalities, and notes that the "old triad of 'flourishing,' 'rapprochement' and 'fusion' collapsed completely with the advent of glasnost(Rywkin 1990: 139-44, 147)."According to Ubiria, sliianie remained a "distant" objective of the CPSU, but Brezhnev (unlike Khrushchev) chose not to focus on it (Ubiria 2018: 235).
7. Soviet Central Asia is (roughly) defined as the five republics of the Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik, and Kyrgyz SSR's. The region was fully divided into these particular administrative units by 1936.
8. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Central Asian population of the USSR grew three to four times as fast as the ethnic Russian population, despite countermeasures by Moscow such as the introduction of sex education, a propaganda campaign to reduce family size, and a wider availability of contraceptives. (Lubin1991: 36, 42-43, 58). For an in-depth analysis of Soviet attempts to get Central Asian young people to relocate outside of their republics through labor migration, see also: (Fierman 1991: 255-83).
9. See also: (George 2001: 4-5).
10. Crowe also mentions that at this time the Kazakhs fully emerged as independent people from "under the Mongol shroud(Crowe 1998: 397)."
11. Olcott adds that "virtually all sectors" of Kazakh society united against the government in the revolt: some reacted to the economic hardships brought about by wartime and others simply did not wish to help the "infidel" Russians fight their Turkish brothers in the Ottoman Empire (Olcott 1995: 123-24).
12. See also: (Olcott 1995: 129).
13. The Kazakh ASSR became the full Soviet Socialist Republic in 1936.
14. See also: (Olcott 1995: 158-59).
15. For a firsthand account of how Stalinist collectivization affected ordinary Kazakhs, see (Shayakhmetov 2007).
16. See also: (Crowe 1998: 402-03). The Kazakh population at this time was only 4-5,000,000.
17. Bjorn Holm-Hansen describes Kazakhstan's ethnic situation during the 20th century as a state of "dramatic demographic flux" brought on by conditions such as "agricultural reform, Stalinism, war, work migration and post-Soviet nation-building."(Holm-Hansen 1990: 157).
18. The budding Kazakh intelligentsia also suffered tremendously during Stalin's purges in the Party from 1934-38. (Crowe 1998: 403). See also: (Olcott 1995: Chapter Nine).
19. See also: (McCauley 1976: 86). The practice of strip cropping of crops and fallow was instituted only in the northern oblast of Pavlodar and thus was far too limited to prevent the ruinous dust storms which engulfed Kazakhstan in the early 1960s. (Craumer 1990: 183, 185-86).
20. According to Kunaev, the republican political leadership was not consulted when the decision was made to conduct nuclear tests in Semipalatinsk. The decision was made personally by Stalin and Laventry Beria, then the head of the KGB and the man in charge of the Soviet Union's atom bomb project, and thus could not be questioned. (Tolmachev 1997: 115).

21. See also: (Roy 2000: 127).
22. For a discussion of how Nursultan Nazarbaev's regime has affected Kazakhstan's traditional clan-based political system, see also: (Peyrouse2016: 29-61). The author argues against the common western perception that, due to the failure of Soviet nationalities policy, clan affiliation has once again become the most important factor in Kazakh internal politics—pointing instead to the Nazarbaev familial patronage network, which bears a greater resemblance to the methodology Vladimir Putin uses to rule Russia.
23. Sharaf Rashidov, First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party during the Brezhnev era, died opportunely in 1983. Between 1984 and 1987, 90% of the Uzbek Central Committee was forced to step down. (Gleason 1990: 16). Roy even goes so far as to label the Andropov-Gorbachev anti-corruption drive as precipitating a "cultural and political split between north and south." (Roy 2000: 125-26).
24. For a thorough discussion of Kunaev's career and the process of "Kazakhization" in the KSSR during his tenure as First Secretary of the CPK, including a full range of statistical information from *KPSS v tsifrakh*, see (Stefany 2013: 49-72).
25. Interviewee Rasulkhan Kudaibirgenov, from Alma-Ata, personally participated in the December events, and at the time he spoke to the author was an active member of the citizen's group Zheltoksan—an organization lobbying the Kazakh government for greater transparency relating to the 1986 protests.
26. Interviewee Kanesha Satpaeva, from Alma-Ata, a professor at Kazakh National Technical University who witnessed the December 1986 events from his nearby apartment, added that he told Kolbin the demonstrations were not nationalistic in character, affirming "*natsionalizmazdes' net"* ("There is no nationalism here.").
27. Interviewee Nurtai Sabil'ianov, from Alma-Ata, was a 24-year-old student at the Alma-Ata Agricultural Institute in 1986 and personally participated in the December events.
28. Interviewee Umit Basmanova, of Alma-Ata, was a 34-year-old Inspector in the Ministry of Light Industry who participated in events on Brezhnev (Alma-Ata's main) Square from 17-19 December; AbdrakhmanUmataev, also of Alma-Ata, was a 26-year-old student at Kazakh State University (KazGU), who spent all day on 17-18 December on the square.
29. Interviewee Dr. Bayan Besbaeva, of Alma-Ata, was a 30-year-old employee of the KSSR Academy of Sciences in 1986.
30. Additional documentation of the Alma-Ata events of 17-20 December 1986 includes: (*Conflict in the Soviet Union* 1990); (Ponomarev and Dzhukeeva, Eds. 1993). See also: (Stefany 2003: Ph.D. dissertation).
31. Roy also mentions that most Central Asians desired a non-Slavic-dominated Soviet system, which protected their cultural and political rights and did not work "only for the advantage of the Russians." (Roy 2000: 129).
32. Indeed, up to December 1986, Gorbachev had shown "remarkable insensitivity to Central Asia and continued to treat the republics as colonies, which led to public resentment." (Rashid, 1994: 36).
33. The authors define contentious politics as "collective political struggle" that is "episodic rather than continuous, occurs in public, involves interaction between makers of claims and others, is recognized by those others as bearing on their interests, and brings in government as mediator, target, or claimant."And, in a chapter entitled "Nationalism, National Disintegration and Contention," the authors directly discuss the Alma-Ata events under the heading of "Kazakh Contention" (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilley 2001:5, 255-61).

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Kazakhstan at the Crossroads: Democratic Imperatives, Leadership and Exigency of Transition

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Abstract

Since Kazakhstan's attainment of independent political identity in 1991, debates on exigency of democratic transition have gone off in multiple directions. However, the systemic transition remained smooth with the introduction of extensive political and economic reforms, keeping people's interest at the centre. At that time, democratization and liberalization were twin-strategic priorities of Kazakhstan. Until recently, Kazakhstan has succeeded in maintaining robust economic performance, stable fiscal condition, and formidable trade relations with major, regional as well as extra-regional powers. Yet the project of democratization is underway, thickening the qualm over Kazakhstan's transition to democracy. Even transition of power after snap presidential election held on June 9, 2019 has raised multiple questions regarding future trajectory of Kazakh politics. To what extent the shift of power will help Kazakhstan to deepen and broaden the base of democracy remains a matter of solemn contestation among academia and policy analysts alike. In this backdrop, the paper undertakes to analyze how Kazakhstan grapples with the enduring predicaments in making it a vibrant democracy. The paper further attempts to dig deeper whether the slew of political and constitutional measures taken by the leadership of Kazakhstan were carefully crafted to ensure regime stability and economic expansion; or it was attempted to pave for smooth transition to democracy?

Keywords

Kazakhstan, Democratic Transition, Democratization, Human Rights, Leadership

Introduction

In spite of being an "essentially contested notion," democracy still maintains a significant place in the contemporary political lexicon.[1] As a genre of political system, democracy had been favoured widely throughout the twentieth century and yet there is no close alternative of this systemic typology in the twenty-first century as well. When the last century was approaching towards the end, history witnessed a drastic change in the Eurasian landscape. With disintegration of the USSR, the Soviet system failed to endure, leading to the emergence of more than a dozen political entities. The new region, Central Asia, which came into being found no other substitute than democratic polity just for the reason that legacy of Soviet totalitarianism, was not agreeable anymore. That is why in the initial first decade, leaders of Central Asian states were keen and optimistic for a

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democratic system. Central Asian states, however, have encountered with many complex challenges vis-à-vis the process of democratization. During the period of 'transition' the Central Asian states have undergone drastic experimentation with democracy, often stretching beyond its universal norms. This has involved skeptics to entitle them "illiberal" to "cunning democracies". Kazakhstan is not treated as an exception either.[2] Even at present, the question whether Kazakhstan has overcome the phase of systemic transition is under serious scrutiny. To many, in spite of its proclaimed democratic espousal, the transition still remains a matter of debate (Isaacs, 2010; Olcott, 2010; Laruelle, 2014; Omelicheva, 2015). Kazakhstan witnessed a regime change when President Nursultan Nazarbayev resigned from his office in March 2019, and in June 2019 a snap presidential poll was conducted in which Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was elected as President. Notwithstanding, Nazarbayev still holds powerful position as a head of the Security Council and keeps with him the status of national leader, and continues to maintain greater influence on the politics of the present day Kazakhstan from the back channels (Kholdorbekov, 2019; Mallinson, 2019: 10-22).

Given this context, the work delves into the imperatives of democracy in Kazakhstan. To this end, first of all, a general overview of the democratic transition in Kazakhstan is presented, followed by a host of perspectives blended with theoretical underpinnings. The contestation over the nature and state of democratization in a narrative and counter-narrative continuum is elaborately elucidated in the subsequent section. The work attempts to inquire in the next section the missing components of the democratization process over the period of three decades in Kazakhstan and tends to connect the links which debilitated the entire process to make it consistently questionable. Following this, the work further examines the recent transition of power and finally comes up with measures to overcome the challenges the process of democratization is facing.

The State of Democracy in Kazakhstan: Diverse Perspectives

After independence in 1991, the main objective before Kazakhstan was to set priorities for both nation and state building. Economic reforms to ensure growth and development, democratic reforms along with nation-building and independent security set up were declared as the prime objectives of a newly independent state. Kazakhstan defined democracy-building as the beginning of a new era in the process of government formation and adopted its first Constitution in 1993 which stated as: "Kazakhstan proclaims itself democratic, secular, legal and social state whose highest values are an individual, his life, rights, and freedoms" (Government of Kazakhstan, 2019). For Kazakhstan, however, the path of democracy has never been smooth and linear. Challenges to democracy have not yet been fully overcome but the transitionary phase has met some progress towards maturity. The major factors which constrained the development of democratization are quite a few; they served as key impediments towards a successful transition to democracy. The first and foremost challenge was to cope up with the heterogeneous social matrix that impeded the process of nation-building supported by unanimous ideology (Omelicheva, 2016). Secondly, internal political dynamics bereft of democratic background infused negative developments discouraging transition to mature. These included the role of president, the attitude of political elites, civil society

and most importantly opposition party (Sordi, 2016). Thirdly, to create an independent foreign policy and self-sufficient security set-up to fill the power gap as well as ideological vacuum created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union also turned out as insurmountable challenges (Junisbai & Junisbai, 2009; Ipek, 2007).

On the given parameter of liberal democracy, the question whether the democratic transition in Kazakhstan is complete requires an inquiry. To many, the advancement of democracy is slow and inadequate. If Robert Putnam's famous maxim on "making democracy work" is paraphrased, it would be pertinent to state that Kazakhstan has softly observed the practices and lackadaisically introduced the elements which would have made democracy work. By universal yardstick, democracy in Kazakhstan is regarded more often "controlled and guided" and therefore subjected to scathing criticism as to why such political arrangements continue to be in operation for more than a quarter-century. However, views on democratic development are varied; scholars and the Kazakh establishment place time and again contrary arguments (Blank, 2005; Luong, 2009; Collins, 2006; McFaul, 2006). A set of scholars consider it a feebly democratized state as compared to the states of Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus. Whereas the Kazakh establishment proclaims it a state, which remained committed to the corresponding democratic principles (Taukebayeva, 2014).

Many western scholars categorize Kazakhstan close to an authoritarian state. For example, Edward Schatz (2004; 2009) in his book, *Modern Clan Politics: The Power of "Blood" in Kazakhstan and Beyond*, has leveled it as "soft-authoritarian" state. Soft-authoritarianism relies more centrally on the means of persuasion than on the means of coercion, even though coercion remains a part of the ruling elite's arsenal (Edward Schatz (2004, 2009). But how the Kazakh state has succeeded in maintaining the authoritarian stability? Assel Tutumlu argued that Kazakhstan has widely taken into consideration redistributing social welfare benefits, restructuring of private pension fund into a single pension fund by introducing pension reforms, and sticking to firm decision making on dilemmatic issues like property rights, investment opportunities and financial credibility to satisfy not only the common people but also elites to keep them loyal to the regime, eventually leading to a degree of stability (Tutumlu, 2016).

There are certain qualifying parameters which polities are leveled as democracy. Democracies widely observe certain conditions: competitive elitism, political pluralism, multi-party system, rule of law, freedom of expression, observation of human rights, free and fair election, independent media, impartial judiciary, strong civil society, liberty, equality, socially and culturally inclusive policies etc. Evidence on the ground fails to evince that Kazakhstan is equipped with these parameters, retarding the pace of transition to democracy and stirring up the row whether democracy is *de jure* or *de facto.* To a section of analysts, Kazakhstan's democracy is on paper (constitutionally) and not in practice (Merritt, 2006). Delving-in deeper to continue interrogation over the state of democracy in Kazakhstan, it is, however, appropriate to spell out the framework of 'democracy'. Robert Dahl, for instance, in his book *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* first used the term polyarchy to refer the institution and political process of modern representative democracy. Polyarchial regimes, as Dahl argued, are distinguished by the combination of two general factors: First is high tolerance of opposition to check

the arbitrary inclinations of government which is guaranteed by a competitive party system, guaranteed and protected civil liberties, and by a vigorous and healthy civil society (Dahl, 1972). Second is an opportunity for participating in politics, which is guaranteed by free and fair competitive elections to ensure a reliable level of popular responsiveness (Dahl, 1972). Following Dahl, Samuel P. Huntington also emphasized the ‘features of a democratic system and the process of democratization. His fascinating idea waves of democratization' has added new thrust to the ongoing debates in the post-Cold War era. Highlighting the importance of participation, Huntington in his book *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (1991) has analyzed the process of democratization. To him, democratization is a process by which a society could progress from authoritarianism to minimalist democracy to substantive democracy. The process has never been linear, smooth and free of hazards. The experiences of both old and new democracies show that sustainable pro-democratic changes cannot be initiated and implemented effectively unless first the right social and economic conditions are created. By focusing on the third wave of democratization, Huntington pointed out that the emergence of social, economic and external conditions favorable to democracy is *necessary*, but not *sufficient*, to build democracy. In other words, building political institutions for supporting the process of democratization is required along with the willingness of political leaders to take the risk of democracy to make it happen (Huntington, 1991: 164-174).

The process of democratic transition varies in different societies owing to certain conditions. On this issue, scholars have diverse observations. For instance, one of the first attempts to create a 'model of transition' to democracy was taken by D. Rustow, who drew emphasis significantly on national unity and national identity as necessary prerequisites and placed sequence of stages in the transition to democracy: the rational unity as underlying cause of democratization through the stages of struggle, compromise and addictive to democracy (Rustow, 2013). Another significant model presented by G.O'Donnell, F. Schmitter and Laurence Whiteheads in their book *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (1986). In the foreword of the book, Abraham F. Lowenthal has shaded light beautifully how transition from authoritarian regimes takes place.

> “Authoritarian rule are conditioned and shaped by historical circumstances, unique in each country but patterned in predictable ways, by the way in which a previous democratic regime broke down, by the nature and duration of the authoritarian period, by the means the authoritarian regime uses to obtain legitimacy and to handle threats to its grip on power, by the initiative and the timing of experimental moves toward *abertura,* by the degree of security and self-confidence of the regime's elites and by the confidence and competence of those pushing for opening the political process, by the presence or absence of financial resources, by the counseling of outsiders, and by the prevailing international *fashions* that provide legitimacy to certain forms of transition” (Lowenthal, 1986: X).

Which model of transition qualifies the condition of Kazakhstan is an object of inquiry. For instance, Vladimir Gel'ma held that most theories of transition to democracy explicitly or implicitly accepted one of two conceptual models. The first model entails Joseph Schumpeter's 'competitive elitism' in which he defined democracy as “the process by which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for

the people's vote" (Gel'man, 2003: 87-104). The second is the pluralist model of 'polyarchy' subscribed by Dahl, as Gel'ma argued further, which includes both "two vital dimensions of democracy, namely competitiveness and participation, and a set of major civic and political rights and freedoms that serves as a basic indicator of democracy"(Gel'man, 2003). Without a doubt it can be argued that regardless of a number of theories dealing with transition, it is difficult to apply anyone for the analysis of democratization in post-Soviet states in general and Kazakhstan in particular. Kazakhstan after independence has been subjected to the dilemma of priority: the market economy first or democracy? But preferring market economy over democracy, Kazakhstan opted the formula "economics first and politics second." This required every step of Kazakhstan's political reform has to be closely tied to economic progress (UNSC Occasional Paper Series, 2014). This model has served Kazakhstan well and corresponded with the priorities of Kazakh citizens. Even president Nazarbayev in his own book, *The Kazakhstan Way* (2008), justified the measures of economic reforms that had been taken before political reform. Nazarbayev once in his presidential address referred it to as: Democracy in Kazakhstan is "not the start of its journey but rather its destination." Inspired by economic progress of four Asian Tigers: Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea, Kazakhstan has adopted Singapore as a role model for "the Kazakhstan way" and recalls its former leader who turned Singapore from a small port to a wealthy global hub (Niyazbekov, 2016). Nazarbayev following this model, accorded precedence to economics over politics. Kazakhstan's two-digit GDP growth rate for years upholds this thesis. For obvious reasons, the fast-pace economic growth has paid considerably in uplifting the social condition of people by reducing poverty, improving access to primary education and promoting gender equality, which in turn has amplified the image of the President and made his economic policies popular (Anderson, Capannelli, Ginting, and Taniguchi, 2018). Jonathan Aitken (2009) in his book *Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan: From Communism to Capitalism* affirmed this argument and emphasized that with this arrangement Nazarbayev succeeded in fetching international recognition for being fairly efficient on reforms and on domestic front attained people's faith; and that too was at the expense of democratic reforms. Aitken argued, although Kazakhstan is in the transition phase or drifting towards the democratic system but "despite the democratic deficit people have accepted the soft authoritarian system which gives legitimacy to the Kazakh government" (Aitken, 2009). Starr, Engwall and Cornell (2016) report has also underlined as: The political reform process in Kazakhstan has followed the mantra of "economy first, then politics". The government has preferred a gradualist model of reform, in which sound economic development has been touted as an essential precondition for democratic reforms.

The Process of Democratization: Narratives and Counter-narratives

Moreover, democratization in Kazakhstan is very specific, as Taukebayeva argues. It took place in the presence of a number of factors: international (disintegration of the bipolar system), nation forming (national identity), socio-economic (crisis of economy), social (lack of middle- class), cultural ("culture shock"), procedural (the interrelations of economics and politics) and individual psychological factor (mental

attitude of political leaders to make important political decisions) (Taukebayeva, 2014). Having taken into consideration the observation of Robert Dahl that no contemporary polity can proclaim itself a full democracy, it can be argued that no given model of democracy applies aptly in the case of Kazakhstan; rather its transition eventually has to pass-through the evolution amenable to its own priorities, needs, and socio-political dynamics.

However contested, it is argued that Kazakhstan has been missing starkly the universal norms of democratic practices. The components which are regarded as indispensable are in great deficiency: the press freedom is deeply narrowed; people do not have adequate religious freedom; there is a lack of freedom of association; there are rampant cases of human rights infringement; and there is a guided political culture critically eclipsing the institutional functioning. Kazakhstan during more than two decades of its political journey has evolved a peculiar systemic arrangement wherein non-transparent electoral practice orchestrated and managed people's choice-determination via popularly unacceptable opposition parties participation, regressive political culture, heavily controlled power transaction intending to fetch the predetermined political outcome and stringently muzzled media pose questions against the claim of Kazakhstan as a democracy (Omelicheva, 2015). A recent report by the Chatham House (Royal Institute of International affairs) corroborates the same argument with facts as:

> "A wide range of political rights and freedoms are effectively non-existent [in Kazakhstan]. In addition to access to information, these include political plurality; media freedom; freedom of assembly; the freedom of civil society to operate without pressure, intimidation or official consent; and freedom of association for trade unions and political parties other than the ruling Nur Otan party and 'accepted' political organizations. At the same time, other freedoms are often unchallenged and modern luxuries widely available, at least in the cities of Almaty and Nur-Sultan". (Nixey, 2019: 4)

Inquiring the Western Perspective

The western view constitutes a developed and sophisticated conceptualization of democratic processes and looks at Kazakhstan through the lens of political pluralism, free and fair elections, and civic engagements. The popular view holds that Kazakh democracy does not fulfill the universal standard and basic norms of liberal democracy. Olcott (2008) once argued that "Kazakhstan is not a fledgling democracy" stands a fair scrutiny here. About a decade back, expressing doubt over founding President Nazarbayev's unwillingness of power transfer, Olcott frowned on the entire development Kazakhstan had been passing through then. To describe that state of affair, Olcott assumed four hypotheses: First that Nazarbayev didn't make up his mind of leaving his position and power; secondly, he didn't believe that someone should leave office at the height of his powers, before his mission to transform or build a new state got completed; thirdly, he had believed that the Kazakh nation was a part of Asian civilization and he was a wise Asian ruler; and lastly, Nazarbayev came from the tradition of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which believed that leaders never handed over power voluntarily. Therefore, Kazakhstan's political future depended widely on the question that when would president Nazarbayev leave office? (Olcott, 2008)

However, these hypotheses have recently been put under test when Nazarbayev, resigned in an unannounced television address in March 2019. In accordance with the Constitution, the speaker of the upper house of parliament, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, became the country's interim president (Kholdorbeko, 2019). Moreover, Nazarbayev stepped down voluntarily. This took place only the second time after Boris Yeltsin (first to do so in 1999), when the President of the post-Soviet republic has left his post upon his wish. Tokayev's interim charge as president was followed by a snap presidential poll which he won attaining 70.76 per cent of the vote defeating his nearest rival Amirzhan Kosanov. Now Tokayev is holding supreme position; nevertheless, Nazarbayev's role in Kazakh polity has not reduced. Through Constitutional Amendment in 2018, the power of the President has been weakened with respect to the National Security Council, which is now headed by Nazarbayev for life. He has assumed the status of national leader or *Elbasy* and retained the chairmanship of the ruling party Nur Otan. Looked critically by Human Rights Watch as: "Everything about this so-called transition has been carefully orchestrated and highly controlled – an approach the Kazakh authorities have long employed to regulate and restrict its citizens' political and civil lives" (Stefanello, 2019). Nazarbayev's resignation did not come as a surprise, as Sebastian Schiek of the Berlin-based German Institute for International and Security Affairs claims: "There were rumors that it could happen", however, noting that laws passed in recent years indicated that leadership change was imminent (Goncharenko, 2019). Secondly, Kazakhstan progressively grew as an authoritarian state and maintained personalized system of power, and even before resignation of Nazarbayev certain protection of ensuring his important powers such as the head of Security Council and the status of a national leader were guaranteed (Goncharenko, 2019).

Given the fact that Kazakhstan has attained the status of principal institutionalized mechanisms of democratic governance such as elections and civil liberties but even then the ability of elites to frame the political debate, thereby defining the political agenda and channeling political outcomes enable them to make effectively good use of the state's means of persuasion as their arsenal, making the state a "soft-authoritarian" one (Schatz, 2009). This authoritarian status quo, however, has been put under strain, as Barbara Junisbai and Azmat Junisbai argued, Democratic Choice Opposition movement, clan divisions, and elite cleavages in fact served as a significant source of pressure for democratic political reform (Junisbai & Junisbai, 2009).

Moreover, western institutional reports published internationally follow broadly two lines while describing the state of democracy in Kazakhstan. The first line focuses on leadership, specifically president Nazarbayev's failure in meeting a prerequisite condition for the transition. The second line of explanation stresses on the structural issues which is voiced from human rights organizations like Amnesty International and institutions such as Freedom House, Eurasianet, and also, to an extent, media and press organizations like International Press Institute (IPI) and Radio Free Europe (RFE). The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, which studies democracy in 165 countries on the basis of five decisive factors: *electoral process and pluralism*; *civil liberties*; the *functioning of government*; *political participation*; and *political culture*, allocate scores on a range of indicators within these categories. Accordingly, each country is then

categorized as one of four types of regime: "full democracies", "flawed democracies", "hybrid regimes", and "authoritarian regimes". In 2018 Kazakhstan secured 144th place with a score of 2.94 falling into the category of authoritarian regimes (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018). However, with a slight improvement, the 2019 report put Kazakhstan on the 139th place. The report has clearly indicated that with overall score below 4 Kazakhstan falls in the authoritarian category (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019).

Table-1: Democracy Index: EIU's Report

Country	Rank	Overall Score	Electoral processes and pluralism	Functioning of Government	Political Participation	Political Cultures	Civil Liberties
Kazakhstan (2018)	144	2.94	0.50	2.14	4.44	4.38	3.24
Kazakhstan (2019)	139	2.94	0.50	2.14	4.44	4.38	3.24

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Democracy Index 2018: Me Too Political Participation, Protest and Democracy", p. 17 & The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Democracy Index 2019: A Year of Democratic Setback and Popular Protest", p. 13. Retrieved 20 July 2020, from https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index

Table-2: Kazakhstan: Democracy Score (Year-wise)

Country	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010
Kazakhstan	2.94	2.94	3.06	3.06	3.06	3.17	3.06	2.95	3.24	3.30

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Democracy Index 2019: A Year of Democratic Setback and Popular Protest", p. 18, Retrieved 20 July 2020, from https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index

Studies of Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization working for "the expansion of freedom and democracy around the world", present similar picture. The latest report (2020) of Freedom House portrays gloomy state of affair for democracy in Kazakhstan, rating its democratic progress very low. The report titled "Nations in Transit 2020: Dropping the Democratic Façade" categorized Kazakhstan as "consolidated authoritarian regime" allocating 1.29, 1.29 and 1.32 democracy score in 2018, 2019 and 2020 reports respectively on the scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the lowest and 7 the highest level of democratic progress. The reports evaluated democratic progress in Kazakhstan on the basis of eight parameters: electoral process, civil society, independent media, national democratic governance, local democratic governance, judicial framework, independence and the last is corruption. All the parameters have shown very abysmal performance as the score for them remained below 1.5 as shown below (Freedom

House, 2020, 24-25).

Table-3: Score for Eight Parameters on the Scale of 1 to 7

National Democratic Governance	1.25
Electoral Process	1.25
Civil Society	1.50
Independent Media	1.25
Local Democratic Governence	1.50
Judicial Framework and Independence	1.25
Corruption	1.25
Democracy Score	1.32
Democracy Percentage	5%

Source: Freedom House, "Nations in Transit 2020: Dropping the Democratic Façade ", Retrieved 20 July 2020, from https;//freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/05062020 FH NIT2020 vfinal.pdf.p.24.

Another study, Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI), has ranked Kazakhstan in 2016, 85 out of 129 countries with score of 4.88 on the scale of 1-10 (Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, 2016). Continuing on declining trend, in 2018 the country again registered 88th position out of 129 countries with the score of 4.70 (BTI, 2018). The BT Index assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of political management on the parameters of country's structural conditions, traditions of civil society, intensity of conflicts, level of education, economic performance and institutional capacity (BTI, 2018). The declining trend can be demonstrated through following graph.

Graph-1: Declining BT Index of Kazakhstan from 2008 Onwards



*Computed from the various reports of BTI, Retrieved 20 July 2020, from https://atlas.bti-project.org/1*2020*CV:CTC:SELKAZ*CAT*KAZ*REG:TAB*

Kazakhstan at the Crossroads: Wither the Democratic Transition

Evidently, as illustrated above, factors responsible for the stagnation in the democratic transition in Kazakhstan are numerous. Meritt has explicated a combination of factors responsible for this stagnation which include both internal and external (Meritt, 2006). At the time of independence, Kazakhstan has emerged as a unique phenomenon of the nations' ethnic and cultural interactions, which can be seen practically in all the aspects of human activity, language, way of life, traditions, confessions, way of thinking and mentality (Olcott, 2010). But after independence, it was clear that the major characteristics of Central Asian states are the presence of sub-national identities and titular nationalities. Despite demographic improvements in the position of titular nationalities, Central Asian states were facing critical challenge of creating a sense of commitment to the nationhood (Olcott, 2010). In the first few years of Kazakh independence, a state-building approach appears to have had decisive advantages over democratic reforms, ensuring that Kazakhstan actually remains Kazakhstan, which eventually led the government to abrogate the basic democratic rights—freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of political activity, and free elections (Bremmer & Welt, 1996: 179). Leaders of Central Asia, including Kazkhstan succeeded in cultivating certain modes of reasoning and evaluation among citizens that eased the acceptance of the regime as right and proper, thereby fetching in "effective authoritarian legitimation" (Omelicheva, 2016). According to Mehran Kamrava, ensuring the legitimacy of the authoritarian, multiethnic state was only one of the steps toward nation-building, albeit a highly significant one (Kamrava, 2019: 1). What followed, "as typified by Kazakhstan's experience", as Kamrava emphasizes, "included the promotion of an inclusive, civic state through official discourse; the implementation of nationalizing policies through the promotion of a dominant language, culture, and historiography (and unofficial discrimination against non-titular groups); and the monopolization of the political field by titular elites" (Kamrava, 2019). This served persuasively as legitimizing logic for powerful presidential control by Nazarbayev.

Role of leadership, especially Nazarbayev's has been key factor in the process of democratization. In fact, the process of nation-building and democratization both are associated with the personality of Kazakh President. Shedding light on this issue, M.B. Olcott rightly observed: "..Nazarbayev thought that the processes of nation-building and state-building of a newly independent Kazakhstan were dependent upon him and to fulfill those objectives, he concentrated all the powers in one man" (Olcott, 2008).

The strong presidential rule was the most effective way to promote reform unencumbered by resistance from "backward looking" forces or special interest groups. Nazarbayev subscribed a archetypical model of democracy swerving away from western model and contending that liberal model of democracy wouldn't fit into Kazakhstan's specific political dynamics, and economic and social environment (Olcott, 2008). "Perhaps we have not yet created the democratic society. But we can be proud of the achievements we have. Our progress to a truly democratic system is irreversible. We have created fundamentals of democracy", adducing gains on the front of democratization, Nazarbayev stated once (Taukebayeva, 2014).

Undoubtedly, over the years, Nazarbayev maintained huge backing of people in the presidential elections and his political party has no close alternative in Kazakh political system. Taking advantage of people's support through electoral exercise he remained undeterred against any mass dissent, for instance which took place in 2011 in Zhanaozen owing to economic reasons, in 2016 against the new amendments to the Land Code in Atyra and Aktobe. Besides, after transfer of presidential power to Tokayev in 2019 in Nur-Sultan (new Capital renamed after Astana) and Almaty, a series of civil society protest took place on political and economic issues. Omelicheva's observation that given the public's apprehension of uncertainty associated with the transition to a post-Nazarbayev political system and the high levels of trust in the person of the president, there is a remote possibility of shunning Nazarbayev in Kazakh politics, proves to be true (Omelicheva, 2016: 12). Omelicheva citing a report of the World Value Survey reiterates that people accord priority to a strong leadership over democratic diffusion as the majority of respondents from Kazakhstan seemed not to be bothered by the deficit of democracy in the country: 64.4% believe that it is very good or fairly good to have a strong leader who does not have to bother with the parliament and elections (Omelicheva, 2016: 12). To add, for instance, in April 2015, Nazarbayev cemented his grip on power, winning reelection in a landslide 97.75 per cent of the vote in his favour.

However, in the period following independence, elections in Kazakhstan have increasingly become stage-managed events designed to shore up the power of Nazarbayev and his ruling Nur Otan party rather than to offer voters a choice about who rules them, and this election was no different (Freedom House, 2016). As a report writes that in spite of these realities, Nazarbayev's popularity had not come to recede till his departure from president; his "cult of personality was – and still is – manifest" (Bohr, et.al., 2019: 5). Most likely Nazarbayev would have won all the elections in which he stood, even had they been held democratically albeit with 70 per cent popular voting in place of 95 per cent and above, the report reiterates (Bohr, et.al., 2019: 5). The fact that in March 2019, Nazarbayev decided to step down from the presidency but continue holding sway as he has retained the status of national leader and maintained himself as the head of

country's Security Council. To detractors, this poll was well planned and choreographed by the former president Nazarbayev to bring a smooth and peaceful transition of power, however he has maintained his powerful position (Vaal and Gordeteyeva, 2019).

As a matter of fact the democratic values that are recognized in principle have not perceived the mass consciousness as a real tool to solve the problems of society. Nevertheless, over the years of the political transformation of Kazakhstan the degree of political participation of citizens through the institution of democratic elections has increased markedly (Taukebayeva, 2014). Lillis (2018) presents political trajectory of the country by analyzing that the major problem of democratic transition lie in the management of election system which are not only a travesty of democracy but lack one essential element and that is *political choice.* Lillis further argues that the lack of free and fair media, violence and intimidation during election, ruthless suppression of opposition, dissent and the total intolerance of peaceful protests are the regular events in Kazakhstan's day-to-day politics (Lillis, 2018).

Civil society plays important role in the process of democratization. In Kazakhstan, in the first decade of independence the process was quite fast and perceptible but in the later period it gradually slowed down. Under Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan retreated from any genuine commitment to developing a vibrant, grassroots-based civil society in favour of a model in which NGOs and other non-profits operate under not just government scrutiny but government control, treating civil society more as a vassal to further government policy than as an independent actor (Lillis, 2019a: 37-58). According to Freedom House Report 2018, score for civil society in Kazakhstan has been falling gradually. On the scale of 1 to 7 (highest to lowest), civil society score in 2010 was 5.75, which further declined to 6.50 in 2015 and 6.75 in 2018. The report states that abysmal civil society condition is caused "due to ongoing routine harassment and persecution of activists, journalists, lawyers, individual users of social networks, and religious communities against the backdrop of increasingly restrictive legislation and administrative pressure on civil society" (Freedom House, 2018).

Leadership, Political Processes and Constitutional Measures

Kazakh establishment, especially former president Nazarbayev, took an attempt to standardize a specific version of democracy what he believed was in practice and suffice in its own right fulfilling democratic values the Kazakh society aspired to have. Nazarbayev gave expression to his ideas publishing articles in different media outlets. To him, laying foundations of the market economy, civil society and democracy simultaneously was the first order of priority. But, this had not to come at the expense of stability and tranquility in society. Nazarbayev clarified:

> "Democratic reform and measures to enhance human rights must not, however, be introduced in a way that undermines stability. We cannot afford to disturb the atmosphere of religious and inter-ethnic tolerance"… and … Please remember also just how long your own societies took to complete the processes on which we are now embarked" (Official site of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan).

Before assuming new role in Kazakh polity in 2019, Nazarbayev introduced multiple constitutional amendments after adoption of the first Constitution in 1993. Over the years,

he succeeded in consolidating "autocratic legacy", at the expense of strengthening democratic institutions intending to embolden his position in power. Kate Mallinson enlists such attempt as:

> "In 1995 Nazarbayev got his term extended till 1999 in a national referendum; in 1998 eliminated the age limit of 65; in May 2007, the presidential term was restored back to five years, with removal of the two-term limit for Nazarbayev; in parallel to these amendments, several other constitutional manoeuvres occurred, including introduction of the concept of the 'First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan' and 'Leader of the Nation' in new law in 2000, subsequently amended in 2010, thereby giving Nazarbayev certain powers for life, such as the right to address the people of Kazakhstan, parliament, government agencies and officials on matters of domestic and foreign policy and national security. Besides, legal and constitutional amendments in 2007, 2010 and 2017 respectively provided Nazarbayev with an unlimited number of terms in office, legal immunity, and immunity of his family's property" (Mallinson, 2019: 12).

However amidst these realities, Nazarbayev didn't disregard the voice raised against democratic process *in toto*, wrote Aitken (2009) while examining such developments. In particular, Nazarbayev has been responsive to pressure coming from the West, particularly, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Kazakhstan held the chair of the OSCE in 2010. Since then Kazakhstan has been taking extensive efforts towards religious freedom, human rights and fair election more than Russia, China and other states of the region. Sophia McClennen, a professor of International Affairs at Penn State University and political analyst who in person visited the polling booth during the presidential election of April 2015, didn't find much in sync with what often claimed to be as democratic discrepancy all-pervasive in the state (as Quoted in Michael, 2016).

It is observed, however, that during the last five years the Kazakh leadership appeared more down to business towards accommodating democratic measures. Nazarbayev time and again called for amending the Constitution to give more power and responsibilities to the parliament and the government for managing social and economic development. For instance, in 2015, he announced a 100-step reform program focusing on introducing greater transparency and increase institutional effectiveness. The major challenge is obviously in the implementation, in particular overcoming vested special interests intent on preserving the status quo. But if the reforms are implemented, they would undoubtedly improve in the quality of public administration and bridge any existing gaps between citizens and their government (Starr, Engvall & Cornell, 2016). In this programme of major democratic reforms, important functions are transferred to Parliament. These include the Parliament's role in the formation of Government, bringing amendments, choosing the cabinet, and lawmakers holding a "vote of no confidence" on a sitting cabinet. What it all means is that the Government would be accountable to the Mazhilis rather than to the President. The Government, headed by Prime Minister, will have the right to set programmes but also bear full accountability for them. However, the President will retain the right to cancel or suspend the acts of the Government (Stobdan, 2017). To implement these proposals, the President has given official approval to the constitutional reforms on March 10, 2017. In his own words, these were aimed at "serious

redistribution of power and democratization of the political system as a whole". Another major development is that through this reform the presidential position is also reframed as that of a "supreme arbiter", focusing on the "strategic functions" of foreign policy, national security, and defense (Pistan, 2017).

Exigency of Transition and Democratic Imperatives

On 19 March 2019 in a big political move, Nazabayev announced to renounce power leading to an eruption of huge speculation regarding this instantaneous regime change and the future of democratic reforms. In his television address, he enunciated: "I have taken a decision, which was not easy for me, to resign as president….I am staying with you…Caring for the country and its people will remain my concerns." (Roth, 2019). Later, as quoted by *The Astana Times*, Nazarbayev affirmed: "I resigned on 19 March. But a new generation will come to lead the country. This is how it works in life and I believe they will work for the sake of the country and our generation should help them." (Satubaldina, 2019). But the fact is that Nazarbayev still holds a powerful position in Kazakh politics as a head of the Security Council and as a leader of the nation. Joanna Lillies has observed that the "President has stepped aside rather than stepping down". Nevertheless, Nazarbayev may retain power behind the scene. Putz (2019) wrote "Nazarbayev, now from behind a thin curtain of retirement, is still the shot-caller in Kazakhstan. Everything else is a flashy theater production designed to distract the Kazakh people, and the international community, from Kazakhstan's economic and social problems",. Another emerging dynamics of Kazakh domestic politics is that due to this snap poll for the first time strong opposition has emerged. In the election, after Tokayev, his nearest rival, opposition candidate Amirzhan Kosanov, garnered a surprisingly respectable 16 per cent of total votes casted. His electoral performance indicates that he did the best till now and no opposition candidate has ever done this before in Kazakhstan's history (Leonard & Kumenov, 2019). Secondly, public protests during elections demonstrated the emergence of burgeoning civil society where so many new protest movements like the Wake Up Movement emerged which called for democratic reforms including civil liberties. Tokayev, however, after election pronounced publicly that "the electoral process was exemplary and democratic", contrary to independent reports from the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), an international watchdog that the government invited to observe the elections. In its preliminary report, ODIHR said the election "was tarnished by clear violations of fundamental freedoms as well as pressure on critical voices" (Sorbello, 2019).

The most exigent task towards resting Kazakhstan on the track of democracy is to exploit the opportunity of the transition of Nazarbayev's regime. For that, Kazakhstan needs to adopt some drastic reforms by introducing both political and constitutional measures. First of all, Kazakhstan needs to adopt political pluralism keeping in mind the diverse character of ethnic composition of the Kazakh society. Kazakhstan needs to strengthen the authority of representative bodies of power. Expansion of Parliament, the introduction of proportional representation system in the lower house of Parliament and promoting local-self governments could be effective measures. Secondly, at the constitutional level, Kazakhstan must introduce some mechanism of checks and balances,

separation of powers, and decentralization by giving some authority to local governments at the grass-root level. For effectively accomplishing these changes Kazakhstan may have two options: first is a presidential form of government with federal features and second is a parliamentary system headed by the prime minister with nominal head of the state which is president. Thirdly, participatory political culture could be augmented to make civil society secured, mobilized, informative and vibrant. Rights and freedoms of citizens should be expanded. Fourthly, the emergence of a multi-party system is a basic pre-requisite for democratic development in Kazakhstan. Being a multi-ethnic society multi-party system should represent the interests of all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan and it must be ensured that these ethnic groups should be represented in both local councils and in Parliament. Fifthly, the implementation of principles and values of democracy and human rights shall be an important measure to enforce democracy in the country. And finally, there is a need to infuse strong political will among political elites and especially those who hold the power including President of the republic to carry on political reforms and the process of democratization (Beary, 2012).

Conclusion

Kazakhstan's professed claim to set the nation on the path of true democracy is yet to meet reality. The checkered history of democratization has posed in itself the challenge of how to meet these claims. Narratives and counter-narratives vis-à-vis democratization process lay down a degree of truth that can't be easily disdained. The attempt of ruling political elite, particularly the President, in making Kazakh democratic venture distinctive and inimitable rationalized with the expediency of historical legacy, cultural exceptionalism, political feasibility and economic need, has been subjected to critical investigation. In the course of the pitched voice against western liberal democratic legitimacy, for sure no strong assertion could defy the logic that the western liberal democracy will not settle down in the region for it being inconsistent with the long historical legacy of the Central Asian countries. The conflict between the quest for its own model and ongoing practice—often termed as simulated with multiple levels such as controlled—can only be settled if real concerns of the people of Kazakhstan receive their genuine place *via* ideal type of democracy in Weberian terms drawing symmetry between the liberal democracy and Kazakhstan's indigenously induced experience. Albeit, through constitutional reforms which are a part of "third modernization" Kazakhstan has succeeded in ensuring "the stability of the political system", "making the Government and Parliament more effective in responding to modern challenges", and evolving a political system for Kazakhstan of its own, rather than "copying a foreign model", to cater to the country's unique problems. Through intended "fourth reform", dubbed as "open government", as undertaken by Nazarbayev, may witness an infusion of maturity in the democratic reforms with the redistribution of powers aiming at ensuring appropriate system with checks and balances (Pistan, 2017). Yet, a full transition to democracy needs plenty of measures, which include settling down the transition of power from Nazarbayev 1.0 to Nazarbayev 2.0; setting the new government of Tokayev to hold governmental accountability within legal and constitutional frame with sheer transparency and inclusiveness; fostering civic culture; widening window for civil societies for enhancing

fertility in the otherwise parched democratic soil; beefing up the bar of the rule of law, civil and justice administration; and maintaining legitimacy of relations with Eurasian countries for both domestic and international sustenance.

Notes

1. W.B. Gallie's idea of "essentially contested concept" is frequently used to illustrate the notion of democracy. The essentially contested concepts "inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users." See: W.B. Gallie. (1956). Essentially Contested Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56, 167–198. The notion of democracy being contested is due to its historical evolution, which itself "reveals that no unequivocal definition is possible because of the significant paradoxes, aporias, and contradictions it contains", writes Oliver Hidalgo (Conceptual history and politics: Is the concept of democracy essentially contested? Contributions to the History of Concepts, 4(2) (2008), 176-201).
2. Democracy in Central Asian republics is not all about what the West subscribes. A fascinating analysis has been presented by Mariya Y. Omelicheva in her book Democracy in Central Asia: Competing perspectives and alternative strategies (2015). To Omelicheva, Western policymakers and academics have developed a sophisticated understanding of what democracy is about and this understanding emphasizes political pluralism, elections, and civic engagement, among other things. Yet, these ideas are largely divorced from how democracy and democratization are understood in Central Asia. The centrality of strong leadership shouldered with the task of resolving larger challenges of the Central Asian societies including democracy get more dogged towards power maintenance often attracting variety of "level" for the regime typology. However, a special level "cunning democracy" for the kind of polity Kazakhstan pursues is cited in a brief report (Kazakhstan: Cunning democracy) of Norwegian Helisinki Committee in 2013.

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The Development of Soviet Education in Kazakh SSR (1917-1991)

Zubeer A. Rather & Darakhshan Abdullah***

Abstract

Experimentation of the Soviet Model of Education in Central Asia has contributed in an enormous way to the development of socio-economic life of Central Asian States in general and Kazakhstan in particular. Why Kazakhstan is particular because its relationship with Russia had been the longest and all-pervading, leading to long-lasting imprints on the Kazakh socio-economic and cultural institutions. Russian rule changed the demographic profile of Kazakh SSR, but along with the task of changing demography, the transformation of socio-economic and cultural fabric through the experimentation of the Soviet model of education cannot be altogether ignored.

The present study intends to investigate the educational development of Kazakhstan throughout the Russian rule along with its underlying causes. The study argues that the educational development in Kazakh SSR was motivated not only to produce favorable conditions for inculcating new values among the younger generation, but to obtain a class of literates or professionals who could help the Union or Republic in economic gains.

Keywords

Nomads, Soviet Education, Russians, Creches, Kindergartens, Technicums

Introduction

In the social sphere, the role of education has always been reckoned. The social up-gradation of a society always comes through new ideas and thoughts which in turn are carried through the channel of education. The case of Central Asia and Kazakhstan as such was not different. Both Czars and Soviets at their level tried best to monopolize education for developing and strengthening their institutions in the region. Though Czars were little interested in the socio-economic improvement, yet they are credited with the introduction of modern education in Kazakhstan. Even though, Central Asia had inherited a rich tradition of education from Arabs and has become famous in the world for its well-developed educational centres. (Mobin Shorish, 1986, p. 340). Kazakhs however could not reap the benefits of Islamic education, particularly in northern parts due to their nomadic character. The semi-nomadic tribes such as Kazakhs and Kirgiz continued to live nomadic life even when the Russians were, literary speaking, ruling them. At first, Czars were reluctant to spread education in Kazakhstan, however, later on they started to develop education and made different experiments in this particular field. Under the Soviets, the development of education viz-à-viz Kazakhstan took new heights.

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Development of Education under Czars

Though Czars were reluctant[1] about introducing changes in the socio-cultural set up of Kazakhstan, yet they were convinced that these nomads could be educated by Muslim education rather than by any other form of secular education. So they first introduced Islamic education and Tatars were entrusted to civilize the nomads of the steppe. (Elizabeth E. Bacon, 1966, p. 100). However, later on when Kazakhstan became a full-fledged colony of Russia, this Tatar influence was smelled as a threat to the colonial regime, and as such Tatar influence was abolished.

So for establishing a strong base and to facilitate smooth administrative functioning, an educational policy was formulated by which Russian schools were established in which Christianity was taught along with modern education. Since these schools failed to attract commoners and only a few merchants and nobles sent their children to these institutions, thus, a network of Russo-Native schools that were new for the land was introduced. (Darakhshan Abdullah, 2014, p. 66). In these schools, the Russian language and culture were taught along with Islamic education. These schools developed pro-Russian elite who later on advocated for the adoption of Russian policies. The growth and development of these schools were quite significant in some oblasts like Turgay and Syr-Darya. The following table reflects the growth of these schools in the Syr-Darya oblast.

Table 1: Growth of Russo-Native Schools in Syr-Darya Oblast: From 1884 to 1915

Year	Number of Schools	Number of students
1884	12	254
1900	23	722
1908	34	1354
1911	54	2658
1915	65	3410

Source: Richard A. Pierce. (1960). Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917: a study in colonial rule. Berkeley: University of California Press. p. 219.

In addition to Russo-Native schools, Kazakh Teachers Training College in 1887 was established (Elizabeth E. Bacon, 1966, pp. 95-101). and steps were also taken for women's education. As a result of colonial initiatives, at least 267 Aul Schools and 157 Russian-Kazakh Schools were established in the Steppe and Semirechie oblast which benefited some 2,000 Kazakhs by 1913. (Gavin Hambly, 1969, p. 222)

The reason for this limited education was the lack of interest shown and the non-availability of extensive funds in spreading modern education.[2] This limited colonial education policy failed to make much impact in Central Asia and Kazakhstan and one could see that the literacy rate remained very low. In the whole territory of Central Asia,

only 4.2 percent of native men and 0.5 of women were literate. By 1917 only 3 percent of Kazakhs were literate though the general literacy rate was even higher than those of natives which shows that Russian migrants had a comparatively much higher literacy rate. (A. K. Patnaik, 2005, pp. 549-50).

These colonial efforts, though limited, inspired a native group of intellectuals who stood for radical changes in the socio-cultural set up of the people of Central Asia and propagated a movement known as the "Jadid movement."[3] The founder of the movement Ismail Bay Gasprinskii (1851-1914) was a Crimean Tatar, who pioneered the idea in the Crimea region in the 1880s. Most of the reformers of this movement came from sedentary areas (like Mahmud Khoja Behbudi from Samarkand, Shaq Khan Tora from Farghana, and Abdul Qadir Shakhuri from Tashkent). The ideas and teachings of these reformers made a profound impact on the whole Central Asian Society including Kazakh intellectuals who got educated from Russian cities.[4] Taking advantage of western scientific progress along with making religion the basis of indigenous socio-cultural setup, the movement was an attempt to modernize Islamic society as a whole. (A. K. Patnaik, 2005, p. 556). They started a campaign against some of the existing customs of society like dowry, child marriage, polygamy, kalym, etc. (Adeeb Khalid, 1998, p. 98). The most important contribution of the Jadid Movement was witnessed in the development of modern education in Central Asia. They opened up new schools where education was given on modern lines. (Z. R. Vaiduanath, 1967, p. 55). Kazakh intellectuals like Shokan Valikhanov who wrote several scholarly works in Russian and Ibraj Altynsarian played an active role in the development of education and Kazakh language. Abay Kunanbayev who played a vital role in the development of Kazakh literature was generally called its father. (Shirin Akiner, 2002, p. 200). Apart from highlighting social inequalities, the movement advocated women's education to liberate them from old bogus traditions. (Adeeb Khalid, 2006, p. 241). They considered women as the torchbearers for prosperity, and as a result advocated for their moral, educational and intellectual progress. (Adeeb Khalid, 1998, p. 225). The reformers of this movement built several New Method schools,[5] which instigated traditional institutions like Maktab and Madrasas to reassert the importance of religious education.[6] Even in nomadic areas, where formal education had not spread earlier, religious schools proliferated along with secular ones. By the first decade of the 20th century, officials recorded 121 Madrasas with 1,800 Kazakh students in the Steppe oblast. (A.K. Patnaik, 2005, pp. 550-551). Besides substantial contribution to the development of the school network, the presence of Russian intellectuals instigated the Kazakh elite to setup local vernaculars like "Qazaqstan," "Ishim-dalasi," "Ayqap" and "Qazakh" in the region. (Adeeb Khalid, 1994, pp. 187-200). Devoting attention first to economic problems, these newspapers gradually turned to political aspects. It criticized the government for its Russification policies and displacement of Kazakhs by Russian colonists. On the other hand, these papers attacked conservative circles of Pan-Islamism, urged military services for Kirghiz and Kazakhs, demanded more schools and transition of nomads to a settled life. (Gavin Hambly, 1969, p. 224). Despite the combined efforts of Russian and Kazakh intellectuals, the literacy rate before October Revolution did not exceed more than 5.8% for men and that of women as 0.8%. (Vishvanath Thakur, 1992, p. 49).

Education under Soviets

The October Revolution and the establishment of Soviet rule ushered a new era in the development of education in Union Republics including Kazakhstan. The Soviet policy of education which was based on Marxist-Leninist ideology regarded education as an essential component of socio-political and economic mobilization. Emphasizing the role of education Lenin wrote, "Our object in the field of school is the same struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, we openly declare that a school outside life, outside politics, is a lie and hypocrisy." (Javid Ashraf, 1978, p. 64). The foundation of the new educational policy was laid between 1917 and 1919 and called for socially non-discriminatory irrespective of caste, class, and sex, free and compulsory education up to the age of 17 years.[7] The new policy advocated that education should be administered in a decentralized manner under a central authority; provide a pre-school keeping of infants, provide adult literacy and cultural programs and teach materialistic scientific education. Schools for literacy known as ABC Schools, where the medium of instruction was mother tongue, were opened to educate people in general and women in particular. Besides ABC Schools, various establishments like special Women's Clubs, Red Yurts and Red Corners, etc, were established which served as centers of teaching and preaching of Soviet ideology. At first ethnic Russians including communist officials were engaged in organizing the "Red Yurts" expedition who migrated with Kazakh Auls, and used to spread Marxist ideology besides education.

Soviet government encountered strong resistance in the 1920s and 1930s when compulsory and co-education was introduced in Central Asian Republics, where the tradition of segregation of sexes and early marriages prevailed strongly. To emancipate and attract more girls towards education, the decree of 1936 replaced the co-education system, and boys and girls were educated separately and more than 12,000 teachers and literary volunteers were sent to work among the Kazakh population and their main task was the education of women in particular. Such types of extraordinary policies served as a cornerstone for the development of education. As such by 1970, the literacy rate in Kazakhstan reached to climax of 99% from a mere 25.2% in 1926 (Table 2).

Table 2: Literacy Rate in RSFSR and Kazakh SSR (1926-1970)

Year	RSFSR	Kazakh SSR		
		Men	Women	Total
1926	60.9	35.9	14.5	25.2
1939	89.9	91.4	75.8	83.6
1959	98.5	98.8	95.1	96.9
1970	NA	NA	NA	99
% Change 1926-70				292.85

Source: David Fidlon. (1968). A Leap through the centuries.Moscow: Progress Publishers. p. 58; Viktor Kozlov, (1988). The peoples of the Soviet Union. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 155-160.

For the further development of education, besides the infrastructural facilities, the Soviet government provided tuition fees; other facilities like free books, free uni-forms,

and free transportation for attending schools in a nearby town or city[8].

From 1930 onwards the Soviet Union passed through a new phase of communism based on coercion and oppression. The era was marked by the emergence of Stalin on the political scene. This period was marked by the use of force to lead people to adopt and follow what communism and socialism were meant for. In 1934 efforts were made by the Soviet government to expand and improve the quality of education.[9] To achieve a rapid increase in the number of schools and students in Kazakhstan and to improve the quality of education, over 13,000 new teachers with middle and higher education were employed in schools, among whom half were Kazakhs. (Martha Brill Olcott, 1995, p. 195). The main motive was not only to produce favorable conditions for inculcating new values among the younger generation but also to gain a much broader base for imparting education to eradicate illiteracy and to obtain a class of literates or professionals who could help the Union or Republic in economic gains.

Structure of Education

The comprehensive and well-implemented Soviet system of education which contributed significantly towards the socio-economic development of Kazakhstan comprised of following stages.

Pre-School

Pre-School education was in the form of Creches (age group of 0-3 years) and Kindergartens (age group of 3-7 years). It was not completely free but parents were required to meet its expenses up to a certain level. (Bejoy Kumar Sinha, 1971, p. 11). The primary goal of Pre-School education was to provide child care to working parents and guaranteeing women's right to work and equality in socio-economic and political spheres which was possible only after letting them free from the responsibility of taking care of children. (Maurrice Bobb, 1943, p. 95). Moreover, the communist regime believed that children must be removed from the influence of family and should be grown under the healthy influence of Communist nurseries and schools. (Saud Joseph, 2003, p, 168).

The growth of pre-school institutions showed a tremendous increase. The total number of Pre-School institutions in Kazakhstan during 1966 was 4,143 attended by 360,167 children which increased to 551,800 in 1970. The number of Kindergartens increased to 8,743 in 1990 and more than half were located in rural areas. (Bejoy K. Sinha, 1971, p. 229; Martha B. Olcott, 1995, p. 315; A. K. Patnaik, 2005, p. 553.)

School Education

The general education in the whole USSR and republics of Central Asia including Kazakhstan was imparted in various types of schools run by the government. These schools consisted of primary schools, first cycle secondary or incomplete secondary (middle schools), and the second cycle secondary or complete secondary. The total number of school years changed from time to time.[10] In 1934 for the first time a uniform system of general education was introduced which consisted of four years of primary education (grades 1-4), three years of incomplete secondary education (grades 5-7), and three years of complete secondary education (grades 8-10). (Aigerim Mynbayeva and

Victoria Pogosian, 2014, p. 150). It was required that all the children in the Soviet Union would get free primary education of the first four grades and were required to study compulsorily for the next three years up to grade seven. The further higher classes of three years were left to the will of children. This was however changed in 1977 when all grades were made compulsory. To improve the years of secondary education, in 1984 one more year was added from 10 to 11. (M. Y. Sharpe, 1978, pp. 35). The eight-year programme (incomplete secondary) provided full-time study while additional years required for complete secondary was achieved either by part-time or full-time study. Most schools provided a complete range of educational classes, but in some rural areas, primary schools existed as separate units. In such cases, children were transferred to the nearest secondary school to complete their education (Ann Sheehy, 1968, p. 147).

The Soviet government made strong efforts to spread education rapidly. Before Revolution, the number of Primary schools was 2,011 which increased to 3,944 by 1927-28 and was further developed during subsequent years. The growing number of primary and secondary schools over the years of Soviet rule is well reflected in table 3.

Table 3: Growth of Primary and Secondary schools (1914-1972)

Date	No. of Schools	No. of Pupil
1914-15	2,011	105,239
1920-21	2,410	144,000
1927-28	3,944	274,000
1932-33	6,869	576,000
1951-52	8,945	1,346,000
1959-60	NA	2,857,000
1971-72	10,101	3,296,000

Source: Ann Sheehy, (1968). Primary and secondary education in Central Asia and Kazakhstan: the current situation.Central Asian Review. 26(2). pp. 148-152; The Europa Year Book, Vol I, 1973, p. 1371.

In 1936, the government employed 12,000 teachers and literary voluntaries, who were sent to Kazakhstan to work among the Kazakh population. This was therefore the most striking feature of the development of education in Kazakhstan as a massive increase in school population was supported by a massive school building programme that was a prerequisite. For this purpose, a large sum from the republic budget was allocated to school construction. For example, in 1930, out of a million roubles, 80% of the sum was spent in Kazakhstan for eradicating illiteracy, (Martha B. Olcott, 1995, p. 196). The number of children attending schools increased enormously in all Republics.[11] Equally significant were increases in numbers of students attending universities and places of higher education and likewise in those studying in technical colleges.

Vocational-Technical Schools

One of the most important categories of schools in the Soviet Union were Specialized Secondary Schools commonly known as Technicums or Professional Technical Schools, which was an important feature of the Soviet educational system. (Kenneth R. Witing, 1962, p. 249). These types of schools served as a bridge between School education on one hand and Higher education on the other hand and provided a variety of courses that produced professional cadres in medicine, engineering, agronomy, and veterinary-specializations, etc. (Javid Ashraf, 1978, p. 121). These Vocational Technical institutes tried to encourage and develop the industrial creativity of students and to develop their ability to solve specific problems (C.N. Chakravarti and A. K. Basu, 1987, p. 72).

The technical schools were of two types, short cycle Vocational Schools and Technicums (Polytechnics) or Specialized Schools. After completing Grade 8, some of the students through a mode of entrance examination moved to Vocational or Technical schools, the duration of which was 2 to 4 years depending on the area of specialization. Seventy-five percent (75%) of full-time students of Technicums received stipends of 40 to 60 roubles per month and dormitory accommodation at a nominal fee (Vadin Madish, 1991, p. 231).

The primary objective of Vocational education was to enable children leaving schools to find their place in life by giving them a definite skill in some branch of industry and agriculture. (N. Dzhandid-din, 1959, p. 16). A large number of Vocational schools were set up in Kazakhstan, which was attracted by a huge number of students. For example, in 1950 there were 110 Vocational-Technical Schools which reached 217 by 1996. Moreover, there were 34 technical institutions attended by 6,300 students in 1940 which showed enormous growth like the Vocational schools. In 1969 there were 317 Technical Institutes that imparted education to almost 154,800 students (N. Rutkevieh, 1969, p. 12).

Another important fact about the Soviets was that they were much eager to produce technical labour who could add to their national income when employed in industries and mining as a result labourers were given a course of technical training before they were sent down to mines for work. All positions in mines were open to every worker, depending on their willingness to study in technical schools which were free of charge, and were meant to perfect their skill theoretically and practically as well. Under such conditions, they found no complexity in recruiting an essential labour force. (W.P. Coates and Z.K. Coates, 1951, pp. 125-126). After passing out of these institutes some of the students joined industries directly while some continued their studies through part-time means. Thus, the establishment of technical institutions proved to be a successful embodiment of the educational policy of Soviet Kazakhstan.

Higher Education

The Soviet system of higher education consisted of two types of institutions one the University and other Institutions. In a university, several faculties were further divided into Chairs (Departments). (Eric W. Slevers, 2003, p. 259). The curriculum of universities covered a wide range of subjects including mathematics, sciences, social and political

sciences, humanities, and jurisprudence (law schools). Institutions that were professional schools and had a specialization in the fields like electric engineering, civil engineering, medicine, agriculture and foreign studies, art academies, musical conservatories, and some military schools.

In higher educational institutions special care was taken to develop the individual creativity of students and their ability to solve specific problems. The duration of study in higher education varied from 4 to 6 years, where successful completion of 3 years was granted the degree of Aspiruna, which was equal to graduate research degree leading further to a Kandidati or Ph. D degree after a further stay of 2 to 3 years in the institution (Vadin Madish, 1991, pp. 220-232).

The development of higher education was a general policy of the Soviet Union to provide cultural enlightenment to a wide range of the population. Before October Revolution, there were no higher educational institutes in Soviet Kazakhstan, however, after the revolution, they quickly began to appear. In the 1940s, the number of higher educational institutes rose almost up to 20. (W.P. Coates and Z.K. Coates, 1951, p. 134). The progress in the field of higher education of Kazakhstan is clear from the fact that in the 1960s, the republic had 44 universities and higher institutes that included Kazakh State University, Kurmangazy Kazakh State Conservatory, 19 Technical Training Institutes, 5 Medical and 10 polytechnic institutions with a total number of 415,000 students. (Bejoy K. Sinha, 1971, p. 229; Martha B. Olcott, 1995, p. 315; A. K. Patnaik, 2005, p. 553). The development in the field of higher educational institutes is well depicted in table 4.

Table 4: Number of Higher Education Institutes in Kazakhstan (1940-1982)

Years	No. of Educational Institutes	No. of Students per 1,000
1940-41	20	10
1955-56	25	49
1958-59	27	60
1959-60	27	70
1960-61	28	77
1969-70	43	195
1981-82	55	267

Source: Bejoy K. Sinha. (1971). The new man in the Soviet Union. New Delhi: People's Publishing House. p. 229; Martha B. Olcott. (1995). The Kazakhs. California: Hoover Institution Press. p. 315; A. K. Patnaik. (2005). Education the press and public health. In Adle, C. History of civilizations of Central Asia, VI, Paris: UNESCO publishing. p. 553.

Though the efforts of the Soviet government, the education system of Kazakhstan was widened and elaborated much. Literacy rate and many other aspects related to education showed a positive trend in terms of the outcomes of education in Kazakhstan . Though the number of Kazakhs was initially very low but later on, they also attained larger proportions (Juldyz Smagulova, 2008, p. 171). This is substantiated by the fact that

in 1955-72, native occupancy in administrative positions was 6.7% and native occupancy in all leading jobs was 46.6%. The share of non-Russian scientific workers in 1960 was 21.4% and in 1973, this figure increased to 29.8%. However, Kazakhs did not attain equality viz-à-viz Russians in terms of placements which implies that Russians were more inclined to modern education as such fetched more placements. This assertion is supported by the facts given in the following table which shows the educational level of Russians and Kazakhs during 1959 and 1970.

Table 5: Educational Level of Russians and Kazakhs (1959-1970)

Ethnic Group	Year		Change (%)
	1959	1970	
%age of students in higher and secondary education (aged over 10 years)			
Russians	37.8	50.8	34.3
Kazakhs	26.8	39.0	32.2
%age of students in higher education to population (aged 16-24)			
Russians	10.02	14.61	4.58
Kazakhs	9.58	14.31	4.93
%age of Specialists with Higher and Secondary Education to population (aged 16 -59)			
Russians	7.28	13.49	8.53
Kazakhs	4.15	9.40	12.65

Source: Robert A. Lewis, Richard H. Rowland, Ralph S. Clem. (1975). Modernizationpopulation change and nationality in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan.Canadian Slavonic Papers. 17(2/3). pp. 297-298.

Conclusion

The Soviet state took several steps for the development of education in Kazakh SSR. Though the development of education in Kazakhstan was motivated by the different pull and push factors created or in-creation from the metropole, however, these developments facilitated Kazakhs to get benefits out of the civilizing mission, the result being that literacy increased to a considerable extent. Moreover, Kazakhstan got several education institutions, both secondary and Higher, which could have been, however, established, but costs on state exchequer would have been enormous.

It is important to mention that once backward vast steppe land of nomads in dumps of poverty and ignorance during the Czarist period, made great strides in developing their educational standards within a short span of about 70 years of the Soviet era. There is no denying the fact that the Pre-Soviet period of Kazakhstan was predominantly illiterate.[12] However, by Soviet efforts, the literacy rate rose constantly from 83.6% in 1939 to 99% in

1970 and 1980. The literacy rate among women reached up to 75.1% in 1960 with a higher percentage of Kazakh women specialized or enrolled in higher education than women of any other Central Asian nationality. Despite government efforts, all this was made possible by the efforts of ethnic Russians also, who followed their masters and facilitated the process.

Notes

1. This reluctancy is substantiated by the remarks of an unspecified dignitary, "I am not impressed by the wild dreams of philanthropists who want to civilize the Kirgiz (including Kazakhs) to educate them and raise them to the level of European nation-------" (H. Carrere and D. Encauss, 1963, p. 312).
2. The assertion is substantiated by the allotment of a meager amount of only 2.3% of the total budget on education and health together. (A.K. Patnaik, 2005, p. 549; Darakhshan Abdullah, 2014, p. 72).
3. The term "Jadid" is an Arabic word that means new, but Jadidism was a drive for cultural and social renewal among Muslims in Russian Empire in the early 20th century. Historians have taken the term "Jadidism" from *Usul-i-Jadid*, meaning a "new method" of teaching in schools, yet Jadidism's significance extended far beyond education. (Marine Kamp, 2008, p.27).
4. The prolific writer Abdurruauf Fitrat, the poet and Current affairs commentator Avalos, etc, were the other Jadidists in Central Asia. (N.A. Abdurakhimov, 2005, p. 151).
5. According to an assertion, in 1917 there were 18 New Method schools in Semirechie province alone. (Elizabeth E Bacon, 1966, p. 115).
6. According to some official Russian sources, the number of traditional Madrasas increased from 11 to 22 in Tashkent (1876-1910) and from 120 to 140 in Farghana (1892-1911). (Devendra Kaushik, 1976, p. 62).
7. The spread of mass education was given high priority in the Soviet Union because it was important for political, economic, and social reasons. (Shirin Akiner, 2002. p. 15; A. K. Patnaik, 2005, p.552).
8. Most of the population in the Kazakh Soviet Republic was involved in animal husbandry so to cater to the needs of these people boarding schools were created across the republic. These schools were meant to provide education to those children who were performing their duties in collective animal rearing areas which were far off in pastoral lands.
9. The Soviets were much concerned to establish a wide network of primary schools.
10. For example, in 1918 the People's Commissariat of education introduced a uniform labour school of nine years with five years of primary education and four years of secondary education. After the restoration from World War and civil war, a four-year primary and five-year secondary education was introduced. However, in July 1930, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party passed a resolution, "on all general compulsory education" which declared that from the academic year 1930-31 there would be free compulsory education up to the fourth grade and seven-year compulsory education in industrial cities and worker's settlements. (M. Y. Sharpe, 1978, pp. 23-31; Vishvanath Thakur, 1992, p. 56).
11. Thus during the second five-year plan (1932-37), the number of children at school (elementary, continuation, and secondary) increased from 103,000 to 184,000 in Turkmenistan, from 644,000 to 932,000 in Uzbekistan, from 125,000 to 221,000 in Tajikistan, from 576,000 to 1,022,000 in Kazakhstan and from 146,000 to 265,000 in Kirghizia. (W.P. Coates and Z.K. Coates, 1951, p. 113).
12. The general literacy rate was only 8.1% in 1987 under the Czarist period though the education level of natives was even much lower than these figures; moreover, the literacy rate among women was below 1%.

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Socio-economical Transformation and Stratification of the Bukharan Society (1860-1920)

*Guzal Normurodova**

Abstract

As the Central Asian States turned into the colony and protectorate of the Russian empire, tangible changes occurred in the social sector. For instance, economic transformations were done which in turn influenced the process of social stratification. Peculiarities of Bukharan society, which clearly express Central Asian traditional social order and its social changes are substantial issue to be researched, since this is regarded as an unsolved problem of the social history of Central Asia. With the establishment of capitalist relations in Bukharan society, the role of personality began to take shape on such criteria as private property, investment, profit, enlightenment, together with previous class rights and preferences. The importance of this article can be seen in the analysis of peculiarities of changes that took place at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries in the Bukharan society.

Keywords

Central Asia, Bukharan Emirate, Traditional Society, Capitalist Relations, Economical Transformation, Social Stratification

Introduction

After analyzing the period, area and approaches of the researches devoted to the history of Bukharan Emirate, it became clear that the social stratification was not investigated systematically. For example, in various Russian and foreign publications of the 19th and early 20th centuries (*H. Vamberi, D. Logofet, V. Krestovsky* and so forth) the population of the Bukhara Emirate was mainly divided into estates on the basis of ethnicity and tribalism, however, description of Bukharan society and its structural and social division was not discussed in detail. In these studies, socio-political crises of the Bukharan society were exaggerated. Similar views expressed in the subsequent researches (*A. Semenov, N. Kislyakov, P. Ivanov*, etc.). It should be noted that most of these views were largely influenced by the ideology of the Soviet regime and as a result Bukharan society was viewed through one sided class distinctive and biased approach. Moreover, the social strata of only few areas was studied, while neglecting the formation of new layers of social setup at other places. In several recent studies of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), while, many issues pertaining to Turkistan society were discussed, however, the consequences of social transformation of Bukharan

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Emirate were not studied in detail. Therefore, the present study is focused to work on the gaps mentioned above so as to bring its relevance to the region.

A wide range of sources have been addressed to reveal the problem truly. Data for the present study has been taken from many sources like the National Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Tashkent, NA RUz, Fond I-126 - of *Kushbegi of Emir Bukhara;* Fond I-3 – *Politicheskiy Agent Rossiyskoy imperii*), Archives of the Russian Federation (Moscow), including the Russian State Military Historical Archive (RG VIA-*Rossiyskiy gosudarstvenniy voyenno-istoricheskiy Arkhiv),* Foreign Policy Archive of Russian Empire (AVP RI – *Arkhiv vneshneypolitiki Rossiyskoy imperii*). Moreover, the works of *Ahmad Donish, Sadriddin Ainiy, Abdurauf Fitrat, Fayzullo Hodjayev*, alongwith, Russian works and local periodicals (*Bukhoroi Sharif, Turon*) etc. have been used. It should be noted that the study has mainly focused on the socio-economic changes and their consequences on Bukharan society. However, changes in the administration of the Empire and the position of government servants during this period are excluded, since these need elaborate and separate investigation.

After becoming a protectorate[1] of the Russian Empire in 1868, significant changes were witnessed in the socio-political and economic life of the Bukharan Emirate. For instance, along with the preservation of traditional relations in socio-economic life; commodity-monetary relations of the new era, capitalistic relationships in urban and rural life, construction of factories, railroads were done, having a considerable impact on the structure of society.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the population of Bukhara Emirate accounted for approximately 2.5-3 million people.[2] This figure reflecting growth, resulted from many factors like changes in the political, social and economic sphere, particularly, consolidation of several regions within the emirate,[3] the rise of migration, as well as creation of Russian settlements. Thus in 1912, the economic report submitted to the government of the emirate by the *Nasrullabiy Kushbegi* informed that the emirate included 26 *viloyats* (regions) and 11 *tumans* (districts).[4] At the end of the 19th century, Russian settlements such as Bukhara (Kogon), New Chorjuy, Karki, Termez, Amirabad, Farob, Saray to serve railways, and sand ports appeared.

Changes in the Structure of the Rural and Urban Population

Considering the ethnic composition of the Bukharan society, it included Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Karakalpak, Jewish, Persian, Afghan, Hindu and other ethnic groups. Moreover, the population during the period under review was 65% sedentary, 15% semi-nomadic and 20% nomadic,[5] which was divided into peasants, nomadic cattle-breeders urban people, artisans, merchants, civil servants and military personals. During this period, agriculture and animal husbandry was a major occupation of the people of Bukharan Emirate. Therefore, 85% of the population was engaged in farming and cattle breeding, 10% in trade and handicraft, and 5% in permanent farming.[6]

Since, the main economic activity of the population of Bukhara Emirate was agriculture and cattle-breeding, therefore, irrigated farming was spread across Zarafshan, Kashkadarya oasis, the upper and middle reaches of the Amu Darya (Kulob, Vakhsh, Gissar). Moreover, rain-fed agricultural pattern was prevalent in the mountainous areas of

East Bukhara. Though the information about the total number of *dehkans* in the emirate during 19th century is lacking, however, some researches show that the *dehkans* made up 85% of the population, but only 15% of them owned land.[7]

At the beginning of the 20th century, the total cultivated and irrigated land was 2,250,000 desyatina, in which *mulki hurri holis* lands accounted for 10.2 %, *mulki khiroj* lands -15. 2 %, *vakf* lands – 24.6 and *amlok* lands made up 50%. *Dehkans*, who accounted for about 85% of population owned only 15.2 % of the land.[8] Therefore, Dehkans, who were landless or in possession of small quantity, rented state lands, *mulk* or even *vakf* and paid 1/3 and 1/5 of the harvest as rent.[9] At the beginning of the 20th century, the capitalistic relations in land ownership began to appear in the far flung areas of the emirate (eastern and southeastern parts). Fayzullo Khodjayev said:

> The Russian capital, which occupied Central Asia, made tremendous changes in the economies of Turkestan and Bukhara, particularly, in the social structure through occupation of the territory with all its banks and trading offices, purchasing raw materials from *dehkans* and suppling manufactured products the Central Asian markets.[10]

Development in trade (domestic inter-regional and foreign trade), contributed to the growth of farming and the specialization in inter-regional economy. As a result, Zarafshan oasis, Karshi, Guzar were specialized in cotton production, whereas, the eastern part of the emirate (Gissar, Kobul and Baljuvon *bekliks*) specialised in grain production, with the result, the region became a major wheat producer and supplier for not only eastern and western Bukhara, but also for Khiva and beyond. For example, Saroykamar exported over 100,000 pounds of wheat, 100,000 pounds of cotton and ten thousand pounds of other crops.[11] During this period, the Bukhara Emirate was the second largest cotton-growing centre in Central Asia after Turkistan. According to Massalskiy V., in 1892, 1-1.2 million pounds of cotton were produced in the emirate.[12]

It should be noted that the primary focus of Russian Empire was to take raw materials. Therefore, Bukharan economy was developed to the level of supplier of raw material only.[13] Moreover, small scale industrial enterprises in the Emirate of Bukhara were established for primary processing of raw materials. Such economic policies were aimed at the supply of raw materials to the factories in the center of the empire, as well as the export of finished products to domestic and foreign markets. As a result of this, production increased in Bukhara.

It should be noted that under new economic relations, cotton growing in the Emirate developed. Cotton growing, procurement, and primary ginning were controlled by Russian monopolies, like the Greater Yaroslavl Manufactory, the Prokhorov Manufactory, and S. Morozov Trading House and others. The result of which was the increase in productivity and capitalistic relations in *dehkan* farms, social division of the population of villages etc. On the one hand, land was put at the disposal of large landowners, and on the other hand, the number of low-income and landless *dehkans* increased. Thus, rich farms owned about 20-30 desyatina lands.[14] Under their control there were irrigated lands in the highest quality, such as *"mulk"* and *"mulkihurr",* and rain-fed lands *tanho,* which could be measured as 100-150 desyatinas per person.[15] In general, the attitudes of the various strata in the emirate to economic change were linked to their social

status. For example, landowners and petty aristocrats, were unchanged because they were independent and economically free. Small farmers, on the other hand, were neutral and passive".[16]

The *dehkans,* who had lost their lands and ran into debt, became *korandas* and *mardikors*. According to the RG VIA, the *korandas* received 20-30 coins per day during the summer months.[17] The sedentary labor was usually paid partly in kind and partly in cash. Taxation was very high and almost half of the farmer's income was taxed. Thus, according to Seymour Beker, the emirate *dehkans* paid taxes eight times more than Turkestan dehkans.[18] As a result, *Dehkans* and cattle breeders who were overburdened from taxation sold their lands to moneylenders and other rich class of society and themselves became landless, which is attested from complaints of *korandas* against *tanhodors* or *amlokdors.*[19] This is further substantiated from the observations of Jadid leader, Abdurauf Fitrat, who said "... farmers will be ruined by the methods of ownership in the Bukharan offices, but they will not be able to benefit from it."

During the second half of the 19th century, on the one hand, the emirate *dehkans* suffered from the local rich and moneylenders, on the other hand, from the Russian capitalists and buyers of raw materials. In order to compensate their needs of livelihood, farmers started to cultivate cotton. Correspondingly, the landowners facilitated the cultivation like they provided tools, cotton seeds and cattle and *dehkans* were responsible for cotton growing and harvesting. Finally, the cost of cultivation was divided equally between the landowner and *korranda* and subsequently the output was also distributed between them.[20]

In 1916-17 the economic situation in the Bukhara Emirate was in a deteriorated state, which was witnessed in a report to the Russian government in which it was emphasized that the situation in many *bekliks* was very difficult because of drought and other natural calamities. For example, in 1916, in Kitob *beklik*, a lack of harvest forced *dehkans* to use seeds for their livelihood. Dehkans working in rain-fed lands had to leave their homes, and their children had to work as laborer.[21] In Karshi, economic status of the people was worst, and there was little food to survive in daily life.[22] During this period, due to the lack of grain products and cattle, the population suffered heavily. Many rebellions of dehkans erupted due to the deteriorated socio-economic conditions. Such rebellions intensified especially in the 80's and 90's of the 19th century. They took place at Kobul in 1888, at Kelif in 1889, at Karmana in 1900, and again at Kelif and Denov *bekliks* in 1901, and Kurgantepa in 1902.[23]

The reason for such revolts were many, however, the transfer of land to the concessions was the most important factor, since most of these lands were used as pastures by *dehkan* farms or cattle farms. Thus, from 1912 to 1915, 300,000 *desyatina* lands were transferred for concessions by the government.[24] As a result of above-mentioned causes, the dehkans sought ways to get rid of poverty. Therefore, they sometimes left the emirate and worked in the Caucasus and other parts of Central Asia.[25]

By the end of the 19th century, as a result of the expansion of irrigated land in the Emirate, there was a process of settlement of semi nomadic and nomadic populations.[26] Cattle breeders were one of those who had to go through new social and economic processes during the period. During this period, on the one hand, a cattle breeding was

attracted to cover the domestic needs of the emirate, on the other hand, it was involved in the production of animal raw materials for Russia and other countries. In addition, along with satisfying the needs of the population, foodstuffs, carpets, rugs, dyes and various types of wool were produced and marketed.

During the period, the production of astrakhan sheep breeding was well established, especially in the Karakul *amlokdorlik* of Western Bukhara, Karshi, Karki and Kelif *bekliks*, as well as in the Kurgantepa *beklik* of East Bukhara. Similarly, large cattle breeding farms were established in West Bukhara, East Bukhara, and the stock of rich cattle breeders reached 2,000.[27] Subsequently, on the eve of World War, I, the total quantity of cattle in the Emirate was about 12-13 million.[2]

During the years between 1917 and 1920, it was found that the situation of the cattle breeders was severely hit and the number of cattle decreased, which is represented in the following table.[29]

Table 1: Population of Cattle (1917 and 1920)

No.	Name of the cattle	Number of the cattle	
		Year 1917	Year 1920
1.	Horse	194.300	180.000
2.	Camel	51.250	40.000
3.	Cattle (cow, bull, sheep)	442.700	350.400
4.	Donkey	150.000	135.000
5.	Goat	8.350	decreased
6.	Astrakhanfur	700-800000 (before the War)	400-450000

It was reported that Karshi *beklik's* most of the animals died from malnutrition and there remained almost no people with cattle.[30] At the beginning of the 20th century, situation of cattle breeding had severe impact on cattle breeders. Due to the shortage of feed for cattle, people had to sell them in winter and bought back in early spring. Well-off cattle breeders sold their cattle for industrial purposes. Their farms were almost preserved, and they had hired workers to maintain them.

During the years of World War-I, domestic animals were also exported to Russia for war movements and other needs, which on the other hand increased the need for cattle in Turkistan. While giving an explanation, the governor of Samarkand said that the cattle was defective, and the cattle could not be bought. On the other hand, it was made obligatory for local authorities and government servants to bring and sell black cattle in Samarkand.[31] It should be noted that World War I and the revolutions in Russia isolated the emirate from the outside world, thus, decreasing its productive capacity. For instance, the cotton harvest in 1919 fell by 20% compared with 1913. Moreover, the prices of crops also declined dramatically. For example, in 1917, one pound of cotton was sold at the price of eleven rubles, and in 1919 it was 1r/80 pounds; and the price of one pound of wool decreased from six rubles to two rubles, and one Astrakhan fur from seven rubles to one ruble.[32] In the 1917, it was revealed that most of the cattle died resulting from drought and malnutrition in Chirokchi *beklik*, and left only in the amount of 1/6, out of which 300 were horses, 800 were cattle and cows, about 10,000 were sheep and goats, 160 were camels and 200 were other kinds of animals.[33]

At the beginning of the 20th century, in the Bukhara Emirate, the majority of labor force was craftsmen. However, the introduction of industrial goods to the Emirate of Bukhara affected the production of local handicraft. In a message from Bukhara to Petersburg in 1910, it was reported that from Russia to Bukhara 21 million rubles worth goods in 1907, 23.5 million rubles in 1908, and 25 million rubles in 1909 were sent, and the continuous imports of Russian goods led to the decline of local handicraft industry.[34] In 1913 through Central Asian railway stations 24990 thousand rubles worth goods were imported to the emirate, out of which 49% comprised fabrics.[35] In eastern mountainous regions of the emirate, where Russian goods were hard to find, local handicraft goods remained significant. By 1914, Bukhara produced 100,000 pounds of silk, which was 50% of silk production of whole Central Asia. Moreover, it is reported that in 1917, the number of craftsmen in Central Asia was about 60,000, out of which 42% in Bukhara alone.[36] In the 1917 economic report of Bukhara, it was reported that the performance of craftsmen was worsening.[37] For example, in 1917, in Kitob *beklik*, silk and woolen weavers completed only 1/3 of production in comparison with the year 1916. Although they continued to deliver high-quality products, however, there was no profit at all.[38] Another example can be of the tanners of *Baljuvon beklik*, whose number made up 100, but could make only 10 products during the whole year and shoemakers (kavushduz, etikduz, and makhsiduz) who also accounted for 100 made 100 pairs of boots, and 200 pairs of *kavush* and *makhsi* for market.[39]Indeed, craftsmen could earn only from their meagre income, this can be understood well from information received from Shahrisabz region. According to it, "... *sarrojs* bought *qish*[40] worth 60,000 sums, then they sewed *lijom* which was sold for only 44,000 sums. Shoemakers bought leather for 90,000 sums and sold *kovush, makhsi and etik*, worth 70,000 sums. 30,000 sums worth material left and the profit was only 1000 sums, which was spent for daily food.[41] Steelmakers were not able to buy copper and iron because of high price, and they had to earn for living through repairing old things. Hence, according to this information it is clear that as a result of new commodity-money relationship, the conditions of craftsmen deteriorated. Subsequently, due to the crisis of several local industries, craftsmen left their jobs and turned to hired work. Working hours together for their masters could fetch them with bare subsistence. In this regard, weavers went on strikes in the city of Bukhara in 1908, 1911-1912, and 1919.[42]

Table 2: Prices of Food Items

No.	Name of the food	Price (rub. kop.)	Amount (pound)
1.	Flour:		
	1-quality	4 r. 6 kop.	1 pound
	2-quality	3 r. 70 kopecks.	1 pound
	3-quality	2 r. 90 kop.	1 pound
	Flour (on mill)	2 r. 70 kopecks.	1 pound
	Wheat	4 rubles.	1 pound
2.	Sugar:		
	Lump sugar	9 r. 70 kopecks.	1 pound
	Sugar	8 r. 80 kop.	1 pound
3.	Rice	7 r. 90 kop.	1 pound

As in the Turkestan region, the Emirate's economy also suffered from massive devastation resulting from large scale famines. Subsequently, during World War-I, prices hiked and as a result added fuel to the fire. The prices of major food products in Bukhara during 1916 and 1917 are given in table 2.[43]

It is reported that the famine was regular in Bukhara,[44] i.e., in 1917, 1918 and 1919.[45] The situation was same in Turkistan as well. Although, Russian authorities claimed that, "at least 100 million pounds of wheat should be imported from Russia to Turkistan and Bukhara, but in Russia, crop fields were cut, and it is hard to get good harvest".[46]

In 1918, the hunger in the emirate was caused by the Bolshevik policies in the economic sphere. After intensification of civil war in Russia and struggle against Bolshevik regime in Turkistan along with economic emergency measures "military communist policy" was developed by the Soviet government. This policy seemed to be aimed at supplying the population with food, who were suffering from hunger caused by general destructions. It was also aimed at direct exchange of goods out of market, which was carried out with economic and military violence, and the policy was intended to provide food to *"red army"* at the front and the working class that was "master" of the Soviet government and Bolsheviks regime, but not to famine ridden people.[47]

For this purpose, in December 1918, at the meeting of the Council of Commissars of the Turkestan Republic, it was revealed that there was scarcity of food, except rice and cotton oil in the republic at that time, and it was decided to import cotton oil in the emirate twice as expensive taking into account the reserves of these two products. Similarly, with the consent of the Council of Commissars, 5-6 wagons of rice were exchanged for 10-12 wagons of wheat.[48] Exchange of such products as coal and leather was also mentioned in the agreement. Despite the importance of wheat as a source of living, forced exchange of products was continued with its responsibility put on Bukharan government. Thus, due to the economic policy of the Russian Empire and the capitalistic relations, which entered Bukhara, the process of stratification intensified and the social transformation occurred in the traditional society. In part, the social division of the population of villages resulted in the appearance of landless *dehkans* and progress seeking large landowners. The migration of additional *dehkans* who needed seasonal work, and craftsmen worsened and a local bourgeoisie class emerged. Especially, major changes took place in the life of the *dehkans*, craftsmen, cattle breeders, etc, who were directly or indirectly involved in the new commodity-money and production relations of rural and urban life. Some of them while losing their property, became workers or *khorrandas* who occupied part time or hired work. This was primarily a social, economic and demographic breakdown of professions in a traditional society.

Bukharan Society at the beginning of the 20th Century

a) Workers' layer: It was a layer of local workers formed in the Bukharan Emirate by the end of the 19th century? If so, how did it appeared and in which areas? The questions have not yet been answered. In previous part of this paper, the changes that occurred in the emirate, have been analyzed along with its influence on the life of people. In this part, the layer of local workers that emerged due to these changes, will be discussed.

Indeed, at the beginning 20th century, seasonal and permanent workers were

formed, who had to do additional or fully hired seasonal work, losing their traditional profession for livelihood. Moreover, a new Strata of workers was formed in Bukhara, which were employed in modern industries, railways and other building projects.

After launching a railway project (1880-1899) for Central Asia, the Russian government wanted to extend it and create new networks. Therefore, motivated by political and economic factors, the government set its goal of connecting the South-West and South-East regions[49] of the Bukhara Emirate with the Central Asian highway through railway. The Russian government began to build a railway, firstly, because of its interest in the Bukhara economy, since the southern part of emirate was rich in natural resources, and secondly, because of the military's strategic importance. Construction of the railways was primarily driven by a great deal of labor force, so it was extremely important to involve the local population. In particular, cheap labor in the colonial territories was easily available which is attested by a report of 1887. The report stated that, "the existence of cheap labor in the construction of the Trans-Caspian railway was confirmed as an experiment."[50] In a letter from a Bukharan railroad engineer to *Kushbegi*, it was stated that *mardikors* (workers) were expected to be send from Kalif province. In due course, in the letter sent to the Kalif's governor, *Kushbegi* mentioned that he required timely sending of laborers and timely payment of their wages.[51] It should be noted that these railway workers were mostly *dehkans*, cattle breeders and craftsmen, who had to work for daily living, which was described in following words,[52] "Our requests for food, wood and hot tea were always directed to ourselves, for one *cub sarjen,*[53] we are given 50 kopecks a day. Working in these conditions is not sufficient even to maintain our family".[54]

It can be inferred that all members of the national team of workers experienced difficult conditions and suffered from severe hardships, which affected their health and social status.[55] It should be noted that, there were around 7,000 people employed in the construction of the Bukhara railway, out of which 500 were Russians, Iranians and Tatars, and the remaining 6500 were people of Bukhara.[56] The workers in the Bukharan railroads, who suffered from shortage of wages, inadequate salaries and other problems, organized rebellions in 1916.[57] Under these circumstances, many of them had to leave their workplaces.

After analyzing the composition of workers in the industry, it can be concluded that, most of them were seasonal workers. The main workers in the industrial enterprises were Russians, supported by a small number of local workers. The local workers were mainly *dehkans* and craftsmen, who came to the city in the hope of better living. Thus, according to a report, only 20,000– 21,000 people among workers were *khorandas* and *kosibs*, which made up only 0.7% of the work force.[58] The working day lasted 14-18 hours, with a monthly salary ranging from 30 to 60 *tiyin.*[59] Unlike Europe labor discrimination can be explained by the absence of labor laws, on the one hand, and the absence of the working society and organizations that could protect the interests of these workers.

It is well known that many cotton producing factories in Bukhara Emirate and Turkestan worked seasonally. By the end of the season, workers returned to their villages. Therefore, each year large groups of people from the Qorategin, Darvoz, Qulob and other *bekliks* (regions) of the emirate went to work in Turkestan and especially in the Fergana valley.[60] Due to the increasing need for livelihood, such social groups became hired

workers. Fayzullo Hodjaev noted that, as a part of the semi-proletarian group, the number of craftsmen, carpenters, water carriers, cobblers reached more than 10,000.[61] The author also noted that agricultural workers and unskilled farmers were several thousand, most of whom were in the regions of Bukhara, Garm, Kulyab, Chorju and Karakul. In the capital of Bukhara and other cities of the emirate, there were potters, weavers, gunmakers, *tunukasozs*, smiths, miners, soap makers and other workers. However, in Bukhara alone, weavers accounted for 1500.[62] So, the changes in economic spheres to more or less shaped the layer of workers.[62]

The discrimination in rights and the problems faced by the working people of different nationalities, rose more demands pertaining to their interests. In fact, as a result of immigration of Russian workers, the outlook of local workers changed. Thus, based on common interests, these workers were actively involved in subsequent democratic movements. The first Russian doctrine of 1905-1907 had a positive impact on the democratic movements in the Bukharan Emirate. In this regard, for the first time in 1905, Bukhara participated in strikes organized by local workers and put forward a reformed vision for protecting the interests of the working people.

b) National bourgeoisie. At the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Bukharan society stepped into modernization.[63] The features of modernity included industrial enterprises and factories, communication lines and facilities, urban development, etc. First of all, such transformation was the result of the formation of new social groups and their role as leaders in the socio-economic and cultural life in the emirate.

The social structure of the society included national bourgeoisie[64] with modern thinking and advanced intellect, who had such privileges as mobility, entrepreneurship, education, and they had a great influence not only on their own group's status, but on the whole nation as well. At the beginning of the 20th century, the position of a person in society in the emirate, besides their traditional rights and privileges, was determined by criteria such as capital and private property. Table 3 shows the social stratification of Bukhara society in the early twentieth century.

As a result of the development of commodity-money relations, the role of the national bourgeoisie, who tried to alter commercial science was especially noteworthy. The basis of the national bourgeoisie was a specific group of proprietors, who were active in capitalistic and new commodity-monetary relationships, and consisted of Uzbek, Tajik, Jewish and people of other nationalities. Their social backgrounds included merchants, industrialists, landowners, craftsmen, who were actively involved in the capital, private property, trade, manufacturing (industry, handicrafts) and agriculture. Fayzullo Hodjaev said, "the number of large independent merchants in the Emirate is considerable, and the main trading people are mostly Russian engineers and agents of Russian firms and banks."[65]

Investments that came through the offices of commercial banks were largely focused on financing the producers. These loans going through the disposal of landowners, cotton profiteers, cotton-ginning farmers turned into moneylenders, not banks. These processes resulted in the increase of the moneylenders among local bourgeoisie. The wealthy among them created their own business and trading houses.

After introducing the raw material processing industry in the Emirate, those who

Table 3: Traditional Layers and Stratification

Social hierarchy			***The reputation of an individual or group defined criteria***
TRADITIONAL LAYERS AND STRATIFICATIONS	***The upper estate***	Emir of Bukhara and his relatives	nobility, power and political authority, inheritance, social and economic status, social rights and privileges, etc.
	Administrative and military servicemen	upper class: vuzaro, umaro, standing at the top of the state, with great social rights and privileges.	genealogy, status in the hierarchy (political, social, etc.), legal or hereditary class rights and privileges, etc.
		middle class: administrative and socially supported by the state, military commanders, etc.	legal or hereditary class rights and privileges; political, social, economic status, social mobility, etc., occupied at the hierarchical level.
		middle class: a dministrative and socially supported by the state, military commanders, etc.lower class: employees, clerks, etc. from the lower echelons of the central and local government system.	
	Religious representatives layer	clerics, members of the sect, various categories of clergy, etc.	genealogy, political, social, economic status, legal or hereditary class rights and privileges, etc.
	Citizen-ship	farmers, ranchers, merchants, artisans, etc.	socio-economic support: property (farm, shop, mill, workshop, working tools, etc.), livestock, etc.
New layers		New owner-representatives of the national bourgeoisie: investor, business owner categories: landowners, merchants, artisans and others. New intellectuals-teacher, student, publisher, writer and others. workers-industrial, railway, seasonal and others.	capital, private property, income, education, profession, experience, etc.
The lowest link the poor, the needy, and so on.			

linked their capital to local industries appeared. Local authorities mainly invested in cotton, grains, oil production, mining and other industries. In the early 20th century, more than 10 out of existing 40 different industrial enterprises in the emirate belonged to such local businessmen as M. Mansurov, Mustafa Khoja, Kayupov, G. Mirjonov, X. Matjunboev, I. Shamsutdinov, Jamoliddinov, M. Fuzaylov, and the government of the emirate. Almost 25-30% of the emirate enterprises belonged to the national bourgeoisie, and the rest belonged to Russian bourgeoisie.

In the Bukhara Emirate, initially, the largest investors were Bukharan Emirs. For instance, Amir Abdulakhadkhon did a lot of sales to increase his income. According to Emir's words, he was third in the world in terms of astrakhan fur trade (1st place was J. Arabov).[66] Unfortunately, in many sources, this information was confused by Emir Amir Alimhan.[67] Amir Abdulahadkhon was honored as a large shareholder in the Russian financial sector. The Emir's contribution to the Russian state banks amounted to $ 27 million, rubles of gold and private commercial banks with a rate of 7 million rubles.[68]

The emirs, who were active in economic relations, invested heavily in trade, railway companies, and industrial enterprises owned by Russian and foreign firms. In 1920, the Emir of Bukhara participated in trade firms and enterprises in the amount of 38,612,500 rubles in cash, in joint-stock companies with a half-share of 62,151,288 rubles. In total, his turnover was 10,076,788 rubles.[69]

Local capitalists took the steps to develop and improve various industries in the emirate, so as to raise the value of local raw materials in the world market. They even tried to overcome the obstacles in this way. H. Shamsutdinov and I. Matjonboyev, who wanted to cultivate cotton in the Termez, Sherabad, Baysun, Kurgantepa and Kobodiyan bekliks, noted: "In addition to personal benefits, our main aim was to introduce new methods in this sphere, to collect cotton harvest in time and to improve cotton production.[70] At a meeting in New Bukhara in April 1912, along with owners of Russian banks, firms, factories operating in the emirate, representatives of local bourgeoisie (factory owners and traders): Mansurov, X. Shamsutdinov, K. Azizov, Latifhuzha and Ubaydulla Kasymkhojaev, J. Arabov, N. Yoqubboevs, makers G. Abdulvasikov, U. Qalandarkhodjaev, A. Boltabekov, T. Safabekov, managers of Bukhara government factory: M. Boriboyev, N. Abdurakhmanov voted for suppling *pakhtakors* with small credits, replacing *tanob* instead of *hiroj* tax.[71] Here it is necessary to note that local businessmen thought that it would be better to replace the rent with the tax on the property.[72]

By the 19th century, although there were not much local bourgeoisie, however, large, medium and small-scale representatives, including merchants, factory owners, major tradesmen, landowners, intermediaries, and others were among them. According to documents of the AV PRI, a list of more than 60 members of the national bourgeoisie of the Bukhara Emirate in 1917, who were involved in Astrakhan fur and cotton trade, was presented by *Kushbegi* of Emir.[73] In addition to neighboring countries, Emirate's merchants had been trading with such countries as Germany, France, Italy, and even America. Merchants who were trained in the commercial sphere consistently became specialists in their profession. Among them, for example, in Bukhara, there were 100 large traders with an investment of 20,000-50,000 rubles, more than a dozen traders and

industrialists with an investment of 100,000 to several million rubles.[74] It should be noted that at the beginning of the twentieth century, not only the progressive part of the intellectuals, but also among the national bourgeoisie, the number of supporters of large-scale economic and cultural reforms in the society had grown.

After the October Revolution, when the Bolshevik regime was established, economic policy, aimed at eliminating private ownership, promoting public-state ownership in all spheres of economic life, and decentralizing management of the national economy, was intensified. In the Bukharan emirate, as in Turkistan, the process of nationalization of industrial sectors had begun. It was informed in the telegram from the center to New Bukhara in 1918 that private entrepreneurs should not operate cotton business.[75] The nationalization policy led the national bourgeoisie to a more difficult economic situation. In addition, taking all types of products back from merchants was done by government prices.

c) New intellectuals. In the second half of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, the leading intellectuals in the Emirate of Bukhara were formed, who proved the necessity of eliminating the social, political and economic backwardness; and worked for enlightening people, and the need for reformation of the society. Among these intellectuals there were such representatives as priests, teachers, students and other layers of the society, including those who worked in government departments. The views of these intellectuals mainly focused on the elimination of the illiteracy that existed among all the layers of the population, reforming the old system of education, putting an end to old and unhealthy habits.[76] In his work, Paolo Sartori said that they especially criticized religious fanaticism and traditional habits that might lead to wasting money.[77] The consequences of economic changes in the Emirate of Bukhara, were clearly visible in the lives of ordinary citizens. For example, the obsolescence of the management system and changes in the economic sphere have put the trade community in a difficult position. Therefore, Khodjaev noted that the Jadids represent the interests of the advanced part of the merchant class".[78]

The new intellectuals played an active role in the socio-political and cultural life of Central Asia and were the most intelligent and the first generation of advanced intellectuals.[79] Among them, educators such as Ahmad Donish started to reform the old system and spread democratic principles, and later, these ideas were developed by Sadriddin Aini, Abdulvohid Munzim, Mirkomil Burhanov, Usmonkhoja Pulatkhojaev, Khalykhoji Mehri, MullaVafo, Abdurauf Fitrat and others. F. Hodjaev's main aims and tasks in the spiritual and cultural life included,[80] the struggle against religious extremism by spreading new secular-religious literature and publications; establishing new schools based on modern methods of the western model instead of pure religious, sophisticated schools; reaching freedom of the press; secular education for the youth; tax reduction, the elimination of misusing of power that had led people to the poverty in economic and administrative spheres.

Unfortunately, these intellectual actions towards democratic changes were at the center of attention of *"kadimchilar"*, who opposed them. According to the RG VIA, in 1910, political groups in Bukhara were divided into three groups: conservatives (*kadimchilar*). Young people of Bukhara and Russian progressive supporters. The

conservatives, or *kadimchilar*, were the largest group, originated from clergymen, and had a strong influence among the masses.[81] Adeeb Khalid mentioned that "*kadimchilar" or "usul-i kadimchilar*",[82] were a specific part of the intellectuals, who were primarily interested in preserving the old system and procedures, and the traditional education system.

It is known that the ideas of democratic renewal of the Turkestan region, adopted at the conference in Fergana in 1917, aroused great interest among the liberal intellectuals and scholars, who took an active part in the modern democratic system, by which the fanatical segments were angered. They spoke on behalf of Islam and strongly opposed any attempt to carry out democratic reforms in society. This conflict between the advanced Jadid intellectuals and the non-intellectuals of Turkestan had led to their division, which was reflected in the formation of the Shorai Ulema Society, which split from the Shorai Islam in mid-June 1917.[83]

The conflict between the advanced intellectuals and the fanatical forces in the emirate lasted until the last days of the emirate. The first conflict between the progressive group and the fanatical forces took place in 1908. While the first group, led by Ikram Domla,[84] argued that the new method schools were beneficial to the development of the people and the country, the second group, led by Mufti Abdurazzaq, argued that the new method schools were harmful to religion and the state.[85] However, the emergence of national leaders with the spirit of democracy and unification of all Muslims subsequently allowed these organizations to work together.

There are several reasons why fanatical people oppose new method schools. For instance, firstly, teaching was conducted in a non-Muslim way (i.e., sitting at a desk, reading and writing, etc.), secondly, in spite of religious teachings, the teaching of sciences such as arithmetic, geography, etc. were primary part of the syllabi. Thus, leading to the division of intellectuals in Bukhara society, whose spiritual and enlightenment views contradicted each other. This contradiction was of great concern to the progressive intelligentsia, particularly, Abdurauf Fitrat's pamphlet "Debate" spoke about this situation and lamented over the division of people into two groups and noted its catastrophic consequences.

The contribution of Jadids can be gauged from the fact that in 1911-1912, there were 57 New Method Schools in the emirate. Among them, the schools of Mirkomil Burhanov, Usmonkhodja Pulatkhodjaev, Khalidhoji Mehri were the best, and special attention was paid towards the teaching of Russian in the school of Mulla Vafo.[86] It is noteworthy that the New Method (Jadid) schools, which operated despite the difficult conditions in the emirate, in a short period managed to lead the people from backward imaginations to an open world. In particular, such schools in a short time became popular even among the advanced part of the various strata. Even evening classes were organized for adults, as well as traders from Bukhara, who traded with the Russians and felt the need for such schools. In this way, the business community tried to increase their literacy in their native language and Russian. In 1914, when the situation worsened and the New Method Schools were closed, representatives of the major merchants invited some teachers to their homes.[87]

The Jadid emphasis on education is evident from their questions and answers. It is

reported that they were questioning in a way like "when we look at our history, we can see that we were followers of the scientists, wise people, but now we have become other people. What should we do for this?' It was emphasized that "we need knowledge, morals, commerce, industry, occupation and all the things that are required for all humanity ... Then we have our illnesses in our spiritual lives and it is time to address to those who could cure these illnesses".[88] By this Jadids proved the possibility of solving economic problems through reforming the education, language learning, producing local production in the regions, solving cultural and educational problems.

The youngest part of the emirate's educated population was madrassah students. At the beginning of the 20th century, madrassas' *tolibs* were divided into two groups in terms of their views. However, most of the students of the madrassah joined "*kadimchilar*" group. They supported the "traditional educational system" and the existed rules under the "influence" of their mentors. In most cases, the power of the *mullabachalar* masses was used by the majority of the "masters" from the priests' stratum.

Thus, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Bukhara Emirate's intellectuals were divided into two groups. Some were supporters of the old regime, and the others were for the reformation and modernization of society. The role of the second group of advanced intellectuals was significant in the development of the Bukhara society, which was deeply rooted in disorders in the administrative system, abuse and religious calmness. These advanced intellectuals, later transformed into Jadids, who started to raise the society in its spirituality, and implement democratic changes. They fought for education of young people who could meet the demands of science and education. Jadids, who turned their operation from education to politics under the name of *"Yosh Bukhoroliklar",* later promoted the goals and objectives of the society and its restructuring.

Notes and References

1. The result of the Russian-Bukhara agreement of 1868 and 1873 revealed that the authority of the Emir was preserved by proving that the Russian government was not intending to occupy the emirate. The Bukhara Emirate lost its status as an international subject of law, but preserved certain sovereignty and internal independence. Such a semi-colonial estate is characterized by the old administrative and tax system, legislative and judicial matters and other social and political rights. In September 1873, according to articles 15, 16 of the agreement signed by Emir of Bukhara, in 1884 at the emirate the Emir's representative was also appointed as a diplomatic political agent of Russia. This post and the apparatus attached to him was called the Russian political agency. The Emir's government was forced to consult with a political agency on issues of relations with Russia and other countries and important domestic policies. RGVIA. F. 400: *Glavniy shtab Asiatskaya chast*, op. 1, d. 878, ll.14 and behind of15.
2. In the 70's of the 19th century, the Eastern Bukhara region was reigned on the basis of inheriting, and consisted of independent and semi-independent colonies. From 70 to 90th, these territories were all conquered by the Emir of Bukhara with the help of the Russian government. Sherabad, Sarijui, Baysun, Kulob, Kurgantepa, Baljuvon, Karategin, Darvoz, Gissar, Denov and Kobadiyan were located in East Bukhara, which was part of Emirate. After defining the borders of Pomir in 1895, the territory of the emirate enlarged including Shakhnon and Rushon, the eastern part of the West Pamir, and Vakhan, northern part. East Bukhara and Western Pamir were mainly mountainous areas. //Xalfin N.A. (1975). Rossiya i Bukharskiy emirat na Zapodnom Pamire (konse19 – nachalo 20v.). Moskva: Nauka. p.77.
3. These include Chorjuy, Karshi, Ziyovuddin, Gissar, Shakhrisabz, Guzar, Karmana, Kitab, Denov and

Yurchi, Khatirchi, Baljuvan, Sherabad, Chirakchi, Nurota, Sarijuy, Baysun, Kurgantepa, Kulyab, Yakkabog, Karki, Kobadiyan, Kelif, Usti, Burdalig, Darvoz and Karatepa *viloyats,* as well as Gijduvan, Konimex, Sultonob/Pirmast (together), Karakul, Vobkent, Zandana and Romitan, Poyonrud/ Shakhrislom, Khayrobod, Vangazy, Yangikurgan and Nakhrikora *tumans*. This administrative territorial division included the lower part of the present Zarafshan oasis (upper and middle parts of Zarafshan were included into the territory of Russia), the Kashkadarya, Surkhandarya oasis, the eastern part of the Emirate such as Chorjuy, Karki and other regions near the Amu Darya River, Gulob, Baljuvon, Gissar. RG VIA, F. 400: *Glavniy shtab Asiatskaya chast*, op.1, d.4458, ll. 5-9.

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7. Documents to the history of agricultural relationship in Bukhara Khanate. (1954). Podbor dokum., perevod, vved.i prim.Chekhovich O.D. Vip.1. - Tashkent. p.7.
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10. Hodjaev F. (1932). K istorii revolutsii v Bukhare I natsionalnogo razmejevaniya Sredney Azii. Izdanie 2-e. Tashkent. p.12.
11. Glovatsky O. (1930). Revolyutsiya pobejdayet: ekonomicheskiye politicheskiye predposilki Bukharskoy revolyutsii v 1917 -1920gg. SanktPeterburg: Peterburgskoe Vostokovedenie. p. 44.
12. Massalsky V.I. (1892). Xlopkovoye delo v Sredney Aziii I yego budushiye. Sankt-Peterburg. pp.140-141RG VIA,F.400, op.1, d.1152, l. 13, 14.
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14. Hodjaev F. (1932). “a”. p.15.
15. Iskandarov B.I. (1970). “a”. p.40.
16. RG VIA,F.400, op.1, d.1152, l. 12
17. Pylov A.I. (2005). “a”. p44.
18. NA RUz, F.I-126, op.1, d.947, ll. 5, 7, 8, 10.
19. Фитрат А. (2010). Tanlangan asarlar: 5 jild. Ilmiy risolalar. Tashkent. - p. 176.
20. *Banki dehkoniy*. //*Bukhoroyi sharif,* 17 aprel, 1912. № 32.
21. NA RUz, F.I-126, op.2, d.421, l. 10.
22. Ishanov A.I. (1955). “a”. pp.20-21.
23. Ishanov A.I. (1955). “b”. p.21.
24. Glovatskiy O. (1930). “a”.p.10.
25. Tuxtametov T. G. (1977). Rossiya i Bukharskiy Emirat v nachale 20 v. Dushanbe. p.88
26. Krestovsky V.V. (1887). V gostyax u Bukharskogo Emira. – Sankt-Peterburg. p.86.
27. Tuxtametov T.G. (1977). “a”. p.90.
28. Hodjaev F. K. (1932). “b”. p.114.
29. NA RUz, F.I-126, op.2, d.328, l. 41.
30. Rashidov U., Rashidov U. (2013). Bukhoroning Rossiya bilan iktisodiy va siyosiy munosabatlari tarixidan (1900-1925 yy). Bukhoro. p. 17.
31. NA RUz, F.I-126, op.2, d.328, l. 3.

32. NA RUz, F.I-126, op.2, d.328, l.10.
33. AV PRIF.147, op. 486, d. 254, l. 10.
34. Ishanov A.I. (1969). Bukharsakaya Narodnaya Sovetskaya Respublika. Tashkent: Uzbekistan.p. 87.
35. Suxareva O. (1962). Pozdnefeodalniy gorod Bukhara. (kontsa XIX - nachale XX veka). Tashkent. p.151.
36. NA RUz, F.I-126, op.2, d.421, l.1.
37. NA RUz, F.I-126, op.2, d.421, l. 31.
38. *Sarroj* – tanner craftsman, *qish*– raw material, *lijom* – ready leather material.
39. NA RUz, F.I-126, op.2, d.421, l. 37.
40. Istoriya Bukhary s drevneyshix vremen do nashix dney. (1976). Tashkent: FAN.p.167.
41. NA RUz, F.I-3, op.2, d.708, l. 1.
42. NA RUz, F.I-3, op.2, d.708, ll. 7-10.
43. NA RUz, F.I-3, op.2, d.919, ll. 1,2,6
44. NA RUz, F.I-3, op.2, d.919, l. behind of 8.
45. NA RUz, F.I-3, op.2, d.919, ll. 1,2,6.
46. AV PRI F.147, op.486, d.343.l. 241.
47. Starting from 1914 the construction of the new railway Bukhara-Termez (with the Karshi-Guzar-Kitob) was completed in 1916 before the deadline.
48. RG VIA, F.400, op.1, d.1152, l. 12.
49. NA RUz, F.I-126, op.2, d.328, l. 36.
50. NA RUz, F.I-126, op.2, d.327, l. 15 and back.
51. *Sarjen* - 2,134 metr.
52. NA RUz, F.I-126, op.2, d.327, l. 15.
53. NA RUz, F.I-3, op.2, d.449, l. 3.
54. RG VIA F.400, op.1, d.1152, l.13.
55. Tuxtametov T. G. (1977). "b". p.19.
56. NA RUz, F.I-126, op.2, d.327, ll. 1 and back.
57. Bukhara. Ethnographicheskiy ocherk. (1910). Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatelstvo O.N. Popovoy. p.38.
58. Tuxtametov T. G. (1977). "c". pp.30-131.
59. Hodjaev F.(1926). K istorii revolutsii v Bukhare. Tashkent: Uzbeksko gosudarstvennoye izdatelstvo. p.11.
60. Istoriya Bukhary s drevneyshix vremen do nashix dney. (1976). Tashkent: FAN. p.175.
61. Modernization - the acquisition of some or some of the modern features, the modern way of thinking, the ideas, the ideas, the way, and the needs. // Sociologic Dictionary of Encyclopedia.(1993). Moskva: Izdatelskaya group INFRA-M-NORMA. p.187.
62. Income-generating unit as a result of trade, industry, credit, finance, and entrepreneurship. Unfortunately, during the Soviet era, this phrase was given a negative connotation based on the ideology of class propagation.
63. Hodjaev F. (1932). "c". p.14.
64. Hodjaev F. (1932). "c". p.14.
65. Tuxtametov T. G. (1977). "e". pp.122-123.
66. Semenov A.A. Ocherki ustroystva centralnogo administrativnogo upravleniya Bukharskogo khanstva pozdneyshego vremeni.(1954). Materialy po istorii tadjikov I uzbekov Sredney Azii. Trudy, tom XXV. Vipusk 2. Stalinabad: IzdatelstvoAN TSSR. p.9.
67. In Semenov's book, this information was shown by Amir Abdulahadkhon on the basis of an unofficial letter sent to a diplomat officer at the General-Governorate of Turkistan in December 21, 1913. I. This information in the book of Faith is a. Semenov was quoted as saying, but Amir Alkhan was confused. Other studies quoted in her book also point to this. // Ishanov A. I.(1969). "a". p.79; Rashidov U., Rashidov U. (2013). "a". p.24; Gaffarof N. (2011). Formirovanie natsionalnoy burjuazii v Buxarskom emirate. *Ахбори ДДҲБСТ(Vestnik TGUPBP).*48,182; Perevezentsevaalso linked this information with Amir Alimjan, but did not quote it. // Perevezentseva T.V. (2015). Bukharian emirate pod protectorate Rossiyskiy imperii (konets XIX-nachalo XX veka). *Molodoy uchyoniy*: *Istoricheskie issledovaniya: materialy III-Mejdunarodnaya konferenciya*. Boiler: Buk.p.17.

68. Semenov A. (1954). “a”. p.9.
69. Semenov A. (1954). “a”. p.9.
70. Hodjaev F. (1932). “d”. p.117.
71. NA RUz, F.I-3, op.1, d.368, ll.78 and back.
72. NA RUz, F.I-3, op.1, d.368, ll. 30-31.
73. The *tanob* or *tanobona* tax is 1/3 of the harvest, but in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the cave tax was levied in the form of money-bearing crops, shrubs and melons.Abduraimov M. (1961). Voprosi feodalnogo zemlevladeniya I feodalnoy renty v pismax Emira Khaydara. Tashkent. p.43.
74. AV PRIF.147, op.485, d.392, ll. 5 and back.
75. Ziyayeva D. (2013). Uzbekiston shaharlari. XIX asrning ikkinchi yarmi va XX asr boshlari. Tashkent. p.184.
76. NA RUz, F.I-3, op.2, d.944, l. 4.
77. One of the most widely spread habits is tax collections, which are defined by the habits established in each region. In the 1890 HTA report, a political analyst interviewed by State Sec. OmanakulPervanchi noted that the customary taxes on the custom of the population made the life of the people worse and nobody dared to challenge the emir. // RG VIAF.400, op.1, d.1380, ll. 5 and back.
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80. Istoriya obshestvenno-kulturnogo reformatorstva na Kavkaze i v Sentralnoy Azii (XIX - nachalo XX veka). (2012). Samarkand: MITSAI. p. 83.
81. Adid Khalid describes the method of "old-fashioned" as the old method. // Khalid Adeeb. The Muslim Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia. (1998). Berkeley: California University Press. https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view.
82. Hodjaev F. (1926). “b”. p. 13.
83. RG VIAF.400, op.1, d.3914, ll.behind of 34.
84. Uzbekistonning yangi tarixi. Uzbekiston Sovet mustamlakachilik davrida. (2000). “a”. p.37.
85. Mulla Ikrom (1847-1925) - the only mujahedin of Bukhara, was a jaded movement. After the Haj trip to Turkey and Mekka, the Emirate publicly criticized the regime. Zandana lived in the Karakalpaktownship as a taxpayer, just because the taxpayers refused to pay taxes. In his opinion, the new methodology does not contradict Shariah principles. It was also supported by an active part of the merchants and Tatars from the emirate. Umnyakov I. (1927). Iz istorii novometodnoy shkole v Buxare. Moskva. p. 90.
86. Hodjaev F. (1926). “c”. p. 8.
87. Gafarov N.U. (2013). Jadidism in Central Asia in the late 20th - early 20th centuries Abstract dis. ... doct.ist. sciences. Dushanbe. - p. 32.
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Tourism Development and Economic Growth Nexus: An Evidence from Tajikistan Economy

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Abstract

This study probes the causal relationship between economic growth and tourism development in Tajikistan from 2002 to 2017. Data for the gross domestic product (GDP) and tourism receipts were obtained from World Data Atlas. To test the data stationarity, this study employs the unit root test followed by a cointegration test to check whether there is a long-run relationship between GDP and tourism receipts. Furthermore, the Granger causality test was used to check the direction of the relationship between tourism development and economic growth. The findings of the study confirm a long-run relationship between tourism development and economic growth in Tajikistan. Moreover, the Granger causality test results showed a unidirectional relationship between two variables running from GDP growth to tourism development. The upshot from the results substantiates economic-led tourism growth in Tajikistan.

Keywords

Tajikistan, Tourism, GDP, Co-integration, Granger Causality, Economic Growth

Introduction

The United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNTWO) defines tourism as the movement of people outside their home environment for either economic or personal purposes. These people are called visitors and tourism has usually dealt with various activities including tourism revenue and expenditure (Paltrade Report, 2013; Tabash, 2017). Tourism is one of the rapid-growing industries in the world (UNWTO, 2002). According to UNWTO (2018), the tourism industry doubled in value during 2001-2017. Its value increased from $0.62 billion in 2001 to $1.4 billion in 2017. Birda and Pulina (2010) listed different channels through which tourism positively impacts economic growth. It increases the foreign exchange income, generates employment opportunities (Salleh, Othman, & Sarmidi, 2011). The foreign exchange brought by tourists could be used to import capital goods. Imported capital could be used to produce other types of goods and services. According to Sakai (2009), tourism stimulates investment in human capital, infrastructure, and technology. It also directly or indirectly affects other industries of the country, i.e., having 'positive economies of scale and scope'(Quan and Weng, 2004). It leads to economic growth and the development of other parts of the host country like political, social, and cultural environment (Tabash, 2017). Certain disadvantages are in vogue, like incurring costs for maintenance and infrastructure provision, increased

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pollution, and potential increase of crime and violence (Peace, 2014). While considering both advantages and drawbacks, it is conceded that the tourism sector may contribute to the country's economic growth.

Tajikistan is considered a potential tourist hotspot because of its natural assets, mountain topography, culture, and connectivity through the silk road. However, this potential has not been fully utilized due to various socio-economic loopholes like deficiency of adequate infrastructure, poor connectivity, and lack of favorable business environment (Project Readiness Financing Report, 2019). Tourism is an essential sector for the Tajikistan economy. It helps to generate more employment opportunities and enhancing the GDP of the country. In 2018, the tourism industry contributed about 8% to GDP and employed about 186.6 thousand persons. Although its contribution in terms of employment and GDP fluctuates in recent years, it shows an increasing trend from 1989-2018 (World Data Atlas). There is enough scope for its further expansion. The relationship between GDP and tourism has not been examined in this country. In this study, an endeavor has been made to investigate the causal relationship between GDP and tourism development from 2002 to 2017 by applying various time series econometric techniques like Unit root test, Cointegration, and Granger causality test.

Literature Review

Four hypotheses have stemmed from the literature concerning the relationship between economic growth and tourism development of the economy, which are as follows:

I. Tourism-Led Economic Growth: According to this hypothesis, there is a unidirectional relation running from tourism to economic growth. If this hypothesis is proven, policies in promoting tourism can enhance the economic growth of the country.

II. Economic growth-Led Tourism Growth: According to this hypothesis, there is a one-directional relation running from economic growth to tourism development. If this hypothesis is proven, economic growth can increase the tourism revenue of the economy.

III. Bi-directional Tourism-Led Economic Growth: According to this hypothesis, there is a bidirectional relationship between economic growth and tourism development.

IV. No Significant Relationship: According to this hypothesis, there is no significant relationship between economic growth and tourism development. Neither tourism development impacts economic growth nor economic growth increases the tourism revenue of the economy.

From the relevant literature, it was observed that different authors used different econometric techniques like Granger Causality Test, Vector Autoregression (VAR), Error-Correction Model (ECM), or Composite Regression Equation by taking the data of a single country over time (Time Series Analysis) or by examining these hypotheses among different group of countries over the period time (Panel Data Approach). Some of the essential empirical works, along with their methodology and findings therein, are presented in the following table-1.

Table 1: Empirical Literature Summary

Author/Authors	Country/Countries	Time-period	Technique Used	Findings
Time series Approach				
Dritakis (2004)	Greece	1960-2000	Cointegration, Granger Causality Test and VECM	*Bi-directional Tourism-Led Economic Growth*
Oh (2005)	South Korea	1995-2001	Bivariate VAR	*No Significant Relationship*
Kim et al. (2006)	South Twain	1971-2003	Cointegration, Granger Causality Test	*Bi-directional Tourism-Led Economic Growth*
Lee and Chain (2008)	Taiwan	1979-2003	Unit Root Test, Cointegration, Granger Causality Test	*Tourism-Led Economic Growth*
Bride et al. (2008)	Mexico	1980-2007	Unit Root Test, Cointegration, weak Exogeneity Test, Granger Causality Test	*Tourism-Led Economic Growth*
Katriciagau (2009)	Turkey	1960-2006	Unit Root Test, Cointegration, ARDL	*No Significant Relationship*
Chein and Chinou – Wei (2009)	South Korea &Taiwan	1975-2007	Unit Root Test, Cointegration, serial Correlation, Conditional Heteroscedasticity-EGARCH, M Modelling, Granger Causality Test	*Tourism-Led Economic Growth* (Twain) *Bi-directional Tourism-Led Economic Growth* (South Korea)

Tang and Jang (2009)	USA	1981-2005	Unit Root Test, Cointegration, Granger Causality Test	*Economic-Led Tourism Growth*
Bellourimi (2010)	Tunisia	1970-2007	Unit Root Test, Cointegration, VECM, Granger Causality Test	*Tourism-Led Economic Growth*
Kasimati (2011)	Greece	1960-2010	Unit Root Test, Cointegration, VECM, Granger Causality Test	*No Significant Relationship*
Ramphul Ohlen (2017)	India	1960-2014	Unit Root Test, Cointegration, VECM, Granger Causality Test, ARDL, Variance Decomposition.	*Tourism-Led Economic Growth*
Mosab I. Tabash (2017)	Palestine	1995-2014	Unit Root Test, Cointegration, Granger Causality Test,	*Tourism-Led Economic Growth*
Sharma & Punjab (2018)	India	1991-2017	Unit Root Test, Cointegration, Granger Causality Test.	*Tourism-Led Economic Growth*
Panel Data Approach				
Eugenio- Martin & Morales (2004)	134 countries	1980-1997	Panel GLS	*No Significant Relationship*
Lee and Chang (2008)	OECD and non-OCED countries (including Latin America and Sub African Countries)	1990-2002	Panel- Cointegration, Panel Granger Causality Test	*Tourism impacts more on GDP in non-OCED than in OCED countries*

Figini and Vici (2009)	A sample of 150 countries	1980-2005	Panel Regression	*980-85; Tourism-Led Economic Growth.* *1990-95 &1995-2005; No Significant Relationship*
Cores (2011)	Sample of 17 Islands	2000-2007	Panel Unit Root Test, Regression (Trans Log Production Function).	*Tourism-Led Economic Growth*
Du and Ng (2011)	Multiple Countries	1995 (single year).	OLS Estimation (Tourism as a Dummy).	*No Significant Relationship*
Holznr (2015)	134 Countries	1970-2007	Ordinary Least Square	*Tourism-Led Economic Growth*
Seghir et al. (2015)	49 countries	1988-2015	Panel-Cointegration, Panel G ranger Causality Test	*Bi-directional Tourism-Led Economic Growth*

Data

The data used in this study comprises gross domestic product (GDP) at 2010 prices in U.S dollars and tourism revenue receipts in U. S dollars. The data used was retrieved from World Data Atlas during the period 2002 to 2017. Figure-1 depicts the graphical representation of GDP and tourism data series for the period mentioned above.

Figure 1: GDP and Tourism Receipts from 2002-2017 (Tajikistan)



Source: Calculated by authors from World Data Atlas

Analytical Methods

a) Unit Root Test

The test is used to identify whether the given data series is stationary or not.Dealing with non-stationary leads to a problem of spurious regression with a high coefficient of determination (R^2) and significant regression coefficients, but coefficients do not carry any meaning (Tabash, 2017). Therefore, for meaningful results, the data series should be stationary. Various tests like Philip-Perron (PP) and Augmented Dicky-Fuller Test (ADF) are used to determine the stationarity of variables. ADF takes into account higher-order correlation by adding the lagged differences of variable and takes the form as:

$$\Delta X_t = \varphi + \gamma t + \beta X_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \beta_i X_{t-i} + e_t \ (1)$$

Where X is the variable of interest, ΔX_t is the first difference ($\Delta X_t = X_t - X_{t-1}$), φ is the intercept, t is the time trend with coefficient γ, and e_t is the error term. The above test is based on the null hypothesis, that data series is non-stationary i.e., β=0 and the alternative hypothesis is that data series is stationary (β≠0).

The PP test developed by Phillips and Perron (1988) is non-parametric. The test is based on a regression equation which is Autoregressive of order one AR (1) process (Tabash, 2017).

b) Cointegration Test

A cointegration test was utilized to check whether there exists a long-run relationship between variables or not. After variables became stationary at the difference, the next step is to check Cointegration among the variables. Johansen and Juselius (1990) developed a Cointegration test that uses two test statistics to determine the Cointegration among variables; these are *trace statistics* and the *maximal eigenvalue*. The test is established on the null hypothesis that there is no Cointegration among variables and the alternative hypothesis is that variables are co-integrated in the long run.

c) Granger Causality Test

If the variables are co-integrated, then a dynamic relationship exists between them. To ascertain the direction of the relationship between the variables of interest, the Granger causality test has been used. The regression equations of the Granger Causality test is shown as:

$$\Delta GDP_t = \varphi + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \beta_i GDP_{t-i} + \sum_{j=1}^{k} \alpha_j Tour_{t-j} + u_{1t} (2)$$

$$\Delta Tour_t = \varphi + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \beta_i Tour_{t-i} + \sum_{j=1}^{k} \alpha_j GDP_{t-j} + u_{2t} (3)$$

It is assumed that (Cov (u_{1t} u_{2t})=0

Here GDP denotes Gross domestic product and Tour represents Tourism of the country. Equation (2), specifies the economic growth-led tourism growth while equation (3) represents tourism-led economic growth.

Results and Discussion

i) Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix

The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of GDP and Tourism data series are shown in Table-2. Descriptive statistics of the data series were obtained by using software EViews 10. From table-2, it can be observed that during the year 2014 the maximum GDP of Tajikistan was $ 9112 million. The same technique was applied to tourism revenues of the country and which also reached a maximum of $286 million during the same year. The GDP is negatively skewed while tourism revenue is positively skewed.

From the correlation matrix, it can be seen from table 2 that GDP and tourism receipts are positively correlated to each other.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix

Statistics	GDP (U.S $ millions)	Tourism Receipts (U.S $ millions)
Descriptive Statistics		
Mean	5198.3	102.1
Median	5401.5	82.6
Maximum	9112	286.6
Minimum	1221	5
Std. Dev.	2617.1	98.95
Skewness	- 0.151	0.39
Kurtosis	1.645	1.67
Jarque-Bera	1.284	1.58
Probability	0.525	0.45
Observations	16	16
Correlation Matrix		
GDP	1.0	0.88
Tourism Receipts	0.88	1.0

Source: Calculated by authors using Eviews 10.

ii) Unit Root Test

The unit root test of both these variables is shown in Table-3. It can be seen from the table that both data series are non-stationary; however, they become stationary at first difference. Thus, it can be inferred from the table that both the variables are stationary at the first difference and therefore are having an order of integration I(1). After having stationary data, the next step is to check whether the variables are co-integrated or not.

Table 3: Unit Root Test

Variables with both intercept and trend	ADF Test		PP Test	
	Level 1	**First Difference**	**Level 1**	**First Difference**
	t-statistics (p-value)	**t-statistics (p-value)**	**t-statistics (p-value)**	**t-statistics (p-value)**
GDP	-0.148976 (0.9872)	-3.392384* (0.0995)	0.946695 (0.9994)	-5.219435** (0.0052)
Tourism	-1.285078 (0.8509)	-3.883094 ** (0.0433)	-1.469632 (0.7937)	-3.881316 ** (0.0434)

**, ** shows significance at 10 percent and 5 percent, respectively.*
Source: Calculated by authors using Eviews 10.

iii) Johansen Cointegration Test

The Johansen Cointegration test for a long-run relationship between economic growth and tourism receipts in Tajikistan is summarized in table-4 and table-5. Table-3 shows the Trace Statistics with their probabilities, while table-5 shows the Maximum Eigen values with their probabilities. The results confirm the long-run relationship between economic growth and tourism development in Tajikistan. The existence of Co-integration leads to the existence of causality at least in one direction.

Table 4: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)

Hypotheses	**Eigen value**	**Trace Statistic**	**0.05 Critical Value**	**Probability ****
None	0.427005	14.15633	15.49471	0.0787
At most 1 *	0.365100	6.360035	3.841466	0.0117

Source: Calculated by authors using Eviews 10.

Table 5: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)

Hypotheses	**Eigen value**	**Max-Eigen Statistic**	**0.05 Critical Value**	**Probability ****
None	0.427005	7.796295	14.26460	0.3998
At most 1 *	0.365100	6.360035	3.841466	0.0117

Source: Calculated by authors using Eviews 10.

iv) Granger Causality Test

The results of the Granger Causality Test with F-statistics and respective probabilities are presented in Table 6. The first hypothesis that *Tourism Receipts does not Granger Cause GDP* is not rejected. Therefore, there is no "Tourism–Led Economic Growth in Tajikistan". The second hypothesis that *GDP does not Granger Cause Tourism Receipts* is not accepted at a 10 percent level of significance. Thus there is "Economic Growth-Led Tourism growth in Tajikistan".

The results of this paper confirm a unidirectional relationship between GDP and Tourism Receipts. It runs from GDP to Tourism Receipts. Thus GDP causes Tourism Receipts in the economy of Tajikistan.

Table 6: Pairwise Granger Causality Test

Null Hypothesis	Obs.	F-Statistic	Prob.
Tourism Receipts does not Granger Cause GDP	12	1.80815	0.3271
GDP does not Granger Cause Tourism Receipts	12	7.09661*	0.0696

** significance at p-value less than 0.10*
Source: Calculated by authors using Eviews 10.

Conclusion

The paper examines the causal relationship between tourism receipts and GDP in Tajikistan during the time 2002-2017. The study unveiled a significant long-run relationship between tourism receipts and economic growth (GDP) in Tajikistan during the study period. Furthermore, the study reveals a unidirectional relation between GDP and tourism receipts running from GDP growth to tourism development. The results of the study motivate us to suggest the concerned authorities of Tajikistan to pay attention to the economic growth of the country as it is vital to increase the tourism revenue receipts. The development of tourism is crucial as it generates employment opportunities, increasing the income for the common masses, and also helps in reducing foreign dependence in terms of foreign aid and foreign gifts.

Based on the paper's findings, the policy implication that can be adopted by the government of Tajikistan is to foster economic growth to boost the tourism revenue receipts. First, the government should provide excellent infrastructure in the form of better roads, tourism sites, and commercial establishments offering to lodge to travelers and tourists. Second, the development of human capital to provide information and communication services to tourists. The third is to develop a feeling about Tajikistan as a peace-loving country using diplomatic and other necessary means required. Lastly, there should be easy mobility of tourists between different tourist places.

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Economic Growth and Kaldor's Laws: Recent Evidence from Kazakhstan Economy

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Abstract

The paper attempts to evaluate manufacturing's role in Kazakhstan's economic growth during the post-independence period based on three laws of Kaldor. The first law states that manufacturing is the engine of economic growth in the long run. The second law states that manufacturing productivity growth is identified with the manufacturing sector's growth through static and dynamic returns to scale. Finally, the third law states a positive association between non-manufacturing productivity growth and manufacturing growth. The paper estimates Kaldor's growth laws using the Kazakhstan economy's time-series data from 2000 to 2018. The results imply that a comprehensive and all-round development of the manufacturing sector should be prioritized to ensure a stable and sustainable growth trajectory. The manufacturing industry has its spill-over effects on the remaining sectors of the economy.

Keywords

Kaldor Laws, Kazakhstan, Kazakh Economy, Economic Growth, Economic Transition, Economic Productivity

Introduction

Achieving faster economic growth and acceptable living standards is the basic premise of all nations across the world. In pursuit of this objective, a set of countries have performed exceptionally well; while others have lagged miserably. Among the nations, wide variations in growth rates and living standards, measured in per capita incomes are observed. These cross-country variations have led the development economists to debate and re-examine the process of growth and development providing different explanations.

From classical to neoclassical and from exogenous theorists to endogenous theorists' different explanations have been advocated for such rampant income disparities across countries. Differences in the supply of production inputs such as workforce, technology, and resources are primarily considered. Kaldor (1967) challenged the idea that production factors' availability is the sole source of growth. According to him, economic growth is highly dependent on increasing returns in the economy, and higher economic returns in the manufacturing industry contribute to economic growth (Keho, 2018:1). He argued that surplus labor was typically available in the non-industrial and agriculture sectors so that a decline in the workforce levels would not lead to an associative decline in output (Bairam, 2006:1). Therefore, Kaldor concluded that a

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degree of migration from non-industrial low-performance sectors to the industrial sector's high profitability section determines the pace of productivity and output growth in the economy (Bairam, 2006: 1).

Kaldor laid down three laws whereby; the first law states that manufacturing is the long-term economic growth engine called the growth hypothesis. The second law is known as the Verdoorn's Law, which states that productivity growth is identified by static and dynamic returns to scale with manufacturing growth. Finally, the third law specifies that non-industrial productivity growth and growth in the manufacturing sector positively affect each other (Kaldor, 1966; Verdoorn, 1980; Thirlwall, 1983; Libanio and Moro, 2011; Kebede, 2020). These laws were first used in 1966 by Kaldor to explain the poorly performing British economy in a lecture. Since then, many countries have tested the laws to explain economic growth. Empirical results which indicated the presence of unique correlation proved that Kaldor's second and third law hold in the economic growth of the European region (Pons Novell and Elisabet, 1999).

Until now, several authors have emphasized further the pertinence of Kaldor's conjecture about the engine of growth. First, the manufacturing division is the driver of growth because of surplus labor and low productivity in non-industrial zones. It generates additional interest for goods and businesses caused by non-industry segments (Cornwall, 1976, 1977; Bairam, 2006). It is also advised that a rapidly industrializing region should generate numerous exports over the imports, thus escaping the balance of payments constraints and growth constraints (Dixon and Thirlwall, 1975; Cornwall, 1977; Bairam, 2006).

Given such paramount importance of the manufacturing sector in the overall development dynamics of an economy, this study examines the relevance of Kaldor's growth laws in the case of Kazakhstan's Economy. Specifically, we tried to investigate manufacturing growth in the Kazakhstan economy using time series data from 2000 to 2018[1].Our results obtained through a simple OLS regression validate Kaldor's laws in the case of the Kazakhstan economy since manufacturing output growth is found to have a positive and substantial impact on the productivity and growth of the non-manufacturing output.

Analytical Framework

Kaldor's First Law (Growth Hypothesis)

Kaldor's First Law asserts that manufacturing is the engine of economic growth. There is a positive relationship between manufacturing growth and output growth in an economy (Kaldor, 1966; Stoneman, 1976; McCombie, 1983; Atesoglu, 2006; Kebede, 2020). The following estimable linear function can represent this proposition:

$$Q=\alpha_1+\beta_1 M+\mu 1, \beta_1>0, \quad (1)$$

Where Q denotes the growth rate of actual aggregate output and M is real manufacturing output. $\mu 1$ is the white noise error term, which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed. In the above regression equation, a positive value of β_1 shows that a unit change in the manufacturing sector leads to a positive shift in

real aggregate output, supporting Kaldor's 1st law. An increasing return to scale geared by the manufacturing industry positively impacts the other sectors of an economy like the services and processing industry.

Kaldor's Second Law (Verdoorns Law)

Kaldor's Second Law states that growth in manufacturing productivity is undoubtedly associated with a change in manufacturing yield, which is not valid in diverse sectors such as agriculture and services (Kaldor, 1966; Stoneman, 1976; Verdoorn, 1980; McCombie, 1983; Yamak et al., 2016; Kebede, 2020). This law is also known in the literature as Verdoorn's law. An industrialized country that faces no demand restrictions can leverage different economies of scale to move on a prominent, sloping path to growth. Initially, the law can be mathematically denoted in the following equation:

$$P_m = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 M_g + \mu 2, \ \beta_2 > 0, \ (2)$$

P_m as the dependent variable represents the growth rate in labor productivity in the manufacturing sector and M_g as an independent variable represents manufacturing output growth. It is also defined as the difference between the output's rate of growth (Q_m) and the employee's rate of growth (E_m) in the manufacturing sector of the economy, i.e. (Pm = Qm-Em). $\mu 2$ is the error term that is generally distributed with a mean of zero and constant variance $\sigma 2$. β_2 is at times called the Verdoorn's coefficient, which has been estimated to be 0.5 empirically. It is calculated as an indicator of any dynamic or static increasing returns to scale in the sense that the output growth endogenously induces any changes in returns to scale. Kaldor was controversial with Verdoorn's formulation. According to Kaldor, it resulted in a spurious correlation. As a result, Kaldor came up with his version:

$$E_m = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 Q_m + \mu 2$$

Where E_m is the rate of growth of employment in the manufacturing sector. Kaldor stated that ¬if β_2 is significantly different from one, then it follows that for every 1% increase in the output from the manufacturing sector, employment grows by less than 1%. Such a case would imply that productivity increased consequently with production growth (Onakaya, 2010).

Kaldor's Third Law

Kaldor's Third Law states that productivity growth in an economy is positively linked to manufacturing output growth (Kaldor, 1966; Alexiou and Tsaliki, 2017; Kebede, 2020). This law explains that productivity in any economy positively correlates with output growth in the manufacturing sector. This implies that as the manufacturing sector grows, the other non-manufacturing sectors of an economy grow simultaneously. As production in the manufacturing sector grows, it draws surplus labor employed in various sectors. As a result, this measure reduces the disguised unemployment implying increased productivity in other economic sectors. This is mathematically expressed as:

$$P_{nm}=\alpha_3+\beta_3 M_g+\mu 3, \ \beta_3> 0, \quad (3)$$

Where P_{nm} is the rate of growth of productivity in the non-manufacturing sector of the economy and M_g is the output growth in the manufacturing sector. This law holds in dualistic economies where the transfer of labor from less productive sectors (agricultural) to high-value sectors (manufacturing) will not result in loss of output to the economy (Mamgain, 1999). μ3 is again an error term with zero mean and constant variance. And according to this law, the coefficient, β_3 attached to the independent variable in the above equation is expected to take a positive value.

Methodology

The time-series data set required in the form of output and employment at the aggregate and sectoral levels have been extracted from the World Development Indicators (WDI) data bank of the World Bank and the International Labour Organization (ILO). The data set is used for the period 2000-2018 and all the values are taken at 2010 constant prices in terms of Local Currency Unit (LCU). The description of variables is as:

Variable	Description	Data Source
Economic growth	Log(GDP)_t-Log(GDP)_{t-1}	World Development Indicators Data Bank
Manufacturing growth	$\text{Log(Manufacturing output)}_t$ -$\text{Log(Manufacturing output)}_{t-1}$	World Development Indicators Data Bank
Growth of Productivity in Manufacturing	$\text{Log(Manufacturing Productivity)}_t$ -$\text{Log(Manufacturing Productivity)}_{t-1}$	World Development Indicators Data Bank and ILO Estimates
Growth of Productivity in Non-Manufacturing	$\text{Log(Non-Manufacturing Productivity)}_t$ -$\text{Log(Non Manufacturing Productivity)}_{t-1}$	World Development Indicators Data Bank and ILO Estimates

Data Source: World Development Indicators Data Bank (Authors calculation)

Econometric Modelling

We first applied the unit root test to avoid the problem of spurious regression. We followed the Augmented Dickey-fuller test of unit root to examine whether variables are stationary or not. The results of the unit root test are presented in table 1. The results confirm that all the variables are stationary at level I (0). Therefore, OLS estimates will provide efficient results. We applied a simple bivariate OLS regression to test the validity of above stated three laws given by Nicholas Kaldor. In all the cases, the statistical inference is conducted at a 95% confidence level with associated p-values reported. The fit of the model represented by R square is also reported to be good, thus highlighting the reliability and precision of our estimated models.

Table 1: Unit Root Test (Augmented Dickey-Fuller test without constant and trend)

Variable	T-Statistics	P-Value	Decision
GDP Growth	-1.692722	0.0849	I (0)
Manufacturing Growth	-2.254225	0.0277	I (0)
Growth of Productivity in Manufacturing	-2.439101	0.0187	I (0)
Growth of Productivity in Non-Manufacturing	-1.627760	0.0959	I (0)

Source: Author's calculation using EViews 10

Results and Discussion

Interpretation of Kaldor's First Law

Table 1 reports the results of the estimated model captured in equation (1) used for empirical validation of Kaldor's first law in which the GDP growth rate is regressed on the growth of manufacturing output. The results are in line with general theoretical expectations. It shows that the coefficient of growth of manufacturing output is positive and statistically significant. Thus, validating Kaldor's first law in the case of Kazakhstan's economy. This validation of Kaldor's first law enables us to claim that manufacturing is the engine of growth for Kazakhstan's economy. More specifically, a unit change in manufacturing output growth increases the overall GDP growth by 0.63 percent.

Table 2: Kaldor's First Law: Relation between the growth of manufacturing output and growth of GDP

Dependent Variable Growth of GDP					
	Coefficients	***T-Stat***	***P-Value***		
Constant	3.32	4.38	0.00		
Growth of Manufacturing Output	0.63	6.12	0.00		
Standard Error	2.05				
R Square	0.73				
Adjusted R Square	0.71				
ANOVA Statistics					
	DF	***SS***	***MS***	***F***	***P-Value***
Regression	1	156.84	156.84	37.47	0.00
Residual	14	58.60	4.19		
Total	15	215.44			

Regression analysis of the growth of GDP of Kazakhstan concerning the growing manufacturing sector output for the years 2000-2018.

Interpretation of Kaldor's Second Law

Table 3 reports the estimated model results of equation (2) representing Kaldor's second law. The growth of productivity in manufacturing is regressed on the growth of manufacturing output. Again, the results are in line with general theoretical expectations. The results from table 2 reveal that the coefficient of growth of manufacturing output is positive and statistically significant. Thus, validating Kaldor's second law in the case of Kazakhstan's economy. The results indicate that a unit change in manufacturing output growth increases productivity in manufacturing by 0.77 percent. The size of the coefficient is comparable with Stoneman's (1979) estimate of 0.66 for the U.K. economy and Mizuno and Ghosh's (1984) estimate of 0.712 for the Japanese economy.

Table 3: Kaldor's Second Law: Relation between the growth of manufacturing output and growth of productivity in manufacturing

Dependent Variable Growth of Productivity in Manufacturing					
	Coefficients	***T - Stat***	***P-value***		
Constant	0.85	0.69	0.50		
Growth of Manufacturing Output	0.77	4.54	0.00		
Standard Error	3.35				
R Square	0.60				
Adjusted R Square	0.57				
ANOVA Statistics					
	DF	***SS***	***MS***	***F***	***P-Value***
Regression	1	231.74	231.74	20.60	0.00
Residual	14	157.51	11.25		
Total	15	389.25			

A regression analysis of the growth of productivity in manufacturing with the growth of manufacturing sector output for the years 2000-2018.

Interpretation of Kaldor's Third Law

Table 4 reports the estimated model results of equation (3) related to Kaldor's third law. The growth of productivity in the non-manufacturing sector is regressed on the growth of manufacturing output. The results from table 3 reveal that the coefficient of growth of manufacturing output is positive and statistically significant. Thus, validating Kaldor's third law as well in the case of Kazakhstan's economy. More specifically, a unit change in manufacturing output growth increases productivity in manufacturing by 0.60 percent.

Table 4: Kaldor's Third Law: Relation between the growth of manufacturing output and growth of productivity in other sectors

Dependent Variable Growth of Productivity in Other Sectors					
	Coefficients	***T - Stat***	***P-value***		
Constant	1.71	1.76	0.10		
Growth of Manufacturing Output	0.60	4.54	0.00		
Standard Error	2.63				
R Square	0.60				
Adjusted R Square	0.57				
ANOVA Statistics					
	DF	***SS***	***MS***	***F***	***P-Value***
Regression	1	142.52	142.52	20.60	0.00
Residual	14	96.86	6.92		
Total	15	239.39			

Regression analysis of productivity growth in non-manufacturing concerning manufacturing sector output growth for the years 2000-2018.

Conclusion

Kaldor's growth laws, which appear controversial in some instances, often help theoretically and in empirical economic analysis. The practical method applied in this research to investigate the significance of Kaldor's growth laws has produced clear evidence that the manufacturing sector is the main driver for Kazakhstan's economy. Moreover, apart from the sector in question contributing the most to the GDP growth levels, it has a significant impact on the rest of the economy. The three laws mainly apply in dualistic economies. The transfer of labor to productive sectors of the economy from less productive sectors (service and agriculture) will not lead to a loss of output.

Our results imply that a comprehensive and all-around development of the manufacturing sector should be prioritized to ensure a stable and sustainable growth trajectory. The manufacturing sector has its spill-over effects on the remaining sectors of the economy.

Notes

1. The data period is decided based on availability.

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Labour Migration and HIV Vulnerability in Tajikistan

Tareak. A. Rather & Samina Mir***

Abstract

Central Asia has experienced a rapid increase in HIV infection over the last decade. The dire life circumstances of labour migrants working in Russia, which are well-known, have increased their HIV risk vulnerability. Low socioeconomic status, lack of access to services, separation from family, and limited risk awareness all contribute to migrants' HIV vulnerability. In a structurally patriarchal society, gender norms limit the wives' abilities to protect themselves and their husbands from HIV/AIDS. This paper examines the factors responsible for the elevated HIV risk behaviours among Tajik labour migrants and which, in turn, infect their left-behind wives in Tajikistan. Having applied Robert Connell's theory of gender and power, it has been manifested that how gender inequality gender and power imbalance has made women vulnerable to HIV. The extended version of the theory of gender and power examines the exposures, social/behavioural risk factors, and biological properties that increase women's vulnerability for getting infected with HIV.

Keywords

Labour Migration, Left-behind Women, Vulnerability, HIV, AIDS, Tajikistan

Introduction

Migration and population mobility has become an enduring dimension of a rapidly globalised world. The estimated number of international migrants is 272 million and women make up around 47.9% of the total (ILO, 2020). Migration results from the interplay between political, social, economic, cultural, and environmental factors. The interplay stimulated various forms of movement of people characterised by duration, reason, and form. It includes the migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, environmental migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2002). Variations are commonly drawn among migrants according to whether their movement is classified as forced or voluntary, internal or international, temporary or permanent, or economic or non-economic (UNO, 2012). In the Central Asian region, economic migration, or migration for employment, has dominated the movement of people. Although primarily motivated by economic conditions, however, Central Asian migrants are not an exception to Arrow's assessment that movement of people implies the movement of sexual desires, beliefs, expressions, and acts (Marin, 2013). In contract labour arrangements, low-skilled migrants are only accepted as 'single' and reduced to asexual beings while as, on the contrary, high-skilled workers are given opportunities to

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settle with their families (Sciortino, 2013). To regulate the low-skilled migrant's employment and stay in the host country, migration policies are also concerned with migrants' sexuality and reproduction. Specifically, migrants' bodies and their sexual and reproductive behaviours have become the 'point of interest of regional, bilateral and national policies centralising on three issues: (i) management of contract migration, (ii) HIV and AIDS prevention, and (iii) human trafficking.

Labour migration is a high trend in Central Asia. Conditions such as economic breakdown and low wages push young men to work away from their homes and families where they are likely to have unprotected sexual contact with commercial sex workers. According to United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS, " The region also reports the fastest rates of HIV/AIDS growth in the world" (UNAIDS, 2006). According to the World Health Organization, "In 2018, 26,000 people were living with HIV in Kazakhstan, 8500 in Kyrgyzstan, and 13000 in Tajikistan" (Deryabina, 2019). The slumping of the Soviet Union produced an economic collapse and a failing healthcare system that bisected with changes in moral and social norms in Central Asia (Smolak, 2010). In the years following the collapse, all health indicators declined dramatically in the former Soviet republics, and HIV prevalence rates increased (Atlani et al., 2000). The overall decline of the health care system produced a catastrophic impact on the health of the population, particularly on the health of women and children. In the post-Soviet period, the rise in sex work and drug use, risk factors associated with HIV infection, has contributed significantly to the rise of HIV in Central Asia. Young men from all Central Asian countries, unable to find employment in their places of origin, go to Moscow in search of good-paid work. The economic and socio-political crises affecting Russia and the surrounding region have created a "risk priming environment" for the spread of STI, including HIV infection (Aral, et al., 2003). Also, Russia is documented as a major country of origin and a major country of destination in human trafficking of young women for sex work. Sex work in Moscow presents a unique situation as this city is a major economic and social magnet for both men and women. The Moscow sex market appears to be an adjusted response of the social system to the economic pressures in Russia and the surrounding countries of the former Soviet Union. The male migrant population creates a great demand for sex work. Similarly, young women who cannot find employment in their hometowns move to Moscow, often temporarily, to find work. In the absence of other employment, sex work presents a rather attractive alternative for these women. These migration patterns have led to the emergence of a burgeoning industry that specializes in recruiting young women into Moscow to become sex workers (Aral et al. 2003). The WHO, and World Bank have identified migrant workers as a major source of the HIV epidemic in Central Asia (Godinho et al., 2005).

Labour Migration and HIV Vulnerability is associated with various factors: prolonged or frequent absence from home; precarious financial status; difficult working and housing conditions; change in cultural norms; separation from family; low social support; substance abuse; mental health problems; lack of HIV testing; needle sharing; limited condom use; concurrent multiple partners; sex work; low HIV knowledge, and low perceived HIV risk (ILO, 2017) and the patriarchal structure regulating the sexual sphere where men's interests are of absolute priority (Japan International Cooperation

Agency, 2008). Tajik people learned about HIV/AIDS at the time when their country was part of the Soviet Union and AIDS was not a serious problem either for the society or for the Ministry of Health of the USSR (Zhores, 1990). Although, as few as 112 people out of 285 million Soviet citizens were officially known to be infected by that date, it was only in 1987 when the first HIV case was officially reported in a Soviet medical publication and described as "a homosexual who got infected in East Africa in 1982" (Latypov, 2008). This man remained the index case until October 1988 when a woman named Olga was posthumously diagnosed with AIDS. This particular case has been widely believed by many Tajiks to come from Khujand, the second-largest city in Tajikistan located in the northern part of the country. According to the Tajik media reports, in 1985 Olga went to Leningrad where she engaged in prostitution, died of AIDS, and was then buried in Khujand (Latypov, 2008). Independent Tajikistan reported its first case in 1991. These cases were two persons who returned to Tajikistan from their business trips to African countries (Latypov, 2008). Although by 1993 some 1,200,000 people were tested for HIV (ILO, 2008) in Tajikistan. In 2000, there were 11 registered cases. Heterosexual HIV transmission is increasing and is mostly "exported to the country from the outside" (Thorne, et al., 2010; Weine, Bahromov, & Mirzoev, 2008). In 2001, thirty-four new cases were reported and it was three times as much as all previously known cases. In 2004, Tajik authorities reported 198 new HIV cases, almost a five-fold increase compared to the previous year. Meanwhile, there were an estimated 10,000 [5,000– 23,000] people living with HIV (PLWH) in Tajikistan (United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS, 2008). In 2013 4,581 people were living with HIV in Tajikistan and 69.8% are male and 30.2% are female (ADB, 2016). The most common transmission route for women is through sexual contact (80% of cases) while men are equally likely to become infected through sexual contact (43% of cases) and injecting drugs (42%) of cases (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2008). In 2016 United Nations estimated that 14,000 Tajiks were HIV positive (Sharifzoda, 2019). According to the country fact sheets of Tajikistan 2019 adults and children living with HIV are 14000 [12000-18000] (WHO, 2019).

Source: World Bank 2019



The above graph depicts, the number of adults who are HIV infected, from 2014 it shows a downward trend may be it is due to various measures which are taken by the government of Tajikistan to curb this epidemic. Testing capacity is increased and the government made it compulsory to submit a medical certificate before getting married. In 2018 approximately 134,000 people received medical check-ups before marriage and 58 of them were identified as HIV positive (Sharifzoda, 2019). Free medical examinations are conducted at airports, railway stations, and border checkpoints to regulate the spread of infections that labour migrants bring back from abroad.

The labour migration in Tajikistan had to be viewed as a "step-wise construction", whereby the migration of workers may occur in four steps: source, transit, destination, and return, each having certain HIV-related implications (UNAIDS, 2001). This construct emphasized one crucial point that to control the rapid spread of the disease, HIV prevention activities need to cross the national boundaries of individual states. It is estimated that around1.5 million migrants went to Moscow from Tajikistan between 2004 and 2008 (Karimov and Maksudov, 2010) and most of these migrants were men, between 18 to 45 years old, who worked as seasonal labour migrants, staying in Moscow from early spring until late autumn (Zabrocki et al. 2015). Russia is one of the fastest-growing HIV epidemics in the world, with the HIV infection rate increasing 7% in 2013. The average infection rate by the end of 2013 was 35.7 cases per 100,000 people (Novosti, 2013). Studies show that labour migrants to Russia may be at risk for HIV infection due to their risky sexual behaviour, including unprotected sex with sex workers (Amirkhanian et al. 2011; Weine, Bahromov, and Mirzoev; 2008). Tajik migrants who become infected in Russia may act as a bridge for HIV transmission between Russia and Tajikistan, infecting their wives when they return home (Golobof et al. 2011; Kramer et al. 2008; United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS, 2008). In this way, migrant workers may sow the seeds for a new regional HIV epidemic. Migrant workers are to be more likely to utilize the services of sex workers and have multiple partners (Mayer and Beyrer, 2007; Magis-Rodriguez et al. 2009). Recent studies reveal HIV prevalence is high and heterosexual transmission rates are escalating and is a major transmission route (Smolak, 2010). Paradoxically, 1700,000 Tajik citizens are working abroad and 80 percent of Tajikistan's financial resources stem from migrant workers (ILO, 2006) hitherto the majority of HIV cases in Tajikistan were among migrant workers. Labour migrants have been included in the risk group in terms of the proliferation of multiple infectious diseases, including diseases of the reproductive system and sexual diseases (Olimova & Bosc, 2003).

Theoretical Perspective

According to the theory of gender and power, three major social structures characterize the gendered relationships between men and women: the sexual division of labour, the sexual division of power, and the structure of cathexis (Connell, 1987; Wingood & DiClemente, 2000). This paper aims to apply an extended version of the theory of gender and power to examine the exposures, social/behavioural risk factors, and biological properties that increase women's vulnerability for acquiring HIV. These exposures, risk factors, and biological properties all interact to increase women's

vulnerability to diseases, including HIV. We have tried to put the arguments in the paradigm of Connell's theory of power and gender and how the exposures, risk factors, and biological properties all interact to increase women's vulnerability to diseases, including HIV. The social mechanisms produce gender-based inequalities and disparities (e.g., in women's economic potential, women's control of resources, and gender-based expectations of women's role in society). Let us first discuss the three structures (labour, power, and cathexis) and define potential exposures and risk factors generated by each structure, and see how each structure, exposure, and risk factors that increases women's HIV risk.

Working Conditions

Migrants working in Moscow are mostly undocumented young males (80%), married (70%), and between 18 to 40 years of age (Olimova & Bosc, 2003). Usually concentrated in the so-called "3-D" jobs – dirty, dangerous and difficult — with little or no occupational and safety protection in the construction sector, as migrants are hired to do the hardest job, in very poor working and living conditions, demanding endurance, physical power and good health condition (Akramov, 2006). Significant numbers of migrant workers live and work in geographically isolated areas, such as construction sites, mining facilities, or in rural agricultural areas, where healthcare facilities and services are limited, inaccessible, or non-existent (ILO, 2016). Many migrants who work in the mining and construction sectors have high rates of occupational accidents, injuries, and deaths. The mining sector in certain countries is a particularly risky environment in terms of HIV exposure and infection (ILO, 2013). Most of the Tajiks who worked in construction reported that they lived in a Barak or wagon. There have been many cases of fires in the wagons where Tajik migrants were burned and killed. They were also subject to workplace accidents at the construction sites for which they could not get medically treated in Moscow. Migrants working in the *bazaars* lived in overcrowded, unsanitary, and poorly heated dormitories or apartments. Ten people live in one room to save money and they felt safer when in large numbers as it is difficult to find rooms for rent because migrants are not trusted. Also, it is expensive for one or two people to rent a place in Moscow (Luo, Weine, Bahromov, & Golobof, 2012). Migrants feel unprotected as they experience: discrimination; beatings; imprisonment; poverty; inhumane and unsafe housing; lack of access to general medical care and health education; lack of access to HIV information, HIV testing, and HIV treatment (ILO, 2016).

> "*If Russians want, they can kill you, beat you and say whatever they want. A Tajik does not have the right to say a simple word. Tajiks are unprotected". "I saw myself in the skin of a slave in Moscow. We are unprotected."*(Weine, Bahromov, & Mirzoev, 2008).

These conditions are widely regarded as human rights violations and likely increase the risk of acquiring HIV as is described in human rights theory (Weine, Bahromov, & Mirzoev, 2008). Human rights approaches concerning HIV/AIDS are based on the premise that "human rights abuses contribute to the spread of HIV and undermine attempts to protect people from becoming infected". Migrants' behaviour and attitudes regarding HIV risk and protection were being framed by the harsh conditions of labour

migration. To comfort themselves from these harsh conditions migrants used to have parties occasionally on birthdays or during national holidays. They sit together and drink different alcoholic drinks, have fun and later dance with girls who they bring in from the street (Luo, Weine, Bahromov, & Golobof, 2012). STI rates are high among the lower strata of sex workers, who are often impoverished non-Muscovites, with limited access to or utilization of health care (Aral et al., 2003). As 85 percent of labour migrants, aged 20 to 49 years old, are married concomitantly their lives are at risk of being exposed to any illnesses that the migrants carry, including sexually transmitted infections such as HIV thus contribute to the acceleration of an epidemic in Tajikistan that has risen dramatically since 2000 (Godinho, et al. 2005; Hamers & Downs, 2003). In May 2011, 3051 HIV cases were registered in Tajikistan, of which 145 (10%) were migrant workers (Tajikistan HIV/AIDS Prevention Center, 2011), and concomitantly increased number of HIV cases have been observed among wives of male Tajik migrants following their return to home (Hegland, 2010). From the above literature, it has been manifested that temporary migrants to whom Piore (1979) used the phrase 'birds of passage" tolerate most abysmal working conditions to accumulate wealth for their investment back home as they have a goal to return their home country (Pedraza,1991). The rupture, separation, and loss that are a part of any migration affect the mental health of all immigrants. Migration induces deep and continuous strain that comes from the difficulties encountered in entering a new economic system and culture, changing people's personalities (Pedraza, 1991). These strains are reflected in the immigrants' physical and psychological health distress, and depression (Vega, Kolody, & Valle, 1987). Migrant workers from Tajikistan who have very poor working and living conditions and being out of Tajikistan in Moscow, they also find themselves drawn to activities involving alcohol and women (Akramov, 2006). They believe that being in a new and difficult social environment is leading them to try new behaviours (Weine, Bahromov, & Mirzoev, 2008). Consequently, being far from their families, most Tajik male migrants have sex with multiple partners, including Moscow-based sex workers, who are known to have rates of HIV-1 that are 30 to 120 times higher than that of Moscow's general population (Shakarishvili, Dubovskaya, Zohrabyan, St Lawrence, Aral, Dugasheva, & Ryan, 2005).

Division of Power

Paradoxically, labour migration flows and trends are influenced by gender dynamics and can provide new opportunities to improve women's lives and change oppressive gender relations. It can also expose women to new vulnerabilities as the result of precarious legal status, exclusion, and isolation (Marin, 2013). Lack of viable economic opportunities, migrant workers and cultural barriers, gender inequality, and poverty (Smolak, 2010) all place the region at risk for a surge in HIV infection rates albeit which is true in the case of Tajikistan. Gender norms are largely shaped by tradition. Female sexuality is the central point of moral respectability and honour; moreover, it is nested in the woman's family, reflecting both her character and that of her husband and family as well. Along the same lines, the only morally acceptable expression of female sexuality is limited to the context of marriage. Society in Central Asian countries is collectivistic and families are expected to defer to the greater good of the community.

Moreover, the collectivist ideals of the majority trump the individualist inclinations of the few (Harris, 2006). Family structure is extended and individuals are expected to place more weight and value on the needs of the family than their own needs. This standard is particularly expected of women. Along such lines, a significant number of marriages in Central Asia are arranged, sometimes with little input from the woman. The collectivist culture of Central Asia is responsible for structuring and guiding virtually all aspects of family life, including marriage (Harris, 2004). Collectivist traditions also dictate that a great deal of importance be placed on reputation within the community. Such emphasis on reputation can be devastating and yield significant implications about HIV (Smolak, 2010). As the social network is the lifeline of the collectivistic society, the people with positive HIV status keep it secret so that it may not interfere with the pursuit of their life goals and to avoid ostracism which may otherwise limit their life goals (Williams, 2007).

Patriarchal rules dictate the institution of marriage in Tajikistan. Labour migration impacted the families in Tajikistan especially women. Marriage remains a central part of Tajik culture, with most Tajik women marrying before reaching age 22 and the majority of men marrying by age 30. Tajik girls are primarily raised to be homemakers and caretakers of the family affairs, future mothers, wives, and "performers of the husband's will", while the boys are raised to be "future breadwinners and family mainstays" (UNO, 2005). Furthermore, in the Central Asian context, economic pressures and religious regulations largely drive polygamy. Infidelity is common in Tajikistan (Ryazantsev, et al., 2014) as Uehling has put it like that in Tajikistan “marital infidelity was reframed as a Muslim tradition called polygyny, lending it an aura of respectability” (Uehling, 2007) and it is a major source of inequality between husband and wife (Charrad, 2001). Polygyny has a strong impact on women's self-esteem it is a way to “humiliate women as a sexual being: not being able to satisfy her husband” (Mernissi, 1987). In most parts of Tajikistan especially rural areas where the younger generation moves to Russia as migrants the women outnumber men, they have only two options left either to practice celibacy or to prefer *defacto* polygynous marriage (Lemon & Thibault, 2018). Since celibacy inevitably leads to the questioning of a woman's reputation and morals, so it is motivated by a desire to shield oneself against gossip − a form of local punishment for transgressing social norms (Kikuta, 2016). Being single often rhymes with the suspicion of prostitution (Cleziou, 2015). The changing nature of marriage and the rise of polygynous unions are both social and economic in nature of which labour migration is an important factor. According to a survey conducted in 2001, eight percent of Tajik migrant labourers in Russia married a second time and lived with their Russian wives (Kasymova, 2006). In 2013, Al-Jazeera reported that every year, 14,000 migrants establish new families in Russia. Of these migrants, it is estimated that 1/3 already have families in Tajikistan (Thibault, 2018). Yet, recently, the difficult negotiation of these family ties seems to increase the number of divorces (Dodarkhujaev, 2015), as well as an increase in polygynous unions in Tajikistan.

Albeit, Tajik society is generally conservative, however, divorce is common. In the context of labour migration, many migrants even end up divorcing over the phone or via text message while in Russia (Najibullah, 2009; 2011). Divorces typically, and quite understandably, often precipitate the interruption of money transfers to the first wife as

culturally women are expected to attain financial support from their husbands (Harris, 2006). Migrant divorces thus reinforce the financial precariousness of families left behind, and the reliance on in-laws (Reeves 2011). In the year 2011, 6,797 divorces were officially registered in Tajikistan and 7,608 in 2012 which represents an increase of 11 percent in the divorce rate. In 2013, the number of divorces increased again by 7 percent in comparison to the previous year, totalizing 8,194 divorces. In 2013, the number of marriages registered was slightly lower than the number of divorces (Rasulzade, 2014). In the past, divorcees used to be stigmatized, because they signalled that the wives had "failed in a woman's most important profession – that of marriage" (Harris, 2005). It is a well-known fact that the survival capabilities of these women are narrow in Tajikistan because of the limited employment or support opportunities available. Concomitantly, these women are vulnerable to trafficking especially, "after they are informally divorced from their absent migrant husbands and they need to provide for their families" (ADB, 2016).

Another facet of labour migration is that of abandoned wives. In 2009, it was estimated that there were between 230,000 and 288,000 economically abandoned households in Tajikistan (ILO, 2009; Khitarishvili, 2016). Consequently, these women are living at or below the poverty level. The condition of these abandoned wives is deteriorating as the husbands stop remittances which is the only source and blood-line of several households living in poverty. These migrants settle in the host country as permanent migrants and in the vast majority of the cases, start a new family there and forget the family back home, leaving their wives to fend for themselves (Berninghaus & Seifert-Vogt, 1989). In often cases, such women are not supported by their in-laws and in some cases, they are even expelled from their homes without any reason (UNO, 2008). Already suffering from traumatic conditions, they easily become vulnerable to depression, suicide, poor physical health, famine, prostitution, or enter polygamous marriages as a coping strategy. Even if these women enter into a polygynous union, which is permeating in the traditional Tajik society, they don't have any financial security as their designation always remains as that of "second wives" and they don't have any inheritance rights and only entertain small share from their husband's economic gains (Cleuziou, 2016). The second wives live in more precarious conditions as they do not have any right on husbands property or they cannot claim any alimony as their marriage are not officially registered rather they are done in simple ceremonies (Lemon & Thibault, 2018). As a result, in search of survival and shelter, these women have higher chances of engaging in prostitution (ILO, 2009). Other factors that push women to fall victim to human trafficking include inequalities in the labour market, experiences of domestic violence and isolation, lack of social protection, and low educational qualifications (ADB, 2016). Unofficial information acquired through International Labour Organization and HIV/AIDS expert in Tajikistan indicates that some women who are abandoned by their husbands may engage in prostitution in the *bazaars* through exchanging sexual services for economic subsistence. This is a matter of basic survival and this type of sex work is termed as sexual' survival strategies (Schoepf, 1988). As mentioned, these abandoned women also fall prey to traffickers who lure them with fake promises of getting the job in the host country. Human trafficking increases vulnerability to HIV infection (ILO, 2013).

Although there is not necessarily a direct causal correlation between trafficking, HIV, and AIDS, once a person is trafficked they are often in an alien environment in which they have little power or agency which increases their vulnerability to HIV. The susceptibility of a trafficked woman to HIV is higher than that of a person who engages in sex work out of choice. Most victims of human trafficking are poorly educated. Their knowledge of HIV risk factors is therefore likely to be low, meaning they have inadequate knowledge of how HIV is transmitted or what they can do to prevent transmission. They may therefore inadvertently transmit the virus to others if they are not aware of their HIV status.

Unequal Status

Central Asian societies still believe in controlling the sexuality of women. The lower status of women is reflected in many dimensions such as the historically disadvantaged legal status, inequities in compensation for women's work outside the home, lack of recognition and compensation of women's work in the home, and generally lower status to equitable employment opportunities and positions of power in social institutions (Amaro, 1995). Women are raised to be homebound, obedient, dependent, modest, and concerned about their reputations (Harris, 2004; 2006). Tajik society adheres to the traditional practices such as restricting girls' education and women's rights, confining girls and women to the home, arranging early marriages of young girls, and using violence to chastise wives and sisters (Haarr, 2007). The risk of HIV infection in women cannot be separated from the unequal status of women and the resulting differences in power between men and women (Amaro, 1995). The impact of women's unequal status on their risk of becoming infected with HIV has been noted by many experts worldwide. The unequal status of women puts them at a severe disadvantage in negotiating sexual encounters in seeking and utilising educational and health services (Chen, Amor, & Segal, 2012). Women's ascribed roles as unequal and sex are something that women give to men in which there is little room for women's acceptance of their sexuality. From this perspective stepping out of traditional roles, as required by safer sex negotiation, places women in direct conflict and challenge with men (Miller, 1986). This presents women with a very difficult situation because *"since women have had to live trying to please men they have been conditioned to prevent men from feeling even uncomfortable. Moreover, when women suspect that they have caused men to feel unhappy or angry they have a strong tendency to assume that they are wrong"* (Miller, 1986).

Women in Tajikistan are expected to behave by cultural norms and prescribed gender identities. Concomitantly, when a girl marries, she leaves her family and joins her husband in the house of her in-laws as the *kelin* (bride). Traditionally, the *kelin* was considered the lowest in importance in the family hierarchy, even lower than children (Poliakov, 1992). Still today, some families consider that the role of the *kelin* is to be at the service of both her husband and her in-laws (Harris 2005), as in the connotation of Walby "*a system of social structures, and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women*" (Walby, 1989). Albeit, patriarchal rules dictate the institution of marriage in Tajikistan it condemns the expression of sexual desires of women while men have more opportunities and leverages to make choices in life. Their sexual desires are socially and

religiously endorsed and are at liberty to have multiple partners (Lemon & Thibault, 2018). Although husbands are expected to control and discipline their wives for behaviours that transgress expectations, and they make this control explicit and visible to protect the reputation of the family (Haarr, 2007). Men are at the privilege to define the nature of the sexual practices and the social arrangements in which they are embedded (Walby, 1989). Gender stereotypes are so strong that the Tajik men don't discuss their sexuality with their wives fearing it might encourage their wives to become more independent or worse to become sexually active in their absence (Harris, 2005). These gender differences even add to the dissatisfaction between relations and are the root cause of the unequal status in society. These conservative views on sexuality also affect marital dissatisfaction (Harris, 2005; Temkina, 2005). A small study of migrants' wives (30 women) in Tajikistan revealed the complex gender dynamics behind the HIV epidemic. Migrants' wives were aware that their husbands were engaged in extramarital affairs, but "believed they had no choice but to accept it" (ADB, 2016). Because of commonly accepted stereotypes about men as leaders and providers, the wives trusted their spouses to take precautions and protect themselves against HIV and generally did not ask their husbands to use condoms (Golobof, et al., 2011). Migration provided opportunities for Tajik migrants for greater sexual encounters than are available or acceptable in communities of origin, which may be small and tightly knit, as well as subject to more restrictive behavioural codes. Having multiple concurrent partners is a behaviour that can be facilitated by mobility and it plays a role in increased HIV risk when it includes limited or no use of condoms. Outside of the norms and constraints of their original social environment, migrants can be more likely to engage in sex with multiple partners (Zabrocki, et al., 2015). It has also been seen that partners who are left behind tend to engage more in sexual relations outside the primary relationship than those with non-migrant partners (Corono and Walque, 2012). Such practices, furthermore, make them also vulnerable to venereal diseases and HIV/AIDS (ILO, 2009) as they face increased risk of exposure to HIV due to migrant or mobile worker partners who engage in unprotected extramarital sexual relations (ILO, 2016).

Violence is a tool used by socially defined dominant groups to control socially defined subservient groups (Miller 1986, Freire 2013). In Tajikistan women treated as subservient has direct ramifications for their exposure to violence especially within relationships with men. A study conducted on a group of women of Latinos by Gomez and Marin (1993) suggests that there is a fear of a partner's anger in response to requests to use condoms. Among women at high risk of HIV infection, the experience of violence and abuse is part and parcel of everyday life. Negotiating condom use in this context is likely to become only another opportunity for conflict and potential abuse. Change in sexual behaviour influences society in general and particularly, sexual relations out of marriage, which hurts wives, who are at the risk of getting sexually transmitted diseases and suffering from psychological stress. The phenomenon of violence against women in families has deep cultural roots. Most Tajiks, both men, and women, do not consider hitting, beating and humiliating behaviours (like constant belittling, calling names, ridicule, non-physical forms of hostility) between the family members to be violence, they view it as a normal part of the family life. The expression of a man's right to 'chastise'

his wife and children, who are considered to be his property, is typically referred to as a family "dispute", "conflict" or "quarrel" and is considered a family's private matter. A woman, who speaks about her family problems in public or complaints about being beaten, is considered to be a "bad wife". Because of the cultural notion that family violence is not openly discussed acknowledged or addressed in Tajik society, women and children typically suffer in silence. The following narrative depicts the extent of violence in Tajik households.

> *"A woman had four children. She lived in a nearby village. She did not cook dinner on time when the husband went to the field to work so the husband beat her…when she was baking bread he stabbed her with a sickle eight times. He came from the back while she was baking and stabbed her…there was blood all over the bread and the oven. She fell to the ground and he was kicking her and trying to get the sickle out…the children went to an orphanage and the villagers paid for the funeral…there were earlier cases where he had beaten her"*. (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2008)

As referred earlier, HIV vulnerability is associated with various factors like violence, lack of HIV testing; needle sharing; limited condom use; concurrent multiple partners; sex work; low HIV knowledge, and low perceived HIV risk (ILO) 2016). The lack of understanding of HIV often leads to low levels of condom use in migrant communities. Even when they are available, condoms may not be used because there are negative connotations associated with them and because they may be considered by some as an obstacle to sexual pleasure (ILO, 2013). Migrants testing positive for HIV are marginalized both within the country in which they work and in their community of origin. HIV is considered a shameful disease in some cultures, and the HIV-positive individuals' initial reactions to the test results, which may include shock and denial, can be exacerbated by the social ostracism. Due to cultural taboos and the stigma associated with the disease, HIV-positive individuals are often reluctant to disclose their status, even to their spouse or partner, leading to a heightened risk of further transmission of the virus as well as an increased risk that the spouse or other partners will not get tested or treatment, or take preventative measures against additional transmission (ILO, 2016). Similarly, under the influence of drugs and alcohol, judgment can be impaired and HIV transmission prevention measures, such as condom use, can be ignored. A study conducted in the Russian Federation on migrant workers discovered that male migrant workers with higher alcohol and drug use attested to higher engagement in risky sexual practices (Luo, Weine, Bahromov, & Golobof, 2012). One migrant said, "*When I am drunk, I can't tell the difference between A from B. Then how I can use condoms*?" (Luo, Weine, Bahromov, & Golobof, 2012). A study of Tajik male migrants living in Moscow found that they had high rates of unprotected sex with prostituted women, multiple concurrent partners, and low condom use, especially when drinking alcohol. The specific working and living conditions of the labour migrants "tend to amplify some masculine norms that are associated with higher HIV sexual risk" (Weine et al., 2013).

The migrants' wives reported basic knowledge of HIV and AIDS, mainly gained through media programs, but also that they were "discouraged from knowing sexuality and HIV/AIDS", or are reluctant to voice concerns with their husbands because it could be

understood as a sign of infidelity or they fear-provoking (Golobof et al., 2011). Many male migrants and female regular partners had basic HIV knowledge, but many also had significant misunderstandings regarding HIV transmission, symptoms, and prevention. There are still many narratives that suggest that the migrants have meagre knowledge about HIV. One participant reported that "*guys suggest drinking some vodka before and after sex as a prevention means from HIV*" (Zabrocki et al., 2015). One female regular partner even feared HIV transmission through everyday items. She said, "*It can be transmitted from a pan or even when people change their clothes. If a person is infected he must have everything separated: clothes and dishes".*

One can now visualise how traditional Tajik society responds when it comes to gender and sexuality. The females are not allowed to express their concerns about their sexuality. Violations of a woman's body within the institution of marriage frequently are justified through cultural values that socialize Tajik men to believe in their sexual prowess and virility (Harris, 2004). Wives remain under cultural constraints regarding sexuality, they know that their husbands utilise the services of prostitutes in Moscow but they cannot reprimand it and they accept their infidelity without questioning. The wives conform to the traditional behaviours and they fear if they bring up the topic of condom use the husbands can reciprocate with violence or abandonment (Golobof, et al. 2011). As a result, wives become more susceptible to HIV infection. Low knowledge about HIV risk was also been found among Tajik migrants returning home (Olimova & Kurbonova, 2006). The HIV vulnerability of labour migrants working in Russia is a public health concern because of the country's high HIV prevalence rate.

Conclusion

Labour migration is helping the dwindling economy to make a comeback paradoxically; it is also a cause of permeating the sexually infected disease HIV/AIDS. Many factors are responsible which make the migrants vulnerable to such disease. In this study, an attempt has been made to give narratives and facts which are based on the perceptions made by Connell's theory of gender and power which states that the sexual division of power, sexual division of labour, and Cathexis produce those behavioural experiences which affect the physical and psychological health of women which makes them vulnerable to HIV. Gender stereotypes and discrimination make females more vulnerable to exploitation and violence resulting in negative sexual and reproductive health outcomes. This situation requires an immediate response from both sending and receiving countries in addressing potential risks associated with population movement including migrants' vulnerability to HIV and another sexually transmitted diseases. There is a pressing need to develop prevention programmes that are effective in reducing the risky sexual behaviours that increasingly place women especially left-behind women at high risk of infection. To take measures for the effectiveness in HIV prevention, first women should be well educated so that they can change their social surroundings- the root cause of health problems of women. Successful strategies must include the protection of women from abuse and promote their role in society as equals. The higher the levels of women's education, the less they will accept the violence. Gender education should be initiated in Tajikistan but even the intellectuals who are working on gender issues are of

the view that the Tajik tradition should be maintained not destroyed and this gender education has to face a brunt from its own society. The power that males enjoy won't be easy to change and the females have to continue to balance their household chores and the outside work. To prevent HIV infection, it is necessary not only to promote changes that support the active role of women in prevention but also to promote change in attitudes and behaviours of men. Such change will inevitably require that men relinquish the power that they currently hold over sexual behaviour. This will require that prevention efforts address and seek to change the power imbalance in a sexual relationship between men and women. Bringing up morals which are indispensable to local masculinity like familial responsibility may have a significant influence on decreasing HIV risk behaviours (Smith, 2007). Furthermore, integrating HIV risk reduction strategies into the cultural norms that hold the male as the protector and provider of his family may serve as powerful and consonant elements of future arbitration. The future of successful HIV research in Central Asia could be enhanced by focusing on and modulating pre-existing positive characteristics that are deep-seated in the region (Smolak, 2010). Paradoxically, cultural norms surrounding sexuality combined with religious doctrine forbidding sexual relations outside of marriage, have led to HIV being highly stigmatised to some extent but in the case of female sexuality, it has made left behind females more vulnerable to STIs as they cannot enquire about their husbands' sexual behaviour as they spend most of their time away from home and they cannot negotiate with their husbands on condom use as socially this makes them suspicious about their husband's behaviour.

NGOs are working to educate people about the different STI infections and their reproductive rights. The organization named *Guli Surkh*, which means Red Flower in Tajik, founded in March 2004 is providing training, assistance, and support for those living with HIV. Various TV shows are also conducted to aware people about HIV challenges traditional Tajik ways of perceiving issues such as gender rights and reproductive health, while at the same time maintaining respect for customs such as respect for elders and concern for the community. Migrants had elevated depression and poor social supports which makes them vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. Programs that emphasize comprehensive basic HIV education and also address coping with discrimination, improving social supports, reducing depression, and broadening acculturation and assimilation opportunities and HIV risk issues surrounding concurrent sexual partnerships, the importance of protection with different types of partners, and alcohol and drug use should be promoted. Still, it is hard to say whether this will improve the situation with migrants' health in the circumstances of the absence of a well-arranged system of medical services for migrants. Besides, employers are not interested in the medical insurance of their employees and reinforcement of their health. In the circumstances of the absence of medical insurance, migrants have to practice self-treatment, look for medical acquaintances, go to pay hospitals. Many cases have been found where employers themselves arrange parties and avail themselves the services of prostitutes for their employees. The issues of medical servicing of migrants can be admitted as a total failure of the Russian migration legislation. Now, only since 2014 purchasing medical insurance for those obtaining patents for working in Russia has become mandatory but as we know the majority of the migrants working in Russia are

undocumented so it also becomes difficult to assess the real situation of the epidemic in the country and both governments i.e. the host, as well as a destination, has to go a long way to curb this epidemic. The government of Tajikistan is also openly holding events to educate people about HIV prevention programmes. They are encouraging people to come out and know their HIV status. Tajikistan joins "Hands up for #HIVprevention" in November 2016" (WHO, 2016). Tajikistan also amended some of the Lawson HIV/AIDS and has adopted a comprehensive and human rights-based response to the HIV epidemic by lifting all the travel restrictions on entry, stay, and residence for people living with HIV in Tajikistan. It was signed by President Emomalii Rahmon, on 14 March 2014. Technical assistance programmes are launched in collaboration with the Russian government to combat infectious disease. This technical assistance programme is supported by a three-year grant of US$16.5 million from the Russian government which aims to strengthen the health system, ensure better epidemiological surveillance of HIV and promote the scale-up of HIV prevention programmes. These programmes will reach the communities that are at higher risk of HIV infection and will help to break the trajectory of the epidemic to some extent.

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The Caspian Sea: Environmental Challenges for the Littoral States

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Abstract

The Caspian Sea is the world's largest enclosed inland water body in terms of its location as well as its vast energy resources. The sea contains 50 billion barrels of oil and 9 trillion cubic meters of natural gas in proven or probable reserves, significant from global energy security and economic perspective. National and international 'Oil and Gas corporations' are commercially active for exploration and exploitation of available resources, identified as the major cause for contamination and irreversible damage of aquatic and surrounding habitat. Among the littoral states, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have been conducting extensive oil and gas drilling activities that releases the maximum of hazardous petrochemical waste and spills in the Caspian Sea besides posing serious challenges to the environment. Other major environmental challenges are; fluctuating sea water levels, declining sturgeon fisheries, imbalances in biodiversity, desertification, urbanization of coastal areas, and degradation of ecosystem. These factors are polluting soil, air and water of the region, which is leading to deteriorating living standards of the people in this vicinity. Considering the commercial and economic interests, the littoral states are not much concern for the environmental laws, so they are very weak and largely unenforced. Another problem is the lack of defining legal status of the Sea. This paper's objective is to identify the key causes for the environmental degradation and their impact on the health of human, aquatic and wildlife population. Further, it would discuss how "competition over the energy resources" among the great powers in the Caspian region is threatening the ecological system and balance. The study will also evaluate the key initiatives taken by the Caspian states to monitor and control environmental pollution.

Keywords

Caspian Sea, Transport network, Caspian pollution, Tehran Convention, Sturgeon

Introduction

The Caspian Sea is the world's largest enclosed inland water body without any natural outflow. It is landlocked among Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran. The sea contains 50 billion barrels of oil and 9 trillion cubic meters of natural gas in proven or probable reserves, significant from global energy security and economic perspective[1]. The area of the Caspian Sea is approximately 14,149,200 square miles (386,400 square km) and covers the drainage basin of around 3,625,000 square km (1,400,000 square miles) (Dubner, 1999: 265).

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Since, the USSR disintegration, the region had been a cynosure of conflict for capturing and exploiting its natural resources and marine reserves (fisheries and other sea species, importantly sturgeon). The economic growth of the newly independent states linked with the implementation of hydrocarbon projects that were financed by western and eastern countries (Zonn, 2001: 69). Each country of the Caspian is responsible for the region's environmental degradation. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have been conducting extensive oil and gas drilling activities that releases the maximum of hazardous petrochemical waste and spills in the Caspian Sea. It is estimated that about 15-20 million tonnes of Carbon dioxide is emitted during the on and off shore fossil fuel production in the Caspian region (Rucevska & Rekacewicz, 2006: 23). Approximately 140 large and small rivers flow into the Caspian, including Volga, Kura, Ural, Sulak and Terek (Namazi, 2000: 123). The Volga is the core fresh water source for the Caspian Sea, which provides 80% of its total inflow (Villa, 2014: 79). Russia is the largest polluter of the Caspian Sea. More than 13 billion cubic meter of waste water comes in the Caspian Sea every year, in which 10 billion cubic meters come from the Volga from Russia. The Volga deposits large amounts of industrial wastes, heavy metals, pesticide, detergents, oil and sewage into the Caspian Sea (Hays, 2008). About 20% species of the region are on the brink of extinction. Thus, the ecological imbalances of the Caspian coastline threatens the health of the humans and wildlife inhabiting this region.

The Priority of Economic Growth at the Expanse of Environmental Perils

The nations are aware of the ecological problems and consequences of the pollution. However, they are undetermined to halt it due to lack of political leverage as well as insufficient resources to enforce the required changes. The exhilarations of rapid economic growth and development have had a negative impact on ecology. After the USSR collapse, the newly independent states started disputing over their claim on offshore and onshore oil assets or gas fields of the Caspian Sea. The exploration and exploitation of these resources considered as the major cause for contamination and irreversible damage of aquatic life and surrounding habitat. Abundant hydrocarbon reserves are considered as a God's gift for the littoral states. The economy of the Caspian states is vastly relied on the energy resources. If we delve deeper on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of newly independent states for the year 2004, the role of hydrocarbon sector and allied industries becomes quite apparent. The industrial sector contributed 45.7 % of the GDP to Azerbaijan. The country's core industries that contribute to maximum part of GDP are directly or indirectly associated with refinement, production, extraction and transportation of oil and gas that constitutes up to 90% exports. In Turkmenistan, the industrial sector provides for 42.7% GDP. The major industrial activities are concentrated on production of petroleum products and extraction of oil and gas. Besides, cotton is another economically important commodity of Turkmenistan. However, the production of cotton possesses a serious threat to environment by increasing desertification and salinization in the Caspian river basins and the Aral Sea. The same pattern is evident in Kazakh economy. Almost all Kazakh oil fields are located in the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan is estimated to have between 9 to 17.6 bbl of oil resources that is the highest in the entire Caspian region (Ladaa, 2005: 30-31).

Russia and Iran are comparatively less interested than other littoral states in the Caspian Sea. The two countries contain large energy resources elsewhere and have more diversified economy. Their economic activities are highly concentrated on fishing and agriculture in the coastal areas. However, both sectors are severely suffering of industrial pollution caused by oil and gas and allied industries. Therefore, both countries are more inclined toward raising environmental concerns onto Caspian agendas in multilateral international forums (Ladaa, 2005: 32).

Environmental Challenges of the Caspian Sea

i) Salinity and Sea Level

In 19th century, between 1880 and 1977, the sea level dropped four meters (from -25 to -29m below sea level). However, after 1977 the Caspian Sea waters continued to expand. The drastic rise in water levels has become a cause of several problems; it flooded urban cities, destroyed industrial infrastructures as well as damaged beaches and resorts. It also displaced around 10,000 people toward the lowlands of Azerbaijan, the Volga delta and Dagestan (Villa, 2014: 79). The salinity of Caspian Sea changes from the north to the south within a range of 1,0 to 13,5 parts per thousand. This difference is principly evident towards the north Caspian[2.] The average salinity of Caspian Sea water is 12.7-12.8%. The lowest salinity is 5-10%. The salinity in Middle Caspian Sea is 12.7%, whereas 13% observed in the Southern Caspian. the highest salinity found in the gulf Kara BogasGol due to massive water evaporation with the salinity of its water being 300-350% (Plotnikov & Aladin, 2011: 104). There was constant flow from the Caspian Sea to Kara BogazGol, a gulf lagoon where water had been evaporating, leading to severe decline in Caspian Sea water levels. Therefore, in 1980, a dam was built between Caspian and Kara BogazGol to decelerate the water flow from Caspian Sea. Kara BogazGol completely dried up within 3 years and converted into a saline desert. Consequently, the salt carrying winds started salinizing the surrounding environment. A new channel toward the Gulf was constructed in 1984 to decrease the adverse environmental impacts and to restore the water flow. After eliminating the dam in 1992, the Caspian Sea level started to rise again that lead to the complete restoration of the Gulf (Plotnikov & Aladin, 2011: 103). Scientists and researchers confess that the reasons of such wide fluctuations are still vague. Nevertheless, it is assumed that changing climatic conditions, river inflows, visible evaporation and human intervention for surface water management, are the key causes. Thus, with above study, it can be inferred that there is an indirect correlation between the water level oscillations and water salinity in Caspian, if water level declines then the salinity of the Sea increases, whereby productivity and nutrition gets severely affected in the coastal zones.

ii) Hydrocarbons

Crude Oil and Gas drilling and extraction is the foremost cause of Pollution, especially in Oceans and Sea. Water pollution and contamination had been increasing at a frightening rate, primarily due to daily crude oil extraction & transportation, construction & operation of underwater pipelines, oil spills, oil tanker accidents, submerged well leakages and wastes. The northern part of the Caspian Sea contains 2 to 2.5 trillion cubic

meters of natural gas and 3 to 3.5 billion tons of oil (Fet & Ponomarenko, 2019). In the northern Caspian area, the oil and gas condensate comprises very high quantities of sulphur. During the distillation process, especially to produce liquid petroleum gas, large parts of sulphur deposits disperses in the air and water, polluting the surrounding regional environment. When the activity ends, the residual toxic waste remains, constituting a hazardous situation. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have been leaving oil wells after utilization and these wells are submerging in the sea water. Big leaks in the sea are another serious concern, responsible for contaminating water that are killing waterfowl and fishes. Kazakhstan's Atyrau and Mangistau regions, bordering the Caspian Sea, are main producers of gas and oil. Approximately, 600,000 hectares of land of these regions are polluted. Besides, thousands of hectares of soil of Absheron Peninsula became unsuitable for agricultural activities (Rucevska & Rekacewicz, 2006: 33). Although, Baku is the formerly oil developed area in the sea, which was considered an achievement. Nevertheless, some scholar's warned about the side effects as pollution of the Caspian Sea has become a worldwide problem.

Commercial activities related to hydrocarbon materials in the Sea pose a serious ecological threat. According to some estimates during production around 2% of total amount of extracted hydrocarbons leak in the sea (Villa, 2014: 80, 81). There is no proper mechanism to dispose industrial waste, which could have some serious repercussions for the eco system. Absheron Peninsula (Azerbaijan) and Aqtau city (Kazakhstan) are the particular examples of improper storage and disposal of the material (Nasrollahzadeh, 2010:98). Today, Baku is considered to be a filthy part of the Caspian Sea. Public-political process, ethnic conflicts as well as military conflicts are also affecting the environmental condition of the sea. For instance, the Russia-Chechnya war became a prominent factor for myriad ecological imbalances in the Sea. Approximately 20-30 military wastes of weapons are found annually[3]. The sea pollution may led to PH changes which reduce water quality, pollute sea bed, direct destroying fish and its ecosystem. In Kazakhstan, blood disease, tuberculosis and others are four times more common in the Caspian area than the rest of the country's average. Water containing a good portion of oil is used for drinking in Kazakhstan, which is a main reason for citing intestinal infections in its coastal areas[4]. Because of oil pollution, sturgeon has been decreasing. In 1993, the total sturgeon catch and caviar production was 1,710 and 106 tons, which in 2009 decreased around 90% to 178.41 and less than 10 tons, respectively (Ovissipour & Rasco, 2012). Moreover, about 4000 of the Caspian seals were found dead at the coast of Kazakhstan (Nasrollahzadeh, 2010: 101).Thus oil spills in the marine environment has a serious concern for biological as well as economic properties. Hence, for the destruction of ecology, Tengizchevron, the Chevron Texaco-led consortium, was fined $75 million in August 2001, which developed the giant Tengiz oil field of western Kazakhstan[5].

iii) Fishing and Illegal Fishing

Traditionally, the Caspian Sea has always been known as the sea of sturgeon that produces more than 90% of the world's caviar (Ovissipour & Rasco, 2012). Beluga Caviar (a species of sturgeon family) is an expansive delicacy in high demand worldwide. The Caspian Sea is richest in biodiversity, which contains 850 fish species (sturgeon, perch,

herring and pike) and more than five hundred plant species[6]. Natural sturgeon productions are decreasing due to overfishing, desiccation of spawning grounds, unsuitable open seasons and reduction of the river flow because of dams, constant changes in sea water level. Moreover, corruption, poverty and unemployment in the coastal population of the Capsian sea are responsible for illegal fishing. Most of the cases, illegal fishing has become a source of income of surrounding populations (Shadrina, 2007: 8). Therefore, spawning areas in the Volga River have decreased from 3,390 ha to 430 ha and the Kura, Sefidroud, Tajan and Gorgan rivers are also not suitable for spawning (Ovissipour & Rasco, 2012).

After the disintegration of the USSR, sturgeon supplies have started to plummet. During the 1980-1989 period, the black market for illegal sturgeon and caviar bloomed due to illegal fishing. The decline was continued until 1993, when total catch was around five thousand tons. In 2007, it stood at less than 1 thousand tons a year. Overfishing in the Caspian Sea is now strictly regulated and international permits must accompany any exports. Despite of these regulations, overfishing and poaching still continue. For instance, a research estimated that in 2006 more than 80% sturgeon catch was illegal in the Caspian Sea. A similar problem is the disappearance of the Caspian seal. From 1900 to 2007, more than 90% of the Caspian seal population has decreased. Oil extraction as well as the climate change may reduce the duration of winter ice upon that Caspian seals depend for breeding (Villa, 2014: 83). There are 17 species in red book of Azerbaijan. The Zandar and Caspian thorn fish have extinct[7]. Due to continuing decline of sturgeons, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) formally classifies "the beluga sturgeon in the Caspian Sea as "critically endangered" on its Red List". Therefore, since October 6, 2005, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service had banned the imports of beluga sturgeon and other beluga products from the Caspian Sea[8]. Moreover, on 27 December 2013, during 34th meeting of the Commission for water biological resources of the Caspian Sea, the Caspian Five countries had agreed to stop sturgeon catches for 2014. The littoral states have also been using new scientific attempts to increase sturgeon population. In Azerbaijan, Shirvan where artificial breeding of sturgeon have been started and they are later releasing them in the Sea to increase their population of the fish (Villa, 2014: 82, 83). In this regard, Khylly factory is engaged in this process. The joint efforts of the littoral states are seriously combating poaching (Nazarli, 2017).

iv) Other Reasons for Pollutions

During the 1990, the major reasons of pollutions in the Caspian were disposal of wastes of industries, pollutants flowing in rivers, agricultural waste water and municipal as well as domestic sewage from cities. Nearly 45% Russian industry as well as 50 % of its agricultural production are situated in the Volga basin. The Volga River brings polluted water from locations as far as 3,500 km away. The inadequately waste water spills in the tributaries of the Volga river. The Kura-Araks Rivers situation on the Absheron Peninsula is similar, as rivers run through Georgia and Armenia, accumulating pollutions from two-thirds of Azerbaijan's industrial production, finally with the waste materials these rivers fall into the Caspian Sea. Apart from this, electrical generation, industrial activity, agricultural exploitation, irregular harvest and tourist industry investments had been

badly affecting the ecosystem of the Caspian since last two decades (Rucevska & Rekacewicz, 2006). As a result, the water quality is declining, which further contaminates drinking water, fish as well as reducing the tourism opportunities.

In the realm of electricity generation, nuclear and thermal power poses a major risk. For instance, in Kazakhstan, the Koshkar- Ata Lake, 8 km away from the Caspian shores, has been used for decades as storage for radioactive and toxic wastes from nearby regions. The industrial cities are located on the shores of the Caspian Sea including Astara, Anzali, Ra msar, Chaloos, Shahi, Mahshahr, Rasht, Lahijan, Sari, Babolsar and Gorgan. The major industries are such as textile, electronics, chemicals, wood and paper, fish processing and food products, which are source of pollution for water as well as atmosphere (Jafari, 2010:28). Sumgayit is the third largest city of Azerbaijan, located near the Caspian Sea. It is one of the most polluted city as declared by the Blacksmith Institute, a New York-based environmental health NGO. Therefore, chemical and heavy metal are affecting more than 275,000 people's health. In this context, a local resident describes condition of the city "The smell of gas wakes me up. I get headaches, I feel nauseous, and it affects my nerves"[9]. Furthermore, Cheleken peninsula located in the western Turkmenistan. It is a big industrial plant accumulated 18,000 tons of radioactive elements which now days are stored in the town of Hazar. It is an open storage area less than 200 meters from the sea. Strong winds and dust storms disperse radioactive elements in seawater as well as air. Therefore, in Turkmenistan today radon concentrations in the local air are 1,000 times higher than the average, which is very critical for humans as well as wild animals. Liquid acid emissions from the plant are another environmental concern. To neutralise stations of these effluents, the state authorities build a radioactive waste storage unit Aligul, which is 17 km away from Khazar. Moreover, a NATO project is assisting Turkmenistan under the Environment and Security Initiative in Central Asia to handle the radioactive waste, which is supporting a radiochemical laboratory in Ashgabat and finding the alternative for waste characterisation and radio protection (Rucevska & Simnoett, 2011: 51).

Another major reason of pollution in the Caspian Sea is agricultural land reclamation and irrigation in coastlines of the Caspian. The use of pesticides and heavy metals for irrigation has been contaminating the sea. The development of domestic tourist industry on the Caspian coasts and their increased population is additional environmental concern. During the last decade, the Iranian coastal area has marked a demographic increase around 5% a year (Villa, 2014: 85).

Competition over the Energy Resources of the Caspian

Due to geopolitical location as well as ample energy resources, the Caspian Sea has become a source of competition among the great powers namely Russia, US, China and European Union. In the 19th century, the region has become a place of 'great game', which is today replaced by the new concept titled 'new great game', struggling for control over the energy resources and pipeline routes. Therefore, superpowers had been attracting the littoral states by providing economic, political as well as security assistance, which are also affecting the domestic and government policies of littoral states. The superpowers had been engaged in building pipelines in their direction to transport oil and gas from the

region. Therefore, a large number of oil and gas pipelines are operational from north to south and east to west. The pipelines split, rust and rapture release oil, which leak into the soil and water, polluting the environment. The pipelines ruptured many times which later have covered with patches. Oil leaks and spills are not rare in the Caspian region. For instance, in September 2003, near Sozram, 700 km east of Moscow, a tanker caught fire and leaked into the Volga River (Hays, 2008). In addition, two Caspian pipelines (one oil, one gas) ruptured and leaked in September 2013, which start from Kazakhstan's offshore Kashagan site (Pannier, 2018).

Pipelines from the new oil fields of Central Asia to the Black Sea, to European markets as well as Eastern markets, affect the environment of the region. The Kazakh government estimated that "2.8 million cubic metres of toxic sour gas had been flared off causing the local air and water to turn acidic" (Chatterjee, 2014). Besides, Greenpeace estimates that every year Russian pipeline system leaks 15 million tons of crude oil (Hays, 2008).

Agreements among the Caspian States for Environmental Protection

The Caspian states signed several agreements for the environmental protection. In September 1995, Russia and Iran agreed to build a Center for Caspian Research Studies in Moscow and expecting other littoral states to join. It conducts research on several topics including balancing the Caspian's water level, to manage the water resources of the Caspian basin and identify the high-risk points in the coastal areas of the Sea (Namazi, 2000:131). The Caspian states together with some international organizations (UNDP, UNEP, the World Bank, the EU-TACIS Programmes and NGOs) have been working together for the environment protection and bio resources management. The Caspian Environment Programme (CEP) launched in 1995 and a prime vehicle for international cooperation. The CEP was established with the aim "sustainable development of the Caspian environment, including living resources and water quality, protecting human health and ecological integrity." (Ladaa, 2005: 43). As a result, in 2003, an agreement titled "the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea (also known as the Tehran Convention)" signed which considered a milestone of Caspian states' environmental cooperation. It is the first legally binding regional agreement that came into force on August 12, 2006 (Hasanova, 2016).

On 23-25 May 2007, first Ministerial meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Tehran Conference (COP I), was held in Baku. During this meeting, the Caspian Five states declared a "Caspian day" on 12 August, marking the importance of the Tehran Convention. In 2011, important agreements were signed such as "the Aktau Protocol concerning Regional Preparedness, Response and Cooperation in Combating Oil Pollution Incidents". In 2012, COP IV took place in Moscow where the five littoral states signed the "Protocol for the Protection of the Caspian Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities". In 2014, COP V was held in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. Though the Tehran Convention is considered as a major diplomatic success, nevertheless there is lack of the permanent seat of the Secretariat because an Interim Secretariat is still headquartered at UNEP's Regional Office for Europe in Geneva, Switzerland (Villa, 2014: 87). Recently, in July 2018, the Caspian five states have signed The Environmental

Impact Assessment Protocol" under the Tehran Convention. The agreement is apparent that individual states are responsible for any damage in sea through construction of pipelines, exploration and development of sites. It is the responsibility of the leading states for safety of the environment, which would involve in future hydrocarbon development or export projects (UN Environment, 2018).

Moreover, five states signed a landmark Caspian agreement titled "Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea" in August 2018 that covered the seabed, the subsoil, natural resources, demarcation, fisheries and navigation. The convention acknowledges all rights over the Caspian Sea and its resources to the five littoral states. It excludes the non-Caspian state from the region. The parties to the convention discussed the ecological system and biodiversity of the Caspian Sea[10]. There are three protected reserved areas:

- **Astrakhan**: It is located in the northern part of the Sea, one of the largest reserved area in the world. Its objective is to preservation and accumulation of natural resources and genetic funds of the coast of the Caspian Sea and of the Volga delta. The goal of this park is not only for the economic development but also for protection of nesting grounds, fish spawning and rare plants. About 30 species of mammal such as boars, otters and fishes like sturgeon and herring and birds like swans and geese live in this park. Since 1984, it gained a status of international biosphere reserve[11].
- **Khazar:** This is located on the southeast coast of the Caspian Sea. It is divided in two parts; the northern from Turkmenbashi to Cheleken peninsula, and the southern - from Okerem to Gasan-Kuli cape and floods of Atrek River. Ducks, swans, dives, flamingos and seagulls are representatives of this reserved park[12].
- **Gizil-Agac**: This park is situated on the southeast border of Azerbaijan in the Gyzyl-Agac Gulf area. Today, the area of this park is 88.4 thousand ha. The goal of this park is protection of wintering of the waterfowl (numbers are the largest in the southeast of the Caspian Sea), fishes. About 74 species of fish live in the Caspian and 54 species live in Big and Small Kizil-Agach Gulfs[13].

Apart from the above discussion, the littoral states have been taking initiatives for ecological sustainability, which are:

1) Russian Federation: The Federal Agency for Fishery of the Russian Federation (Rosrybolovstvo) manages bio-resources of the Caspian Sea. It is an executive authority, with following functions: conservation of marine biological resources, their protection, preservation, research and reproduction of marine biology resources and their habitat in the inland waters of the Russian Federation, to exercise control and supervision over marine biology resources[14]. Moreover, Russia has deployed its border police force to protect sturgeon and curb poaching in Russian territorial waters and in border areas[15].

2) Kazakhstan: The Kazakh Fishery Committee of the Ministry of Agriculture manages fishery resources. It monitors regulations and protection of fishery resources in the country. The Ural-Caspian Basin Inter-regional Fishery Inspection Group in the Caspian Sea area represents the committee. There are two laboratories in Atyrau and Aktau to control pollution in the Caspian Sea[16]. Kazakhstan has started reconstruction work on the seaport of Aktau and reinforced dikes to protect oil fields. The country has also established contacts with corporate firms for environmental protection measures in oil extraction[17].

3) Azerbaijan: The Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources (MENR) is responsible for Caspian environment protection. The country has taken steps for fish breeding plants. The Department of Environmental Protection (MENP) is responsible for pollution control and monitors solid and liquid wastes. It emphasises on nine sector that includes dangerous wastes, protection of atmospheric conditions, protection of surface water resources and other ecological issues[18]. The country strictly follow the official moratorium on catching sturgeon as well as caviar. Additionally, MehmanAkhundov, director of the Scientific Council of Scientific-research Azerbaijan Fisheries Research Institute (AFRI) of Ecology and Natural Resources Ministry, said in 2017, "The sturgeon issue will be discussed in the first secession of intergovernmental Commission on Water Biological Resources of Caspian Sea". Further, he said, "the meeting will focus on possibility of concluding an intergovernmental agreement on a moratorium and setting a ban on catching sturgeon for a period of 20-25 years". However, since 2011, the Caspian states agreed on a technical moratorium on industrial sturgeon(Nazarli, 2017), which entered into force on 24 May 2016. Afterwards, the commission acquired an intergovernmental status. The first meeting of new commission of intergovernmental was held in November 2016 in Azerbaijan[19].

4) Turkmenistan: In Turkmenistan, three major environmental issues are identified such as desertification, the drying of the Aral Sea due to excessive irrigation and chemical pollution. All these areas directly reduce fertility of soil. The Ministry of Natural Resources Use and Environmental Protection Department has been responsible for environmental protection, forestry, hydrometeorology, protection of flora and fauna and administrative planning. The country has also developed an Environmental Fund collected from environmental fines (Hays, 2008).

5) Iran: The Iranian Fisheries Organization (Shilat) is responsible for the management of fishery resources and aquaculture. The organization supervises fishing as well as fish processing. Additionally, it issues licenses and data of fishing stocks[20]. Moreover, the Iranian government introduced the International Sturgeon Institute of the Caspian Sea.

Conclusion

In present century, the environmental challenge is the major problem today at international level, so the Caspian Sea is not an exception. Due to its geopolitical location as well as its ample hydrocarbon resources, the Caspian Sea has become a hub of competitions among the great powers over the region. The great powers have been struggling control over the natural resources and transport routes, so the region has become a playground of competitions for building a large number of pipelines for the transportation of oil and gas. The pipelines split, rust and rapture releases oil, which leaks into the soil and water, pollutes the environment. The sea had been suffering from pollution, which comes from indiscriminate oil and gas extraction, offshore oil fields; refining, radioactive wastes from nuclear power plants, industrial wastes and untreated sewage flow into the Volga River, empties into the Caspian Sea. As a result, spawning areas in the Volga River have decreased from 3,390 ha to 430 ha and the Kura, Sefidroud, Tajan and Gorgan rivers are also not suitable for spawning. In addition, the quality of air and water of the coastal areas has been declining creating hazardous situation for health of

human as well as wildlife population. It is apparent that the energy resources had been playing an important role in economy of the littoral states. Although, the Caspian states are aware of ecological system, they are aspiring to become sovereign and independent state from Russian hegemony, hence want economic growth but at the cost of environmental concerns.

It is obvious that pollution does not see the national boundaries and it is in trans-boundary character. Therefore, only through multilateral actions, this problem could be ameliorated. The littoral states have signed several agreements including 'Tehran Convention' and Environmental Impact Assessment Protocol', however there is lack of strict action for implementation of their environment policies due to economic and political interests. Moreover, they have been taking individual initiatives for the sustainable environment. Apart from this, there are other steps, which need to be introduced such as energy saving measures including increasing renewable resources and decreasing production of waste products. The government must prioritize the environmental as well as health policies and use of clean technology.

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China's One Belt One Road: Implications on Indian Economy

Shugufta Habib & Suadat Hussain***

Abstract

The oldest recorded transcontinental trade link, the "ancient silk route" had been a major land bridge between the east and the west for over twenty centuries. This route was a major link not only for trade but also for cultural exchange, the transmission of art, religion, and people-to-people contacts. However, with the disintegrations of empires particularly the Mongol empire in the 14th century and changing political conditions in the countries along the silk route, trade through this route suffered and was replaced by vessel shipping and cargo flights which shifted the trade from the silk route to another surface, sea and air routes. In modern times, keeping its economic conditions in mind and searching for easy and cheaper routes to markets of developing and developed countries, China took the initiative for the revival of the silk route. This route offers a link between China and Europe through Central Asia and Russia potentially complementing the shipping routes and offers a new opportunity for the development and integration of linked economies. This paper attempts to explore the connectivity advancements via silk roads intended to facilitate the regional and long-distance trade from China to Europe and the possible economic opportunities for India to join the initiative.

Keywords

OBOR, CPEC, Silk Route, Maritime Silk Road, New Silk Route, Connectivity

Introduction

It was German geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen who coined the term “Silk Rote” in 1877 while referring to an ancient truck road crossing Central Asia, which is believed to be the first Trans-Continental trade and diplomatic road in the history of mankind connecting China and the Far East with Europe and India passed through Central Asia covering 6400 km (Foltz, 1999). This network of roads followed the wide and varied links between the people of Mediterranean countries, Middle East, Central Asia, Indian subcontinent, and East Asia. Silk Route included the famously called "Oasis Route"[1]- linking the caravan cities in the desert and semi-desert areas of Central Asia; the “Steppe Route”[2]- the commercial route controlled by the nomadic tribes who lived in the Eurasian Steppe region extending to the north of the Oasis Route; and the “Southern Sea Route", which linked the China Sea, Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and Mediterranean Sea (Andrea, 2014). The division of the Mongol empire weakened the political, cultural, and economic unity of the silk route. With the fall of the Mongol empire, great political powers

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along the silk route became economically and culturally separated (Richard, 2002). The emergence of Ottoman and Safavid empires in WestAsia led to a revival of overland trade, which was often interrupted by warfare between them. The route continued to flourish until the collapse of the Safavid Empire in the 1720s (Faroqhi, 1993).

In modern times due to the wave of globalization and increased trade relations between countries, there has been an increase in interest in the Silk Road. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in1990s, the barriers have been brought down that were instrumental in blocking Central Eurasia from other economies of the world. After gaining independence these Central Asian states made huge efforts to create more and more trans-regional ties linking them to East Asia, South East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. The revival of the old silk route for these regions and countries presents new opportunities for access to new markets, sources of energy, and diplomatic ties with other countries of the world. In modern times the most instrumental initiative has been taken by China to revive the silk route from Central Asia to Germany through an overland corridor and maritime route from Guangzhou through Suez Canal to Venice which is estimated to cost around USD 40 billion. Other than China, many countries including the USA and Japan have taken initiative for the same cause.

Trade along the Silk Route

The Silk Route did not exist for the sole purpose of trading silk. Although silk was most remarkable for western traders, it was one of many items that were traded throughout the history of the Silk Road. Gold, precious stones and metals, ivory, and glass went towards China; while furs, ceramics, gun powder, jade bronze objects, lacquer, and iron went West (Boulnois, 1963) However, apart from silk, China also exported ivory and precious stones, textiles and furs, ceramics and lacquer, cinnamon bark and variety of other spices (Freedom, 2011). These goods were bartered or sold in various oases on the way in Central Asian cities like Samarkand and Bukhara on Parthian and then in the Mediterranean lands. These goods were eventually shipped to Rome and Alexandria. The Parthians, Kushans as well as Central Asian traders played the role of middlemen and reaped profits on this two-way traffic. The returning caravans brought mainly gold from the Greek and Roman Empires, jewels and pearls from India, horses, and rubies from Badakhshan. Trade along the silk route has been pivotal in playing an important role in the emergence of the civilization of China, Arabia, the Indian subcontinent, Northern Africa, Persia, and Europe.

India's Association with Silk Route

India imported both silk textile and yarn from China and controlled part of the silk trade between China and Byzantium along this route. Before the Byzantine acquired the knowledge of sericulture, their silk industry was heavily dependent on the Chinese yarn, which they obtained through the Persians. The Persians, in turn, bought silk yarn from Central Asia and India (Maity, 1957).

Review of Literature

Silk route not only allowed merchandise trade through it, but individuals were

able to make the entire journey from Europe to China and home again without fear of robbery, harassment, or capture (Brugier, 2014). In contemporary times, the Silk route occupies much of the discourse on globalization, international and regional cooperation, and world trade (Kalra, 2018). In direction of reorganization of the silk route, a growing interest is seen in the partnership in tourism development with the belief at the backdrop that tourist destination areas and organizations may be able to gain competitive advantage by bringing together knowledge, expertise, capital, and other resources of several stakeholders (Bramwell & Lane, 2003). Furthermore, the interdependence of economies, services, transportation, information, and promotion highlights the need for cooperation and collaboration and it is evident that companies located in a destination have a lot to gain from being located nearby (Nordin, 2003). Presently, when China is vigorously promoting its "One belt, One Road" (OBOR) initiative, a 21st century avatar of Silk Road is rapidly coming into being as a result of a well-planned Chinese strategy. This is seen as a means to bring boons to China and adjoining economies (Frankopan, 2018). Looking at these developments, the present study attempts to provide a framework for the reorganization of the old silk route and possible implications on the Indian economy. The objectives of the study are enlisted as:-

- Reflect upon the revival of the silk route
- Highlight the dynamic implications of the revival of the silk route on the Indian economy.

To fulfill the above-mentioned objectives, the present study is based on the information collected from secondary sources like journals, books and magazines.

Rediscovery of Silk Route

A significant chapter in the narrative of silk routes is the story of their rediscovery in modern times. Apart from the overland old silk route, Arabs, Persians, Indians, Chinese, and Southeast Asian traders have been, for several thousand years, cruising and trading in EastChina and South China Sea, Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf; generally known as Indo-Pacific which is also termed as Ancient Maritime Silk Road (Koh, 2015). With initiatives taken by the countries along the Silk Road (Including China, Kazakhstan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, India, and Russia) to reorganize the silk route, revamped route pledges to offer trade and cultural interchange opportunities with the potential to shape the modern world. Recognizing the fact that China has 14 maritime and eight land-based neighbors, apparently taking cues from the concepts of cooperative strategy, and in October 2013, President of China Xi Jinping initiated the proposal of building the 21st century MSR (maritime silk route) during his address to the parliament of Indonesia (Brugier, 2014).

In the 21st century, MSR is seen as a complement to diverse overland Silk Routes, such as those to Nepal, Pakistan, Myanmar, India, Central Asia, and even up to Germany, would offer better connectivity in different modes and dimensions. This grandiose project potentially involves an area that covers 55 percent of world GNP, 70 percent of the global population, and 75 percent of known energy reserves (Godement, 2015). All the possible routes put together, called "One Belt, One Road", (Cheng, 2015) encompassing two routes; the land route called "the silk road economic belt", linking Central Asia, Russia,

and Europe, and sea route called "the 21st centurymaritime silk route", going through Western Pacific and Indian Ocean (Confederation of Indian Industry, 2011). According to the project, "one belt, land-based new silk route will begin in Xian in Central China before stretching west through Lanzhou" (Gansu province) (Xu, 2000) Urumqi (Xinjiang), and Khorgas (Xinjiang), which is near the border with Kazakhstan, then running southwest from Central Asia to Northern Iran to Syria, Turkey and finally to North-Western Europe, where it meets up with equally ambitious Maritime Silk Road which will begin in Quanzhou in Fujian province, also hit Guangzhou (Guangdong province), Beihai (Guangxi), and Haikou (Hainan) before heading south to Malacca Strait. From Kuala Lumpur, Maritime silk route heads to Kolkata (India), then cross rest of Indian Ocean to Nairobi Kenya to the home of Africa and move through the Red Sea into the Mediterranean and meets land-based Silk Road. The new silk route particularly MSR is expected to boost China's cooperation with countries along the road, improve mutual trust and create a win-win situation. The MSR is not just a road for China, but the whole of Asia and Africa. Many scholars term this new route as 'Civilization Road', 'Economic and Trade Road' and 'Tourism Road' of Asian countries. China along this new route needs to connect with people of Asian-African countries of the West Pacific and the Indian Ocean to enlarge the industrial chain, guarantee maritime security passage, and deal with maritime non-traditional security.

The project is formulated to amplify expectedly five connections, involving trade, infrastructure, investment, capital, and people. Over the long run, it is likely to create a community with a shared interest, destiny, and responsibilities. It can, therefore, be summarized that MSR is an economic initiative, at least to start with (Magnus, 2015) which aims at building an open-minded, comprehensive, balanced and inclusive regional economic cooperation framework.

Implications of New Silk Route on Indian Economy

China is attempting to rope India into its connectivity strategies through proposals such as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor linking Yunnan province of China with India's northeast (EEAS). The corridor covers an estimated population of 440 million in Yunnan province of China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Bihar in northern India. This corridor is a combination of road, rail, water, and air linkages which would facilitate the cross-border flow of goods and people, minimize trade obstacles, and ensure greater market access which would increase trade between involved countries (Baffa, 2013). This corridor intends to integrate the sub-region that would be instrumental in enabling the integration of Asia and other border regions by focusing on the agenda of TTE (Trade, Transport, and Energy). The idea of multi-modal transportation has been also added to this corridor with a focus on inland water transportation and the promotion of port development and coastal shipping (Sakhuja, 2015a). Though India is the main player and claims to be the net provider of security in the Indian Ocean (Kumar, 2013), there are many reservations in the country regarding these initiatives of connectivity as there are chances of Chinese domination, and countries involved may get caught in a debt trap. India on its own is trying to promote east-west connectivity through Myanmar, Thailand, and on to Vietnam to balance China'snorth-south connectivity to south-east Asia (Sakhuja, 2015b). During October 2014, seemingly a part of the Maritime Silk Road project, China was invited to take over the management of the new segment of Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, built with his financial assistance, which may incorporate berths devoted for Chinese use which escalates speculation that the country wants to sustain a kind of military presence in the Indian ocean, and Sri Lanka may contribute in its effort (Brewster, 2014). On the other hand, in March 2015, India announced the establishment of a new security arrangement with the island states of Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius (Brewster, 2015). What is captivating and fascinating to the Indians is that China is hunting for port access agreements with countries in the Bay of Bengal or the Indian Ocean. It has already done so with three of the ports of Malaysia along the Strait of Malacca, which is instrumental in triggering India's apprehension about Chinese military objectives seemingly disguised under such projects. The proposed Thai canal is also known as the Kra canal project in Thailand connecting the Gulf of Thailand with the Andaman Sea across southern Thailand and Iran's invitation to China to assist develop the Jask Port, overlooking the Arabian Sea are the other such cases. With Pakistan and Iranian navies already present in the southwestern part of the Indian Ocean, India seems concerned about the Jask Port being used as a forward support facility for the PLA (People's Liberation Army) navy in the event of hostilities in the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean (Sakhuja, 2015c). India was perhaps the most prominent and critical factor for the success of the ancient silk route, owing to the rich civilization, proximity to China, and a geographical link to the east (UNCTAD, 2009).

In contemporary times, India is a fast emerging biggest market, a powerful democracy to take on board, and is placed geographically in a strategic position which makes it important for China to take it into confidence to join its new initiative of the silk route. India falls in the MSR branch of this initiative, hence the implications on the Indian economy will be discussed vis- a- viz the MSR.

Positive Implications

1) India's own 'Sagarmala'[3] the project which is envisaged to leverage the country's coastline and inland waterways to boost up the industrial development can be integrated with the Maritime silk route and hence contribute to the nation's attempts to enhance the sea trade connectivity, while also progressively leading to the port-led development of the hinterland and Special Economic Zones.
2) To address economic slowdown, China is offering outsourcing options to its silk route partners, which gives a comparative edge to India given its low cost of labor and raw material and hence a chance to strengthen its manufacturing base, propagate its "Make in India" campaign and generate employment opportunities.
3) While recognizing the fact that China's manufacturing capacity is at least two decades ahead of India, engaging in OBOR initiative, Indian industries could "leap forward" in the same way, South East Asian nations did in the 1980s on the back of outsourcing.
4) The maritime silk route could effectively supplement the land-based Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor under active consideration of India.
5) Engaging in this initiative to re-organize the silk route, India is more likely to reap the indirect boons since China is willing to link the "belt and road" initiatives with India's 'Spice Route' which would link up historic sea routes in Asia, Europe, and Africa and 'Mausam projects' envisaging re-establishment of India's ancient maritime routes with its traditional trade partners along Indian ocean.
6) India's participation in the Silk Road project and increased Chinese investment projects would be instrumental in easing out the trade deficit.
   India could also be able to get access to various routes and thus economic interaction with other countries would increase.

Negative Implications

1) Amongst the high unpredictability about how the Maritime Silk Route would be executed, along with the apprehensions as to whether it will have a geo-economic argument or a security orientation, India may fall into the Chinese trap by joining it, thereby surrendering a good deal of its economic liberty to China.
2) Experts are concerned about the fact that the new silk route may be nothing but an economic disguise for the 'string of pearls'[4] theory, which concerns the build-up of Chinese commercial and military facilities, and relationships in the Indian ocean, Hambantota port, and Gwadar.
3) Other than the threat of Chinese intention of encircling India through "pearl of strings", the country would be able to get direct access to the Arabian sea through Pakistan which mainly passes through Pakistan held Kashmir, thus providing easy logistic facilities to the army of these countries in case of any conflict.
4) New silk route initiative particularly MSR would significantly bring more South and Southeast Asian economies under China's sphere of influence, which may lead to serious complications to India's traditional conception of the subcontinent as its advantaged sphere of influence.
5) If India chooses to stay out of this initiative, India's industrial growth would lag

behind its Asian neighbors, most of which are China's acknowledged MSR partners, thereby adversely affecting the economic growth and development plans of India.

6) Engaging in the MSR initiative, India may face enhanced dumping of goods in its markets due to new production units in the western region of China and greater accessibility in the Indian market.
7) It is a serious matter of concern for India since this project would increase China's influence over Indian neighbors like Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, and Bhutan.

Conclusion

This ambitious project that China has embarked upon, may seemingly not have smooth sailing and is quite likely to face difficulties from its geopolitical and economic ambitions as well. While recognizing the historical importance of this route India must put in plentiful thoughts before joining the new silk route. India is situated at such a prominent location that it can't miss out on the opportunities to be part of this initiative. The new silk Route will be passing through the close vicinity of India and it is beneficial for the country to join the initiative to reap the benefits of increasing regional connectivity. Moreover, the aspirations of India to attract Chinese investments can also be fulfilled which would also be helpful to develop its northeast states and take forward its Act East policy of prioritizing relations with East Asia. It is in the interest of India to follow a two-way strategy- First to intensify its economic connections and draw China into major infrastructural investments in the country. Second, to safeguard from negative implications of the maritime silk route, India should invest in neighboring countries like Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka exactly in those capacities in which China is planning and increase its presence in these countries. With the help of these initiatives, Indian investment in neighboring countries could help in reducing China's sphere of influence and dominance in South Asia to some extent. In the process of achieving the objective of new economic heights, India must not lose sight of the potential repercussions like dumping, massive trade deficit, security concerns, Chinese hegemony, and dominance, etc. More than anything, if India refuses to be a part of the initiative, it may stand isolated. Thus policymakers should formulate policy in such a manner that may help India not only to preserve its role in the present world economy but also help in the sustainable development of the country. Engaging in the new silk route is the opportunity that may be beneficial for trade and regional integration in many ways, on which India cannot take a reserved stand but needs to proactively shape the discourse.

Notes

1. 'Oasis Silk Road' refers to the portion of the trade route networks in northwest China linking Chinese inland to Central Asia. It is the most commonly known land route in the entire grand network of the Silk Road.
2. The land route which links central China to Europe through the vast regions of the Eurasian steppe was named as steppe Silk Road. This route consists of the whole network of land routes which fall into two main lines, southern and northern lines connecting central China to the steppe and then to the west.

3. It is an initiative by the government of India to set up new ports, modernize existing ports, development of coastal employment zones and coastal employment units to enhance port connectivity via roads, railways, pipelines and waterways, and multi-modal logistic facilities to enhance trade and generate employment opportunities in the country.
4. A string of pearls refers to military and commercial facilities of china along sea lines of communication that extend from the mainland of China to Port Sudan in the horn of Africa. The sea lines run through many maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Mandeb, Strait of Malacca, Strait of Hormuz, and other strategic maritime centers in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Somalia.

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Superbride, or a little about Modern Uzbek Cinema

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Abstract

The female image in cinema has always been a reflection of socio-political transformation, thus, changes in the social status of women are directly related to their artistic representation. The image of a modern Uzbek woman in cinema combines traditionalism peculiar to the Central Asian region and glamorous femininity inspired by the West. Although the female image has undergone diversification in commercial film production, the willingness to build a family remains an integral part of women's aspirations and desires. The search for personal happiness as a wife and mother is an obligatory element of the plot narrative, and success in personal life despite various circumstances is almost the only possible happy ending for a female protagonist. In the latest art cinema, there is a general trend toward the reverse evolution of the female image-from a modern woman to a traditional one. In these movies, spiritual values, morality, and traditions as the principal factor of society's well-being are brought to the foreground, while female characters are mostly depicted in a traditional environment and within an ethnographic context.

This paper mainly focuses on Bakhrom Yakubov's film Superbride (2008), which became a national hit and box-office sensation in the domestic market. Superbride is a particularly successful example of a fiction film that through the prism of youth comedy promotes an ideal and frankly banal female image based on patriarchal mentality.

Keywords

Central Asia, Uzbekistan, Cinema, Film Studies, Feminism, Women, Gender Inequality

Introduction

After undergoing many significant changes, the Uzbek republic demonstrated a remarkable female transformation from a secluded Muslim wife to an emancipated woman. Uzbek women were always an integral part of national cinema. Having passed through unveiling campaign of social and intellectual "liberation" in the 1920s, Soviet times, and crisis years after independence the female image has always served as a reflection of every era, "in transition periods – defenseless, in a stable society – strong, beloved, and socially active".[1] The transformation of the female character in different periods is very indicative: from an unhappy wife to emancipated Soviet woman, from fabric girl to mother, from an unstable woman to socially active. In the 1920s and 1930s, one of the main campaigns was *Hujum* (attack, assault) aimed at changing the situation of women in a patriarchal community through mass unveiling. The Communist Party made

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an attempt to modernize the Central Asian region, and it was believed that the *Hujum* movement would mobilize local women "under the message of equality and liberation for the female sex".[2] Since it was considered as a "catalyst to a complete societal and political change"[3], the government has created special places of employment "such as collective farms that employed women only"[4] to help them integrate into the social structure. Therefore, reflecting policy on the liberation of indigenous female population film industry widely exploited the plots about the "hell" and "paradise" of two women: the story of an unhappy Uzbek woman oppressed by husband, traditions, and unlike her, a happy emancipated Soviet woman"[5]. In Soviet times, the woman representations were reduced to a few clichés: "liberated woman of the East", shock worker at the factory, "fighter - heroic daughter of the people"[6], or the grieving mother. The images of liberated women and factory girls are primarily related to policies towards the employment of the female part of population, including Muslim women. This was due to labor shortages, as there were more women than men in the Soviet Union after World War II. At the same time, another image was also associated with post-war consequences – the mother who lost her son in the war. The period of *Perestroika* has brought uncertain female characters on screens – suffering and unprotected as the embodiment of the time of instability.

The period of independence is characterized by the so-called politics of national revival, specific features of which were distancing from the Soviet past, return to the roots, and romanticization of archaic. Since home and family are two concepts that form the basis of any society, in the early years of independence the image of the mother becomes central in the Uzbek cinema. In general, the idea of the 'natural purpose of a woman' was dominant in all post-Soviet countries, however, in the Central Asian region, it was burdened by a nationalist idea, so local mass media required a 'truly Uzbek woman' to play the traditional role of mistress of the house and educator of children. The building of a strong family is often compared to a state-building, thus, having a full family is compared to harmony and well-being in society. Therefore, the mother embodied the ideology of nation-building as she appeared to be a keeper of family, bearer of traditions and national values which were placed at the head of politics.

Commercial films of the 2000s

In the 2000s, Uzbek film officials introduced a "Bollywoodization" system that redefined the domestic film market. The cinema industry of Uzbekistan has adopted the experience of Indian cinema and applied it to local production. Uzbek studios produced films for a growing domestic audience creating one of the most profitable markets in Central Asia. Quantity in this situation did not always mean quality, and the standard was generally comparable with soap opera-style melodramas – a preferred genre in which filmmakers expressed themselves. Film critics stated that while the number of Uzbek films was increasing, the budget was usually low. After a period of stagnation and crisis during the first years after the independence, the Uzbek film industry entered the revival stage partly due to the emergence of cheap digital technology, which has allowed the production of hundreds of films over the past decade. Following the formula of low-budget melodramas, the wave of commercial films provided fairytale storylines with pathetic actors and exaggerated characters, or similar to each other Cindrella or Romeo &

Juliet-sque love stories where the girl is rich and the man is poor or vice versa, while the main antihero was represented by a mother-in-law, stepmother, or failed fiancé.

Today's Uzbek society is primarily dominated by the influence of two mentalities – ethnic and religious, although Uzbek people have also felt the influence of the West that is often reflected in modern films. "Ethnic" encompasses historical experience as traditional views, customs, regional mentality, whereas "religious" predominantly refers to Muslims, as Uzbekistan is a country where the majority of the population practice Islam. Partial westernization proclaimed the building of a secular society, which also affected the appearance of the local women: fashion outfits, high heels, ability to wear shorts and bright makeup, botox lips, and fake lashes. On the wave of the progressive social changes, Uzbek commercial films of the XXI century introduced diverse female portrayals: revengeful daughters (*Fatima and Zukhra, Sogdiana, Homicidal*), fatal beauties (*Sogdiana, Payback for Adultery*), tender sweethearts (*Romeo and Juliet, The Heart is Crying*), spoiled rich girls (*Groom for Rent, Super Servant*), loyal girlfriends (*Insane, Daddy, Consequences*), modern brides opposing a traditional mother-in-law (*Superbride, Fighting Mother-in-Law*), and unhappy Cinderellas (*Zumrad and Qimmat, The Flaw*). Unhappy love stories, where a priority of the family triggers an inner conflict between love and family obligations, achieved special success with a domestic audience and gained huge popularity among Uzbek youth (*Fatima and Zukhra*, *Sogdiana*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Insane,* etc.). Although contemporary film projects presented rich variations of female characters, one trait remains unchanged – the protagonist is a modern girl whose main purpose is creating a family. To some extent, the line of the mother as a tradition-keeper continues in up-to-date cinema.

Superbride – comedy on a familiar topic

However, amid tear melodramas and unhappy love stories, Bakhrom Yakubov's *Superbride* was the most successful commercial hit since it promoted an ideal woman image through the prism of comedy, and all film events were presented with sparkling humor. Diana and Sardor meet in a bowling club and to the displeasure of their parents very quickly decide to get married. Diana, who grew up in a non-traditional environment, finds it difficult to build good relationships with Sardor's mother Munira-opa. With the study of the national traditions of Uzbekistan, Diana is trying to find an approach to a strict mother-in-law.

Yakubov tells the story of an interracial marriage, where contrasting cultural and ethnic values evoke the discontent between two families: Sardor belongs to a typical Uzbek family, and Diana to a family that apparently follows Russian or Western traditions. Generally in Uzbekistan, when a young man reaches marriageable age his family begins to look for a future wife for him. Usually, young people marry within specific social groups, and marriages are arranged between families. Often times, a boy and a girl are sent on a date to meet each other so they can express their opinion later. If everything satisfies both families, parents of the groom send matchmakers to the bride's house. Nowadays the situation when young people choose their marriage partners is common, though the custom of arranged matrimonial alliances where parents make the choices lives on not only in rural areas of the country but in the capital as well. *Superbride*

also reflects the typical customs tied to the arranged marriage traditions. Thus, Munira-opa has already found a proper wife for her son –daughter of their neighbors Gulchehra– and uses Sardor's only date with her as an argument for marriage. Sardor goes against the family's decision and chooses Diana, but under the pressure of traditional thinking, his parents do not want to accept a daughter-in-law of non-Uzbek ethnicity.

In the center of the narrative lies a conflict between the modern bride or *kelin* (daughter-in-law in Uzbek) and her conservative mother-in-law. Since the daughter-in-law occupies the lowest position in the husband's family, treating the daughter-in-law as a free worker or slave is one of the most pressing problems in Uzbek society. The aggression of mothers-in-law towards daughter-in-law is not only one of the main reasons for quarrels, divorces, and even suicides in real life, but one of the most frequently exploited themes in the local cinema. However, in *Superbride*, the conflict between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law is shown from a humorous side; although Sardor's mother constantly comes up with more and more new tasks for Diana, the girl manages to cleverly get out of tricky situations. In many ways, it happens with a help of technical devices –a laptop and the Internet– which makes comedy truly up-to-date. Many jokes in *Superbride* are built around the Internet, which Diana uses frequently; it emphasizes Diana's modern upbringing – the girl studies Uzbek traditions online and searches for national food recipes on culinary websites. At the beginning of the film, Diana performs "Kelin Salom" – the wedding rite, which literal translation is "bride's greeting". During the ceremony parents of both sides, all relatives, friends, and closest neighbors gather outside, while the bride in national costume welcomes them performing low bows from the waist. Guests in their turn greet a newlywed with wishes, presents, and blessings. When Munira-opa asks how she has learned "Kelin Salom", Diana answers, "Have read on the Internet". Later Diana surprises her mother-in-law again with the ability to light the fire in the traditional Uzbek clay oven. "Where did you learn it?" questions mother-in-law, "On the Internet", the girl answers again.

Besides modern humor, the film is also replete with a humor inherent to romantic comedies that "has less to do with slapstick or the grotesque and more to do with absurd situations, verbal sparring, and improbable couplings"[7]. The genre "generates its humor from conventional gender roles as they are expressed in men's and women's mistaken expectations of each other"[8]. So is in *Superbride* when Sardor jokingly proposes to Diana, and the girl suddenly agrees. However, she immediately asks, "Are you scared?", while on his part, Sardor looks confused and embarrassed. No less funny are the verbal arguments between the older generation couples when their expectations for each other do not match.

Snappy conversations, modern gags, as well as the gap between the generations that prevents the understanding of youth pranks and fills individual scenes with a special comicality, helped in making *Superbride* a box-office sensation in 2008.

Uzbek daughter-in-law in frames of a patriarchal gaze

Despite the huge success among local viewers, *Superbride* is well-suited to be considered as an object of feminist critics for the hidden idea of humiliating a woman. The unwanted marriage creates tensions between Diana and her mother-in-law, who is deeply

dissatisfied with the interracial union and dreams of a "proper" Uzbek wife for her son. Considering Sardor's choice as a great shame, Munira-opa decides to make Diana leave by way of becoming a "venomous mother-in-law". She shifts the entire house holding on Diana's shoulders as it is customary in Central Asian families. Treating daughter-in-law as a free workforce is rooted in age-old norms, according to which the newly bride should not only help mother-in-law but also babysit younger members of the family, cook, clean, wash, take care of domestic animals, meet the guests, and generally obey all the orders of senior family members. In such circumstances, *kelin* who bears the brunt of caregiving and chores does not have time for her self-development, education, and health. *Superbride* demonstrates that Diana has faced similar strict norms and pressure after entering Sardor's family as a daughter-in-law. The story of Diana and her mother-in-law raises questions about gender relations in contemporary Uzbek families, which despite modernized lifestyles are still based on male supremacy. Most female characters are shown in a domestic setting fulfilling their "female" duties as caregivers, while men spend time relaxing, playing bowling, or meeting friends. *Superbride* as many other Uzbek films accepts the image of a 'domesticated' woman as an ideal while the plot based on traditionalistic views on female purpose subtly transmits the idea of humiliating a woman especially when it comes to young married women. On top of that, Sardor's mother, despite being a woman herself, is a vivid example of a *social patriarchal mentality* towards the place of women in the family structure; going through oppression within the family, these women expect the same from their daughters and daughters-in-law unwilling to break the vicious circle of women's discrimination. Hanging all housework on Diana, Munira-opa reminds Sardor's father how his mother forced her to do the same.

Diana seems resisting assumptions about male domination but still turns into a victim of gender inequality at home or outside of it. Although the relationship between spouses is built not on single-sex supremacy but more on a peer friendship, Diana fully depends on Sardor's opinion and his evaluation of her as a woman and wife. Sardor is ruining the typical stereotype of an Uzbek man by breaking off the arranged marriage with an Uzbek girl and marrying Diana, however, after the wedding he acts like a traditional husband. He brings Diana flowers everyday but does not help around the house and insists on having a baby as soon as possible. "She will sweep my yard," boasts the young man to his friend when he meets Diana for the first time. *Sweep my yard* is a reference to the bounden duty of kelin to sweep the courtyard in front of the house if there is one, which cannot be neglected in any case. This sharp phrase about Diana reflects not only Sardor's opinion but also a limited male perception of female potential.

The depiction of Eastern women lying in the core of *Superbride*'s narrative has a lot of common with Susan Faludi's definition of backlash – a deeply conservative media response to feminist progress claiming that women's equality was leading to their unhappiness. In the '80s, backlash shaped much of Hollywood's portrayal of women presenting typical plot narratives, where a "good mother and wife" wins over a careerist woman. According to the humiliating subtext of backlash films, an independent woman should be punished in the end, shamed or killed. These Hollywood portrayals grew up from one of the main backlash's theses – women were unhappy because they were too free. Independent and working women were painted as "selfish" or "immoral", while the

medical prescriptions for females who resisted "nesting trends" were limited in simplicity – quit work and get married. Thus in the *Superbride*, explaining to the neighbors the reason why Diana is not at home, Munira-opa spits sarcastically, "Diana is at the university, she has to study!" Her reaction once again expresses the limiting stereotypes on a woman's role in the household – in the kitchen preparing food and cleaning the house. Diana's study is considered to be unimportant in comparison with the female's primal duty – pleasing her man. Patriarchal ideology in the film was also conveyed in the demand to get pregnant as soon as possible. As literary scholars, Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar observe, "Just as more and more women were getting paid for using their brains, more and more men represented them in novels, plays, and poems as nothing but bodies."[9] *Superbride*'s main lead is an example of an emancipated young woman who attends university, dresses extravagantly, drives a jeep, participates in a hip-hop dance contest, and argues with her parents. But everybody in her husband's neighborhood sees her only as an object of reproduction, making Diana suffer by the constant requirement to have a baby. In Uzbek society, if the daughter-in-law failed to get pregnant during the first year she is considered "defective" while male infertility and other possible causes are not taken into account.When the doctor informs the young couple about incompatible RH factors, Sardor blames Diana in it thereby demonstrating the climax of patriarchism – accusing a woman alone of failing to get pregnant. Earlier in the movie, the same does Sardor's father blaming Munira-opa in their son's inter-ethnic marriage.

The director does not include a religious sequence in the film, perhaps, for a variety of reasons: avoiding the imposition of religion and depiction of a binational marriage in the first place. There are just a few films that show relations between spouses of different ethnic groups but those that deal with this topic almost ignore the religious content. Usually, Uzbek movies include performing of Muslim rites as a part of daily life like praying or ablution; however, *Superbride* does not depict even that small sequence of the everyday religious part of living. Although Sardor's family represented as modern from the visual side –holding a modern wedding, playing bowling, partying with friends, and wearing non-national clothes outside of *makhallya*– it is deeply patriarchal about gender relations. There is also no single hint about whether or not Diana and her parents practice any religion. Therefore, it can be argued that Diana's oppression is almost completely based on gender inequality.

Superbride and postmodern femininity

Post feminism typical for romantic comedies of the 2000s looked for a balance to bind an idea of female strength and power with femininity characterized by passivity and dependence. When Sardor asks Diana if she is satisfied with everyday sweeping and cleaning, the young woman knowingly answers, "It's okay; I am just a *kelin* in this house". Her phrase once again reminds the viewer of the lowest status of the daughter-in-law in the husband's family, particularly until she produces the first child. Until that, fundamental decisions about a young woman's life – whether she will work or not, with whom she is allowed to communicate, and how often she can visit her natal family completely depends on her new relatives. Here Diana adopts a knowing tone inherent to the post feminist cinema, demonstrating the contemporary knowing woman's choice of

traditional lifestyle. Diana is aware of her place in the husband's family, as well as of her female duties. "But you are – Diana", tells Sardor. His phrase "*But you are Diana*" emphasizes not only the girl's non-Uzbek ethnicity but embraces her modern upbringing, sassy personality, and as a result her unfitting into the conventional family surrounding.

According to Yvonne Tasker, traces of feminism as a cultural force are reflected in a romantic comedy as "a narrative insistence that men too must change".[10] *Superbride* does not fully meet post feminist film features but few attempts of smoothing male unwavering supremacy can be seen in the ending sequences. Unable to withstand the pressure from new family members Diana leaves to parents' house. Eventually, mother-in-law feels remorse, while Sardor asks Diana to return passionately confessing his love but never apologizes. Diana refuses, however, suddenly discovered girl's pregnancy plays into the hands of her husband. The girl returns home and repairs relations with the mother-in-law who warms up to her non-Uzbek *kelin*. Finally, in the best traditions of backlash movies, the protagonist transforms into an obedient Uzbek wife whose "primary responsibility consists of getting pregnant and ensuring the stability of a traditional social structure"[11]. Such imagery is close to Diane Negra's notion of *retreatism* as a central trope of contemporary post feminist culture. According to it, "a variety of recent popular cultural narratives centralize/idealize a woman's apparently fully knowledgeable choice to retreat from public sphere interactions in favor of domesticity"[12]. The final moments of the film are revealing an "idyllic picture": two men are discussing the questions of their business, while Diana and Munira-opa fight over a broomstick for an order to sweep the yard.

Superbride moves to the foreground all basic female virtues as beauty, cleanliness, kindness, obedience, and patience by propagating the desirable portrait of a good-looking female who manages to study and get her domestic work done at the same time; but what is more important – not paying attention to naggings of the husband's family. During the film, Diana is undergoing significant visual changes as well, her transformation is shown through the outfits she wears, for example, outside of her husband's house Diana shows up in shorts and modern dresses that shock the residents of *makhallya*. Changes in her personal style during the film are obvious: if in the first scene, the girl is wearing a high fashioned jumpsuit and heels, by the end she mostly appears in Uzbek traditional clothes – plain khan-atlas dress, wide trousers, and a kerchief. On the other hand, Diana and her attitude reflect the main conditions of postmodern femininity: she is knowing, having a multicultural background, well-educated and, what is strikes the most, she makes her own choice towards her future life.

The extraordinary mixture of Uzbek conservatism and up-to-date glamorous femininity reflected in *Superbride* found its continuous depiction in such popular projects as *Insane, Groom for Rent*, *Daddy, Not a Good Match, The Heart is Crying*, etc. However, *Superbride* more than the others is fulfilling a realistic expectation of men since traditional motives highly dominate the local screens even nowadays, and leave the woman's image in frames of patriarchal gaze.

Contemporary art cinema: return to traditionalism

After years of overwhelming Western influence, national context became one of

the prevailing topics in modern Uzbek films, since the cinema of independent Uzbekistan is an important part of national art and the main factor of the spiritual renewal of society. Filmmakers show their intentions to rediscover local identity, and skillfully draw the new portrait of Uzbek woman.

From the 2000s, along with low-quality commercial products Uzbekistan released a number of art movies that cover such topics as a rethinking of the past, local traditions, customs, daily reality, and societal problems. Directors base their characters on the mentality of Uzbek people inseparable from deep spiritual values. In the attempt to rediscover the identity of the indigenous population, film projects of "Uzbekkino" promote the image of a woman that meets the expectations of society. Female leads of these films follow the traditional and ritualistic way of life richly endowed with spiritual meaning. Cinema helps in representing the cultural ideas about the role of women and propagate characters who put husband, family, shame, and tradition above career, self-interests, and wealth, so there took place a devolution of the woman's portrayal – from an emancipated woman to a traditional one. Art movies generated the image of a silent female, sometimes an outcast, but with a highly strong presence, so the soulful and traditional woman of art cinema coexists with the image of the spoiled modern girl from commercial movies. The woman becomes an essential element of the majority of films, where the depiction of her spiritual world intersects with the reflection of diverse social issues as a whole or as a "women issue" separately (*Heaven is my Dwelling Place*, *Road under the Skies*, *Women of Heaven*, etc.). Many films address contemporary problems and present women as victims of various circumstances: wives of men working abroad (*Women of Heaven*) forced to wait for their husbands for years, women lured to Islamic groups (*The Deceived Woman*), victims of sex traffic (*Shame, Colorless Dreams)*, women who are not understood or accepted by society (*Heaven is my Dwelling Place, The Yurt*, etc.).

Heaven is my Dwelling Place is telling a sad story about the young woman whose incongruous beauty makes her an object of human hostility. Her beauty was considered as a trick of a devil, so nobody wanted to marry her but to use for their dirty purposes; the protagonist tries to adapt to any situations, and yet becomes an outcast due to "evils of traditional, patriarchal community, where prejudices of ancestral society prevail".[13] The plot of *Road Under the Skies* revolves around two young people – Aziz and Muhabbat. While Aziz was doing military service, Muhabbat pregnant with his baby was forced to marry an adult man. In the end, the girl accepts her fate and adapts to a new life. The film conveys the idea of variability and motion of life, as well as the woman's reconciliation and humility before the circumstances. The only female lead of *The Yurt* is a mute village girl who vigorously supports her husband in his refusal to accept the modern style of life. Satisfied with the secluded way of living in the mountain yurt and household toils, she helps her gloomy spouse to find the joy of life again. On the day before her marriage, the protagonist of *The Spring* comes to an understanding that life is not that pure as it seems. Realizing that her spiritual values cannot be protected in her home town society, the bride humbly cries near the spring where according to the local tradition each girl should wash her face on the eve of the wedding. All these movies reveal how modern cinema bases its female characters on the traditional mentality, while the character's victimhood and

ability to adapt to the strikes of fate are brought to the fore.

Feministic perspectives on women's place within the patriarchal community were reflected in the scandalous documentary *Burden of Virginity*, probably the only documentary film on gender subject. In modern Uzbek movies, sex or sexual motives are strongly forbidden; romantic scenes include only innocent physical contacts while flirtatious or pathetic dialogues compensate the missing sensuality in a character's interaction. An unspoken prohibition to discuss intimate topics, and especially to display them on the screen, was one of the reasons why *Burden of Virginity* considered controversial. In the conservative Central Asian society boys are allowed to have sexual relations before marriage, but for a girl, it is a shame since being a virgin is the bride's primary duty. The documentary is based on virginity check-up tradition in Uzbekistan and draws attention to the people who have fallen victims to this ritual – as questions on sexuality and sex education remain taboo, girls and boys, as well as their parents, are cut off from the necessary information that could protect entire families from breakups. *Burden of Virginity* tells a story of a girl who was chased out from her husband's home the next morning after the wedding as the absence of virgin blood on the sheets became the reason for immediate divorce. The film demonstrates the paradox, "while in some places people can have a fully civilized wedding, very similar to a European one, and at the same time they can organize an inspection of virginity".[14]

Conclusion

Although few studies have indicated a higher percentage of strong female characters on daytime television, stereotypical and traditional images of women still predominate in all media forms. Both the media and national policy statements reinforce notions of women as homemakers and attribute to women characteristics of devotion, selflessness, and tenderness. Such presentations are positive, though at the same time they portray women as "passive and are generally not compatible with images of women in leadership roles in politics, business, or even in civil society".[15] Despite numerous women's achievements in various fields, the perception of women primarily as caretakers and household keepers leads to the limitation of their opportunities in professional growth and participation in public life. Lately, Uzbek women are highly concerned about the "ideal" image that oppresses women and builds a model of behavior for youngster viewers. Mass media are continuing to maintain the sex-role stereotypes even in the face of changing reality where women are active and successful at work and define themselves not only like housewives and mothers. Unfortunately, in today's life, gender stereotypes are not eliminated, and woman's achievements are losing their meaning when everybody starts talking about women and their nature.

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Traces of Muslims in Early Medieval Kashmir: A Historical Survey

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Abstract

The Kashmir valley, eulogised as the heaven on earth, has been, throughout its history, a place of great interest for saints, sages, Sufis, travellers, adventurers, and rulers. Unlike its neighbouring regions, the conquest of Kashmir at the hands of (foreign) Muslim rulers was suspended for a considerable period of time (i.e., up to 1586, when Mughal rulers of India annexed it) but could not escape the spiritually elite lot among Muslims (Sufis and Rishis), who conquered but not the land, rather the hearts of the people, receiving from them the unfathomable love and reverence for generations to come; thus, bringing forth the materialization of the prediction about Kashmir made by Kalhānā, the ardent Brahman and classical Sanskrit chronicler of Kashmir, who says, "That country may be conquered by the force of spiritual merits, but not by forces of soldiers. Hence its inhabitants are afraid only of the world beyond." Muslims were present in Kashmir centuries before the establishment of Muslim rule and large scale propagation of Islam there. This, historical fact substantiated with valid documents, depicts the broad-mindedness, welcoming, peace loving and tolerant nature of medieval society of Kashmir, that eventually sustained a multicultural and all-inclusive environment in Kashmir for a considerable period of time. The current paper endeavours to trace the presence of Muslims in Kashmir in the early medieval period i.e., much before the large-scale propagation of Islam and the establishment of Muslim rule there.

Keywords

Kashmir, Muslims, Cross-cultural intercourse, Hindu society / Buddhist society

Introduction

The magnetic attraction that the lush green valley, Kashmir, possess with an affluence of captivating natural scenery of alluring meadows and flower beds, water-falls, rivers and lakes, coloured saffron fields, fruit orchards, singing cataracts and rivulets has been highly talked about. The beauty and appealing scenery of Kashmir has received the attention of renowned local and foreign poets besides receiving a place in the age-old Geography of Ptolemy and Histories of Herodotus (Sufi, 1975, p.iv).'Urfī Shīrāzī, the renowned Persian bard, thus eulogizes the valley as:

گرمرغ کباب است کہ بابال و پر آید ہرسوختہ جان کہ بہ کشمیر در آید

Any burnt creature entering Kashmir; Even if a roasted fowl, it shall grow feathers. (Diddamarī, 2011, p.xxix).

In the words of Abū al-Faḍl "the praises of Kashmir cannot be contained within the

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narrows of language" (Abū al-Faḍl,1939, p.828). Likewise, the Mughal emperor Jahāṇgīr has expressed his feelings about the beauty of Kashmir in a eurhythmict popular Persian couplet:

اگر فردوس بر روئے زمیں است ہمیں استو ہمیں استو ہمیں استو

If the paradise is anywhere on the surface of earth it is here, it is here, it is here (Diddamarī, 2011, p.xxix and Blake, 2002, p.44).

In the same vein, Mirzā Ghālib, Aḷṭāf Ḥusayn Ḥālī, Brij Nārāyan Chakbast, Prof. Āl Aḥmad Surūr, Jagan Nāth Āzād, Ḥafīz Jālandharī, Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl and others have left exquisite poetic expressions about the exhilarating beauty of Kashmir.

Located amidst the lofty mountain ramparts the picturesque valley, Kashmir, offers a sight of "an emerald of verdure enclosed in the amphitheater of virgin snow" (Sufi, 1975, p.1). The valley, which was dominated with the Hindu-Buddhist religious philosophy during the early medieval period,was destined to become a Muslim majority region by the end of 17th century. The emergence and subsequent spread of Islam and Muslims, through peaceful preaching, was a gradual process initiated long before the establishment of Muslim Sultanate (in 1339 C.E.) and the subsequent annexation by Mughal empire (in 1586). This steady arrival of Muslims (traders, fortune seekers, preachers and adventurers) in the valley was greatly catalyzed by the age-old cross cultural interactions or inter-regional trade links that hooked the valley with the adjoining regions, which had already come under the sway of Islamic missionaries and conquerors (Khan, 1974, p.61). Arnold (1864-1930 C.E.) with his synoptic insights argues that "all the evidence" pertaining to the gradual process of emergence and profuse spread of Islam in Kashmir, "leads us to attribute it on the whole to a long-continued missionary movement inaugurated and carried out mainly by *faqīrs and dervishes*" (Arnold, 1913, p.291). The snowy mountain ramparts, beyond any doubt, offered a strong natural protection to the valley, thereby impeding its subjugation by any foreign rule for centuries together. However, this natural impediment could hardly resist the arrival of Muslims who gradually formed a significant section of the medieval society of Kashmir in consequence to the expansion of Islam in the neighboring regions including Syria, Persia and Central Asia within the span of few centuries. The renowned historian, Tārā Chand affirms that:

> "The rise of Islam in the beginning of the seventh century and the unification of the Arab tribes under a centralized state gave tremendous impetus to the movement of expansion which was going on since pre-Islamic days. Muslim armies rapidly conquered Syria and Persia and began to hover on the outskirts of India. Muslim merchants immediately entered into the inheritance of Persian maritime trade, and Arab fleets began to scour the Indian seas" (Tara Chand, 1946, p.31).

The whole of the northern India was under the control of Muslim empire (represented by various ruling dynasties) towards the beginning of thirteenth century. Unfortunately, the classical Sanskrit literature of Kashmir remains almost silent, keeping in obscurity the changing religio-political scenario in the adjoining territories of Kashmir (mainly Northern India and Central Asia) and its impact on the valley, which is an essential factor for gaining a proper understanding of the emergence of Islam/Muslims in Kashmir. The only direct source of available information regarding the ancient Kashmir is the

Rājātaranginī of Kalhānā that covers history of Kashmir from the earliest times till 1149-50 C.E. Aurel Stein, the English translator of this historical Sanskrit source also laments on the failure of Kalhānā to provide a lucid and detailed information of the vividly changing political and religious milieu of the adjacent areas of Kashmir and its impact on the Kashmiri society, though isolated politically and geographically, yet closely involved with them, through the longstanding social and commercial relations[1] (Bukhārī, 2013, pp.10-18 and Bamzai, 2009). During 8th century, the Arab Muslims (travellers, traders, preachers) reached Sind and Hind and some historical sources allude to the presence of Muslims in Kashmir in this period[2] (Nadwī, 1976 and Abdullah, 2009, p.4).

Rise of Islam in Sind / Hind[3] and its Impact on Kashmir

Following the establishment of Caliphate/*Khilafah* in the whole of Arabia, a series of Muslim expeditions were dispatched towards Sind and Hind (modern Indo-Pak subcontinent and some parts of Afghanistan) which is evedent from the earliest historical sources (Balādhurī, Vol.II, p.209), like the *ChachNāmah*[4] (Kūfī,1979, p.ii) and *Kitāb Futūḥ al-Buldān*of al-Balādhurī. In the beginning of 8th Century C.E., Imād al-Dīn Muḥammad bin Qāsim, was sent out by the '*Umawī* governor of Iraq, Ḥajjāj bin Yūsuf, at the bidding of the*Umawī Khalīfah* Walīd-I to lead the Muslim army against Rājā Dāhir of Sind[5] (Kūfī, 1979, 9.ii and Abdullah, p.6), who had succeeded his father, Chach Brahman, the ruler of Hindu Sāhasī Kingdom (Kūfī, pp.57-195; Bhaṭṭī, 2002 and Elliot and Dowson, 1867, Vol. I, pp.131-207). In the year 93 A.H. or 711 C.E. Rājā Dāhir met his death in a fierce assault with Muslim army lead by Muḥammad bin Qāsim (Kūfī, pp.142-144 and Balādhurī, p.220). "When Dāhir was killed Muḥammad bin Qāsim was in complete control of the country as-Sind" maintains Balādhurī (Balādhurī, p.220).

Muḥammad bin Qāsim annexed a vast territory including Dībal and Nirūn or modern Hyderabad, Multān and Bātiah near Bahāwalpūr, Alor (capital of Dāhir's kingdom), Brahminābād or Manṣūrāh, Askalandah or modern Uch, and proceeded to the frontiers of Kashmir called as *PanjNāhiyāt*, present at the upper course of river Jhelum (Kūfī, 1979, pp.193-194; Balādhurī, pp.220-223 and Ibn-i Khaldūn, Vol. II, pp.624-625). However, he could not make further conquests as he was recalled by *Khalīfah* Sulaymān (who had succeeded Walid-I) and got him killed, and the danger on Kashmir was precluded[6] ('Ali,1916, pp.121-122; Balādhurī, p.224 and Ibn-i Khaldūn, p.633). In the reign of '*Umawī Khalīfah* Hishām, the ambitious governor of Sind, Al-Junayd lead an expedition against the frontiers of Kashmir, but was deterred back successfully by Lalitādityā (724-60 C.E.), the then ruler of Kashmir, thereby making an end of further Muslim expeditions on Kashmir[7] (Balādhurī, pp.230-231 and Kalhānā, 1900, Vol. I, p.124). Still the regular threat of the advancing Muslim army persisted on Kashmir, as its adjoining territories including the Central Asia had come under the Muslim subjugation by the end of 8th century C.E., (Gibb, 1923) together with firm establishment of Islam in its western and northern territories i.e. the Hindu Sāhasī kingdom[8] (Bamzai, p.3) respectively, in the beginning of 11th Century C.E. by the Ghaznavids. (*Ghaznawī's*) (Farishta, 1981, p.19; Ibn-i Khaldūn, p.672; Balādhurī, pp-226-238; Kalhānā, Vol.I, pp.106,108; Wani, 2004, p.44 and Bamzai, p-211). In this context in the year 1003 C.E., Abū al-Qāsim Maḥmūd Ghaznī, defeated Rāja Jaipāl, the ruler of Waihund (one of the

principalities of Hindu Sāhī kingdom) and later on, his grandson Anand Pāl felt too fragile to withstand Maḥmūd's strong armed legion, sought Sangrāmarājā's (the then ruler of Kashmir –1003-1028 C.E.) help, who sent a big armed contingent for his support under the command of his the prime minister Tungā. But this armed coalition could not hold for long against Sultān Maḥmūd after facing him in a valley near Jhelum and got defeated ultimately in 1014 C.E., (Ibn-i Khaldūn, p.685; Kalhānā,Vol. I, pp.270-71; Farsihta, p.32; Hasan, pp.44,45 and Fawq, 2011, p.256f) as Stein signifies (in his introduction to *Rājātaranginī*) that "Mahmūd seems to have won his victory in one of the valleys which lead from the region about Jhelum, towards Kashmir… and some chiefs of confines of Kashmir are said to have made their submission to the Sultān in consequence of his victory"[9] (Kalhanā, 1900, pp.271-73).

Aggravated by Sangrāmārājā's conduct Maḥmūd decided to advance towards Kashmir again in 1016 C.E.[10] via Tosamaidān pass (crossed by most direct path between Pūnch and Srinagar and leads to Lahore) and reached a fort known as LohKote. Some chroniclers like GhulāmNabī Khānyārī (*Wajīz al-Tawārīkh*) have maintained that Sultān Maḥmūd was warmly welcomed by Sangrāmarājā and stayed there for one month and also accounts of the presence of Muslims in Kashmir at that time[11] (Farsihta, pp.32-33; Stein, pp.106,108; Hasan, pp.44,45; Fawq, p.256f; Bukhārī, 2013, pp.36-44; Khānyārī, 2006, p.72f).

Apart from the developments of the Muslim rule, the Muslim presence in Hind and Sind had already been expedited by the age-old Indo-Arab trade/business relations especially in the coastal area. Muslim traders, adventurers, preachers and travellers used to visit India and explore the country long before the Muslim rule was established there (Mubārakpūrī, 1965; Nadwī, 1976, p.6; Anjum, 2007, pp.217-240; Tara Chand, p.30. Arnold, pp.254-93 and Nadwī, 1966, pp.30-39). Many Muslims had established permanent settlements especially in the coastal regions and were instrumental in propagating Islam among the Indian masses. Both these developments i.e., the early presence of Muslim preachers, traders/travellers and the establishment of Muslim rule in Hind and Sind, would have plausibly facilitated the entrance of Muslim seers, travellers and traders into the valley. As such, the impact of the presence and influx of Muslims in Hind and Sind cannot be relegated as an insignificant event while dealing with the emergence of Islam and Muslims in Kashmir.

Muslim Diffusion in Kashmir: Locating The Earliest Traces

The natural impediments offered to the (foreign) Muslim army by the snowy mountain ramparts, made Kashmir, by the end of the 13th century C.E., the only contiguous region of Central Asia and Northern India that was spared to carry on with its local non-Muslim political governance for next more than a century. (Freguson, 2009, p.21 and Wani, 2004, p.44). However, these natural impediments could not intercept the gradual and persistent diffusion of Muslims, which had begun near about 8th century C.E. This early Muslim penetration into the valley resulted (as a necessary outcome) of the longstanding social, cultural and commercial intercourse (Warikoo, 1989, pp.55-121) of the valley with the adjoining areas (particularly from the south), "where Islam had spread [long before its large scale diffusion in Kashmir] irresistibly through the whole of the

Indian plains" (Kalhānā, p.130f; Khānyārī, 2006, p.36).

Hindu-Buddhist Rulers and Muslims Immigrants

Reliable traditional sources lend sufficient evidences supporting, the diffusion of Muslims in Kashmir since 8th century C.E. To quote *ChachNāmah*, a fugitive Arab chief of Banū Asāmah tribe namely Muḥammad Alāfī having entered the service of Rājā Dāhir[12] (Wani, 2004, fn.6, p.45 and Sufi, 2008, p.76) and later on his son Jaysiah, as a reliable adviser, in the beginning of 8th century C.E., sought refuge in Kashmir along with his five hundred men, following Jaysiyāh's defeat from the advancing Muslim warriors lead by Muḥammad bin Qāsim, during his expedition on Sind (Kūfī,1979, pp.56,110-111,152-55,160). The then ruler of Kashmir, Chandrāpīda, paid due respect and regard to Alāfī (Kalhānā, 1900, p.88.) as, after the death of Dāhir, his son Jaysiyāh had embarked on preparations at Brahminābād for a war against the Muslim army lead by Muḥammad bin Qāsim (Kūfī, 1979, p.156). *ChachNāmah*, the contemporary chronicle of the event, relates that; [After separating from Jaysiyāh and reaching at a particular place named Rawistan, Alāfī]

> "… wrote letters to the king of Kashmīr, whose capital was situated further up in the midst of hills, protesting his sincerity, and praying for a refuge. The Rānā of Kashmīr, after reading the letters, ordered one of the towns, in the skirts of Kashmīr, known by the name of Shakalbār to be granted to Alāfī. Later on Alāfī paid a visit to the Rānā , the latter … sent him back with honor and éclat to the land assigned to him, which was situated in a valley. After some time Alāfī died at Shakalbār and was succeeded by Jehm son of Samah, and his line survives up to this time. He built many mosques and enjoyed great respect and dignity at the Kashmīr court" (Kūfī, 1979, p.160).

The concluding part of this authentic report offers a vivid and decisive statement regarding the presence of Muslims in Kashmir during Chandrāpida's rule (713 and 720 C.E.), who has been highly eulogized by Kalhānā for his being a just ruler with much for bearance and enough valor and thus calls him "crest-jewel among the kings" (Kalhānā, 1900, pp.124-130). And as such, the religious freedom he vouchsafed on the Muslims, (like building of Mosques, as proved from the contemporary Arab chronicle, the *ChachNāmah*) hamper to conceive any kind of skeptic idea, regarding the Muslim presence in Kashmir, almost six centuries before the establishment of Muslim Sultanate in Kashmir.

Though Kalhānā's silence/reticence regarding the presence of Muslims in the valley before 13th century is apparent throughout his classical chronicle *Rājātaranginī*, which is unfortunately, the only extant local source of information (from the earliest times up to 1149 C.E.) about ancient Kashmir (Bukhārī, 2013, p.15f), yet, Kalhānā corroborates this fact while he contemptuously introduces, as per him, the "sinful king and sensuous ruler" named as Vajrādityā or Bappiyākā or Lalitādityā (763-770 C.E.), who "sold many men to *Mlecchās*,[13] and introduced in the country practices which befitted the *Mlecchās"* (Kalhānā, 1900, p.158). The term *Mlecchās* in all probability refer to none other than "Muslim" traders, adventurers and administrative members of ruling Muslim dynasties, who had already made their settlements in the nearby conquered provinces of Kashmir i.e. Sind[14] (Tara Chand, 1946, pp.29-34,55; Tanvir Anjum, 2007, p.224) and since then, Muslim forces had been continuously involved in maintaining a strain of expeditions via

the borders of Kashmir. Obviously its necessary socio-political implications on Kashmir would have made the flow of Muslims, essentially possible, in the valley, though at a small scale during this period. Vajrādityā, thus, adjusted his foreign policy in accordance with the social, political and religious vicissitudes of the surrounding regions, for the welfare of his country, granted the Muslims with the freedom of practicing and preaching their religion as is evident by his selling of "many men to *Mlecchās*" (means he allowed people to accept Islam) or more closely, introduced such practices, as in the words of Kalhana, "which befitted the *Mlecchās*". The early presence of these *Mlecchās* (or Muslims) in the valley during 8th century C.E., could be vindicated only on the ground that Muslims from the adjoining areas had immigrated in the valley and by practicing their faith, in all probability had managed to earn the peaceful conversions , though at a small scale to start with.

However, due to the emergence and subsequent high-speed influx of the Muslim forces and immigrants mainly after Ghaznī's expeditions[15] in India (though abortive on Kashmir) in the beginning of 11th century C.E., as related above, the Hindu rulers of Kashmir reinforced the security check at the mountain passes, that were serving as gates or "*dhakkās*" or "*drangās*"for the valley and as per Al-Bīrūnī: "In former times they used to allow one or two foreigners to enter their country [Kashmir], particularly the Jews, but at present they do not allow even a Hindu whom they did not know personally to enter, much less other people" (Al-Bīrūnī, 1910, Vol.I, p.206).

The watch-stations primarily offered the surveillance of the entrances and secondarily served as spots for collecting the customs revenue (provided the continuation of the inter-territorial trade), thereby impeding the movement of immigrants, though temporarily, particularly after the mid of 11th century C.E.[16] Owing to the political vicissitudes of the neighboring territories, the strategy of fastening the gateways for the protection measures of the valley could not hold on for a longer period and turned out to be provisional in action (Kalhānā, 1900, Vol. II, p.64). The aggrandizement of the Muslim population in the surroundings of Kashmir and its immediate impact on the internal affairs of the valley, demanded from the rulers to establish cordial relations with the Muslim rulers of the adjoining territories, to avoid any kind of political calamity. Consequently, the relieving of security check on the border gateways resulted in the rapid streaming of Muslims into the valley which is corroborated by the fact that the Muslim cavalry was employed[17] in the service of both the local rulers and their rivals as in case of Anantā (1028-63 C.E.) who was attacked by, one of his rivals, namely, Acālamangalā (from Dardistān) and his allies "*Mlecchā* princes". But the king with the help of the Sāhī prince, Rudrāpalā[18] managed to put a setback on this expedition (Kalhāṇā, 1900, Vol. I, p.281). Stein argues that the term "*Mlecchās"* most probably referred to the Muḥammadan [Muslim] tribesmen who had already made their settlements in the Indus valley (Kalhānā, 1900, Vol. I, p.109).

Following this period, Kalhānā again refers to the "*Mlecchās*" while elucidating king Harshā's (1089-1101 C.E.), persecution of *Dāmarās* or feudal land holders, belonging mostly to the tribal division of the *Lavanyās* (preserved in the modern caste or *Krām* of *Lōn*), of whom many "fled in all directions" and "some of them ate cow's meat in the lands of *Mlecchās*" (Kalhānā, 1900, Vol. I, p.364.). As eating of beef is unlawful in

Hinduism and lawful among Muslims, the eating of beef by the *Lavanyās* can be justified either on the assumption of their conversion to Islam, or, their assimilation of some Muslim traits[19] signifying that the term refers strictly to none other than the Muslims (Kalahānā, 1900,Vol. II and also, See note on Verses 2762-64, p.217). The verity of early Muslim settlements in Kashmir is further substantiated; when Kalhānā disparagingly calls Harshā the "*Turuska king*" following his iconoclastic activities[20] and also accounts of the employment of Muslim armies or "… *Turuska* captains of hundreds …" in his service (Kalahānā, 1900, Vol.I, p.357).

The influence of Islamic culture on Kashmir could be gauged from Harshā's reign (1089-1101 C.E.), when he imitated the Muslim (regimes of the neighboring areas) in maintaining a splendid court, introducing gold coins and employing *Turuskas* or Muslim army (Turks) for training his army (Kalahānā, 1900, Vol. I, pp.326-333). Further, during Jayāsimhā's reign (1128-49 C.E.) Bhōjā, the ambitious son of Harshā , lead an attack from the north[21] to demand the kingship, he was allied with "the chiefs of *Mlecchas*" and the Dard army (Kalahānā,, 1900, p.91). This recruitment of Muslim forces, or *Turūskās* in the army of King Harshā and the subsequent rulers and claimants of the throne, including, Bhojā, Bhiksācārā (1120-21 C.E.) and Jayāsimhā (1128-49 C.E.), to subdue their rivals,[22] offers an indisputable validity of the presence of Muslims, (having variable denomination) with significant importance in the state affairs of Kashmir, almost two centuries prior to the establishment of Muslim Sultanate.

To substantiate this fact, one among the modern day Kashmiri historians, M.A.Wānī, deciphering the scattered evidences in the earliest known chronicle of Kashmir i.e. *Rājātaranginī*, reveals that the employment of Muslims at "high positions" in the government's "sensitive wing, namely military" alludes the presence of Muslims in the concluding years of eleventh century in an incredible number"[23] (Kalhānā, 1900, note on verses 2762-64, Vol. I, p.281, Vol. II, pp.70, 175; Wani, 2004, p.49f). Wānī maintains that,

> "The number [of Muslims]further increased with the passage of time when civil wars became rampant in Kashmir and the Kashmiri rulers and the rival claimants to the throne became more and more dependent upon the support of the Muslims [who were best experts in warfare than the local forces] … and this is why the rulers as well as the rival factions [*Dāmarās*] constantly sought and received the support of the neighboring Muslim rulers … it is quit natural to presume that these Muslim captains [employed constantly by the local Hindu rulers and other Muslim settlers] would have either brought their families along with them or married local girls, both pointing to the presence of larger Muslim population in Kashmir than is adumbrated in Kalhana's *Rājtarangini*" (Wani, 2004, p.49f).

Hence, the unremitting involvement of Muslims or *Turūskās* of Kalhānā, in the military affairs of the Kashmir province since 11th century onwards[24] demystify the fact that, the Muslims had interspersed profusely with considerable significance in the society of Kashmir and had made permanent settlements there, well before the official establishment of Muslim Sultanate in 14th century. This view further gets substantiated while considering the long-standing socio-commercial relations between Kashmir and its neighboring Muslim provinces mainly the Persia and Central Asia,[25] from where both the traders as well as mercenaries enjoyed free access to Kashmir (since 10th/11thcentury). The

firm establishment of Muslim rule in the frontier regions of Kashmir after 11th century and the simultaneous disturbance in the local administration of Kashmir, would have inevitably expedited the influx and subsequent settlements of the Muslim traders in the valley, (Kalhānā, 1900, Vol. I, p.311; Bamzai, 2009, p.211ff andWarikoo, 1989, p.90) as Kalhānā relates of Sussālā (1112-1120 C.E.) that, "being fond of new works, and of possessing many horses, the artisans and foreign horse-dealers grew rich under him" (Kalhānā, 1900, Vol. II, p.40). Not only he, but his predecessors like Anantā (1028-63 C.E.) and Uccalā (1101-11 C.E.) also had great obsession for horses, such that the horse-trainers enjoyed great munificence and made plentiful riches from them. Interestingly, Central Asia was known for its horse trade, which was counted among first-rate trades during this period and Central Asian Muslims used to visit Kashmir frequently for such trade activities as the "horses were another lucrative item [in addition other items] of import, mostly from Central Asia and Afghanistan" (Kalhānā,1900, Vol. II,p.7; Kapur, 1922, p.137). Similarly Kashmiri traders also managed to make huge profits via exporting precious items (like Saffron) to these adjoining countries. To make it more explicable, it can be held that the geographical location of Kashmir has been, since ancient times, responsible for its excessive promotion of business and trade ventures with its surroundings as Kashmir "stands on the old Central Asian trade route and … has, since ancient times, been the halting place of the caravans travelling between the plains of India and the high reaches of Central Asia" (Bamzai, 1994, p.2).

Accounts of Al-Bīrūnī and Marco Polo

Abū Rayḥān Muḥammad bin al-Bīrūnī (973-1048 C.E.), the 11th century Persian polymath, has provided vital information regarding the social, religious, commercial and geographical aspects of Kashmir in his, *Kitāb al-Hind*,[26] which is mainly based on his personal investigation and observation, as he maintains that " the people of Kashmir, with whom I have conversed on the subject [of celebration of some particular festival in Kashmir during his times]" (Al Bīrūnī, 1910, Vol. II, p.181) and acknowledges that Kashmir has been a seat of high learning along with Varanasi throughout the then Indo-Pak subcontinent, consequently attracting scholars from farthest places to quench their academic thirst (Al Bīrūnī, 1910,Vol. I, p.173). Further, Al-Bīrūnī confirms the subsistence of commercial links between Muslim traders of nearby territories and the Kashmir before mid-11th century C.E., while delineating the frontiers of India, he gives an account of Rājāwarī or modern Rajaurī in Kashmir, that it is the "farthest place to which our merchants trade" (Al Bīrūnī,1910, p.208) and accordingly this commercial link would have become more stronger with the expansion of Muslims dominions along the periphery of Kashmir.

Furthermore, the unequivocal evidences offered by the Venetian traveler, Marco Polo, regarding the early Muslim presence in Kashmir, demands the ungrudging appreciation of the fact that by the end of 13th century C.E., a sizeable Muslim population had established permanently in Kashmir and going on with local tune, formed a significant part (denomination) of the society, as the venetian traveler puts it: "The people of the province [Kashmir] do not kill animals, nor spill blood, so if they want to eat meat they get the *Saracens* [Muslims or *Mlecchas* of Kalhānā] who dwell among them to play

the butcher"(Yule,1914, Vol. I, p.167). Thus, by means of the social, economic and political affairs, Kashmir valley, from ancient times, continued to foster, its linkage with its Muslim ruled neighboring countries, especially the Central Asia, consequently imbibing the religio-cultural tint of these areas amidst the inescapable environment of interactions among the populace of these region (Bukhārī, 2013, pp.53-61; Bamzai, 1994, pp.23-43; Kapoor, 1922, p.137 and Kaw, 2010), Vol. 17, No: 2 and 3, p.7).

The above description of the first hand evidences from Al-Bīrūnī, advocates the interlinking of Kashmir via social, commercial, educational and political ties with its adjacent neighbours, where Islam/Muslims had already made a profuse diffusion. Likewise, Marco Polo brings forth that the *Saracens* (of Marco Polo) or *Mlecchās* (of Kalhānā), designated as butchers, living permanently within the Kashmiri society, could have been either the local converts to Islam or the foreign Muslim immigrants and both these plausible inferences corroborate the presence of Muslim settlements, considerably, in Kashmir towards the end of thirteenth century.

Egalitarian Islam and Early Conversions in the Caste-Ridden Hindu-Buddhist Society

Another important dimension of the theme under study is to take into consideration the possibilities of conversions from the medieval Hindu-Buddhist Kashmiri society. It is an undeniable fact that the medieval society of Kashmir highly endorsed caste-system that ensured a sound fortune for upper classes or castes at the cost of the lower castes. Islam with its lofty, universal and egalitarian principles brought to the then Kashmiri society by travellers, adventurers, traders and preachers would have plausibly fascinated and received the attention of people especially the lower castes (who would have accepted it to ensure for them a dignified and respectable status in the society). Herbert Risley pertinently argues:

> "Islam … is in every respect the antithesis of Hinduism. Its ideal is strenuous action rather than hypnotic … On its social side the religion of [Prophet] Muḥammad [pbuh] is equally opposed to the Hindu scheme of a hierarchy of castes, an elaborate stratification of society based upon subtle distinctions of food, drink, dress, marriage and ceremonial usage. In the sight of God and His Prophet all followers of Islam are equal" (Risley and Crooke, London, 1915, p.121).

Since, Islam believes in egalitarianism/equality of all (in being human) and confers upon every believer an equal status in the society unlike Hinduism, where the caste system, categorizes the people into upper/privileged and lower/underprivileged grades within the society, leading to exploitation of the later class/caste. So, it is quite explicable that people belonging to such lower castes or denominations, including the butcher class, might had come under the sway of the lucid, clear, loft and egalitarian teachings of Islam and having accepted it, enjoyed an elevated social status, which is manifested (even in the current day Kashmiri society) in their subsequent adoption of prestigious *Krāms* or surnames[27] (Lawrence, 2011, pp.302-19; Wani, 2004, p.53; Risely, 1915, p.247 f and Fawq, 1934).

Given the uncontested authenticity of above facts, it, therefore, becomes plausible, that by the end of thirteenth century (C.E.), when whole of the Northern India had come under the sway of Islam (Tara Chand, 1946, p.135), Muslims of varied

denominations including mercenaries, traders, adventurers, artisans, proselytizers and the converted sections etc. had established their settlements within the mountainous abode of Kashmir.[28] The early Muslim settlements, though small, "formed a core of Muslim settlers in Kashmir" much before the installation of Muslim Sultanate in 1339 C.E. (Rizvi, 1997, p.289).

During 1320s Rinchana, the Buddhist ruler accepted Islam at the hands of Sayyid 'Abd al-Raḥmān popularly known as Bulbul Shah and later on, in 1339 Shah Mir, an immigrant from Swat, having installed himself fully in the state-apparatus through his skill of state-craft, ascended the throne as the Sultan of the valley thereby initiating the Muslim Sultanate that ended only with its annexation by the Mughals during the second half of 16th century. Meanwhile, enormous number of Muslim Sufis/preachers (especially from Central Asia/Iran) including the renowned Mir Sayyid 'Ali Hamadani entitled as *Amir Kabir* or *Shah-i Hamadan* reached Kashmir and spread Islam to its every nook and corner, thereby playing an important role in the process of transition of Kashmir from a Hindu-Buddhist dominated to Muslim majority region within a span of few centuries.

Conclusion

The mountain ramparts as natural impediments though barred the Muslim conquerors from establishing their full-fledged command over the valley, yet they failed to check the gradual and peaceful emergence of Muslims into the medieval Kashmiri society. The arrival and peaceful sustenance of Muslims in such an ardent Hindu/Buddhist society of medieval Kashmir signifies towards the persistence of a purposeful inter-religious, commercial and intellectual intercourse among diverse religious and cultural denominations during medieval era. By means of this, the current study amply brings to limelight the tolerant and peaceful environment of the medieval Kashmiri society engrossing diverse cultures, religions and ethnicities. Moreover, the pluralistic and accommodative nature of the medieval Kashmiri state is revealed through its munificence towards Muslim migrants (from Central Asia etc.), through their engagement in mercenaries and as high royal posts along with the liberty of practicing and preaching their religion.

The engagement of not only the religious but state bureaucracy with Muslim (Sufi) scholars in religious and intellectual discussions depicts the persistence of an academically and intellectually serene environment that nurtured inter-faith dialogue for inter-religious understanding.

To sum up, the study amply reveals that Muslims had made their permanent presence in Kashmir during the early medieval period and were living as a significant section of the society engaged in the social, cultural, political and religious milieu of the valley.

Notes

1. See, the introduction to the earliest Sanskrit Chronicle of Kings of Kashmir written in 1149-50 C.E. by Kalhānā Panditā, Known as *Rājātaranginī*, which keeps the history of Kashmir from earliest times up to 1150 C.E. This has been translated with introduction, commentary and Appendices by M. Aurel Stein. Also see, Kalhānā, *Rājātaranginī*, Eng.tr., M. A. Stein, (Westminster, 1900), Vol.I, pp.107-108; This work of Kalhānā was later on extended after two

centuries by Jōnā Rājā, who added to it the events from 1150-1459 C.E. and himself being an eyewitness to the changing circumstances between 1389-1459 C.E. Notwithstanding his silence regarding the illustrious Sufis like Mīr Sayyid 'Alī Hamadānī, LalDed, and Shaykh Nūr al-Dīn Walī, he has provided an account of his contemporary Sufi Mīr Muḥammad Hamadānī son of Mīr Sayyid 'Alī Hamdānī and his relations with SultānSikandar (1389-1413 C.E.) . This work was further carried on by Srivārā, a pupil of Jōnā Rājā, who continued to write the account of the Sultāns of Kashmir and named it *ZaynāRājātaranginī*. Being a friend of SultānZayn al-'Ābidīn the author accounts of Sultān's reign between 1459-1470 C.E., besides giving details of Sultan Ḥydar Shāh (1470-72 C.E.) and Ḥasan Shāh (1472-84 C.E.). This way he was able to compile the history of the Sultans from 1472-1486 C.E.

2. Sind included modern day Pakistan, India, Kashmir and a major portion of Afghanistan. To the Arabs the entire area from the Arabian Sea to the mountains of Kashmir constituted Hind and Sind.
3. For the medieval Arab geographers/travellers and historians Hind and Sind were two separate countries including the regions of modern-day Indo-Pak subcontinent .
4. 'Alī bin Muḥammad Kūfī's *ChachNāmah* is the Persian translation of an Arabic Manuscript named as *Tārīkh-i Hind Wa Sindḫ* written by some unknown person and a contemporary of Muḥammad bin Qāsim, and thus serves as one of the earliest extant historical sources. It was rendered into Persian in 1216 C.E., during the time of 'Amīr Qubācha, the then ruler of Sind. From Persian it has been translated into English by MirzaKalichbegFredunbeg.
5. Before Muḥammad bin Qāsim's arrival, Sind, together with the northern India, was ruled by Rājpūts. The last ruler from this race was Rājā Sahāsī II, whose area of dominance reached up to Kashmir and having professed Buddhism like his father, died in 632 C.E., leaving the kingdom in the hands of a chamberlain namely, Chach, a *Brahman* and a favorite of Sahāsī's wife. Chach Brahman, ruled for 68 years from 632 till 700 C.E. and in his time the Sāhasī Kingdom, extended on the East and West to Kashmir and Makrān. On the South to the shores of Dībal and on the North to the mountains of Kardan to Qayqān or extended between modern Afghanistan and Punjab. His dominion included the great cities like Multan, Sikka, Brahmāpur, Ashahar and Kumba together with the borders of Kashmir. Dāhir was Chach Brahman's son
6. The author of *TheChachNāmah* relates an incident in which the death of Muḥammad IbnQāsim, has been attributed to Al-Walīd.Kūfī, *op.cit.*, pp.193-94. But other sources record that actually, there was hostility between Sulaymān and Al-Ḥajjāj, for long time because of the latter's friendly relations with Walīd I, who wanted his son instead of Sulaymān to be the *Khalīfah*. On his death, Al-Walīd was succeeded by Sulaymān and reversed the policies of Al–Walīd. As a result of this, those who had been the devotees of Al-Walīd, came under persecution after Sulaymān's succession as *Khalīfah*. He not only deposed Muḥammad IbnQāsim, the son in law of Al-Hajjāj, but also ordered his execution.
7. MohibbulHasan, *Kashmir Under the Sultāns*, Hamid Naseem, (ed.), (Srinagar,2002), p.43; As per Balādhurī, in the reign of *'Abbasī Khalīfah*, Al-Manṣūr 754-775 C.E., his governor of Sind, HishāmIbn al-'Amr al-Taghlibī made a successful expedition towards Kashmir, yet no other local source validates this, but Stein substantiates the continuity of these ventures of Muslim forces on Kashmir during the 8th Century C.E. on the authority of annals of Tang dynasty, when he writes, that during the 8th Century C.E., Chandrāpida the then ruler of Kashmir, sought help from Chinese ruler against the Arab invasions, that continued from its northern territories.
8. Dardistan included, Swāt, Bunji,Hunza,Punial,Chitral, Hazara, Pakhli, Gilgit, Askardo, Chilas and Astor. The inhabitants of these territories are known as *Dards* and *Gilchās*.
9. See note on verses;47-69. Kalhanā is obscure on SultānMaḥmūd's advancements after this victory over Tunga and the Sanskrit terms *Turūskā* and *Hammīrā* (Sanskritized form of '*Amīr*) refer to the Muslim forces and Maḥmūd Ghaznawī respectively..
10. Historians are at variance regarding the 2nd expedition of Maḥmūd Ghaznawī, some argue its date as, 1016 C.E., while others record it as 1021 C.E.
11. Similarly Abū Sa'īd Gurdīzī in his *Zaynal-Akhyār*, argues of conversions and presence of Muslims in considerable size at the time of SultānMaḥmūd's visit to Kashmir, as cited by Bukhārī.

12. It has been erroneously recorded in *ChachNāmah* that Muḥammad Alāfī had killed one of the *Umawī* commanders namely 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Ash'ath (See Kūfī, *op.cit*., p.55), which is contradictory with its own report on p.67.cf. p.55, where in the killed person by Alāfī is recorded as Sa'īd ibnAslam, which as per Ibn-i Khaldūn seems correct. See, Ibn-i Khaldūn, *op.cit*., p.593. As per Ibn-i Khaldūn, 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Ash'ath was sent to take over Ratbayl ,who was governing the Turks, and later on Ibn 'Ash'ath revolted against the *Umawīs* and was deceptively killed by Ratbayl. See, IbnKhaldūn, *op.cit*., pp.592-93,601. On killing Sa'īd, who was deposed to Makrān, Alāfī joined Dāhir out of the governor Hajjāj's retribution. However, Alāfī refused to fight against 'Arab army and after Dāhir's death Alāfī was pardoned by Muḥammad ibnQāsim on behalf of Al–Hajjāj(See, Kūfī, p.128). Among the modern Historians of Kashmir both, M.A. Wani and G. M. D. Sufi, have accepted the same view while referring to *ChachNāmah*, bringing forth the same misconception, which needs a more critical and comparative evaluation.

13. Al Bīrūnī relates that the Hindus used the term *Mlecchā* contemptuously for any foreigner who slaughtered animals and ate cow's meat and usually the Arabs (Muslims) were called as *Mlecchās*(Al Bīrūnī, 1910, Vol.I, p.302, Vol. II, p.136). Throughout his chronicle the orthodox Brahman, Kalhānā has used this term for Muslims in Kashmir, giving vent to his biased feelings with this newly emerging eternal faith (Islam) in Kashmir.

14. Substantiating this proposition, Tara Chand accentuates the establishment of early Muslim settlements in India during 8th century C.E. and relates:[H]enceforth Muslims influence grew rapidly. For over a hundred years, the Muslims had been established on the Malabar Coast. They were welcomed as traders, and, apparently facilities were given to them to settle and acquire lands and openly practice their religion. They must have entered upon missionary efforts soon after settling down, for Islam is essentially a missionary religion and every Musalman is a missionary of his faith."Balādhurī relates of the conversion of even some rulers of Sind during the 2nd decade of 8th century (Balādhurī,1916, Vol. II, p.209-225 ff; Arnold,1913, p.254 ff; Ibn-i Khaldūn,2003, pp.51-74; Wani2004, p.47.Similarly, Balādhurī mentions of the ruler of 'Usayfān, a country between Kashmir and Multan, who had accepted Islam (Balādhurī, Vol. II,p.225).

15. While highlighting the impact of the ambitious endeavors of Sultān Maḥmūd Ghaznawī, M. L. Kapoor says that "the Islamic influence became much more marked. He gave refuge to a number of Sāhi princes who fled from the Punjab after its occupation by Mahmud of Ghazni"-(Kapur,1922, p.81).

16. One such watch-station was at Sūrpōrā or modern Hurpōrā, where the ruins of the great wall built in the reign of Avantīvarman–855-883 C.E., had been traced out by Stein in 1891 C.E. (Kalahānā, 1900*,* Vol. II, Note D III, p.291). During Harshā's reign Kalhānā's father Canpakā was made as in-charge of various important watch-stations (Kalahānā, 1900, Vol.I, p.361).

17. Muslim forces or "*Turūskās*" form the nearby areas of Kashmir, were highly skilled in warfare than the locals which is corroborated by the statement "*Until you have become acquainted with the Turūskā warfare, you should post yourself on the scarp of this hill, [keeping] idle against your desire*". This statement was addressed by Trilocanapālā, to the local army chief, Tungā on facing Maḥmūd Ghaznawī's army, See, Kalahānā, *op.cit*., Vol. I,p.270ff. Kalhānā relates, "*in the morning then came in fury and in full battle array the leader of the Turuskā army himself, skilled in stratagem*"(Kalahānā, 1900.,Vol.I, p.270ff).

18. During SultānMaḥmūd's expedition on Sāhī kingdom, that extended from modern Afganistan to Punjab, several Sāhī princes including Rudrāpāla, Anangāpālā and Diddāpālā sought refuge in Kashmir and also exercised great influence there. See, Kalahānā, *op.cit*., Vol. I, p.279ff. Al-Bīrūnī relates of this period that, "*the Hindu Shāhiya [Sāhi] dynasty is now extinct, and of the whole house there is no longer the slightest remnant in existence*" (Al-Bīrūnī, 1910*,* Vol. II, p.13).

19. Literally the Sanskrit term *Mlecchā* refers to the foreigners with different religious and cultural identities. However it has been proved earlier that Kalhānā by this term refers to Muslims.

20. Some scholars are of the view that he did so, to meet his fiscal demands out of the costly idols and others suggest his bent towards Islam, on the basis of his employing their army in his service. However, this contention also seems implausible when he is related to have been accustomed of

some immodest habits utterly unbecoming of a Muslim (Kalahānā, 190, Vol.I, p.353).

21. This region was called as Dardistān, a union of small territories bordering the northern frontiers of Kashmir and included Swat, Pakhli, Hazara, Askardo,Chilas and Astor (Wani, 2004, p.45).
22. Harshā's son Bhōjā, who at the support of Dāradā army [inhabiting the North zones of Kashmir like Gilgit, Hazara or shortly called as Dardistān, where Islam had made its considerable presence already] and *Mlecchā* (Muslim) chiefs launched an attack on Kashmir from the North [Dardistān], to claim the crown, during Jayāsimhā's reing-1128-1149 C.E. Kalhānā relates that such was the impact of the army on the locals that, "*The people feared that the territory invaded by the Turuskas (Muslim armies) has fallen [altogether] into their power and thought that the whole country was overrun by the Mlecchas*" (Kalahānā, 1900, Vol. II, p.224). Further Stein maintains that *"if stress can be laid on the term Mleccha, we should have to conclude that the conversion of the Darad tribes on the Indus from Buddhism to Islam had already made great progress in the twelfth century*", (Kalahānā, 1900, Vol. II. See note on Verses 2762-64, p.217and Vol. I, p.281.Bhiksācārā (1120-21 C.E.) the grandson of Harshā, also sought the aid of Muslim forces against his rival Sussālā, who had took refuge in Lohārā at that time. See, Kalhānā, *op.cit*., Vol. II, p.70. The presence of *Yavanās* in the reign of Jayāsimhā, again, as per Stein, refer to Muslims. (Kalahānā, 1900, Vol. II, p.175).
23. In the modern Kashmir, a place named to be as *Malchimār*, situated on the right bank of river Jhelum, has been called as *MlechMār* or place of *Mlecchās*, in the early times. Since the *Mlecchās* were not initially provided with any social recognition and therefore, could have inhabited a separate area for enjoying and sustaining their own social environment (Wani, 2004,p.50).
24. As per the 19th century traveler, Sir Walter Lawrence, during the period 1110 to 1149 C.E., "*when Kalhānā Pandit ends his history, there was little else than civil war, and the Dāmarās [or local feudal lords], 'well-skilled in burning, plundering and fighting,' were a terror to the country. Central authority was at an end, and the kings seemed to grow more helpless and incapable*" (Lawrence,2011,p.189).
25. Kalhānā depicts various instances of social and economic intercourse with the Muslims or *Turūskās*during Kalāsā's tenure–1063-89 C.E., like, he refers to the service offered by a *Turūskā* or Muslim artisan (probably from Central Asia) to Kalāsā, and the former enjoyed the king's royal hospitality for several days (Kalhānā, 1900,Vol.I, pp.301-311).
26. This book, a unique piece in Arabic literature was edited by E. Sachau and published first in 1887 C.E. and was rendered to English by the same German orientalist in 1888 C.E.
27. Herbert Risely argues of the temptation for a higher social status, among lower castes in Hindus, playing a very important role in conversion of lower castes to Islam in Hindu societies— Guy Wint, sketches a contrasting picture between Islam and Hinduism and says, "*Breathing from infancy the axioms of caste, Hindus accepted human inequality as a permanent and inexpugnable fact; Islam was a leveling religion with a passion for equality by which even its monarchs were periodically humbled.*" The interaction between these two cultures, many a times, turned out to be vice versa i.e … "*where Islam flourished the caste system weakened*" (Schuster and Wint, 1941, p.54f).
28. The Sanskrit chronicler Kalhānā in his *Rājātaranginī* records that due to the disturbed socio-political order of the state the entrance ways were rarely secured and people were almost free to go in and out of the Valley(Kalhānā, 1900, Vol. I, and Vol. II; Sayyid 'Alī, 2009, Introduction).

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